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Abstract 
 
In November 2018, The New York Times ran a front-page story describing how Facebook concealed 
knowledge and disclosure of Russian-linked activity and exploitation resulting in Kremlin led disruption 
of the 2016 and 2018 U.S. elections, through the use of global hate campaigns and propaganda warfare. 
By mid-December 2018, it became clear that the Russian efforts leading up to the 2016 U.S. elections 
were much more extensive than previously thought. Two studies conducted for the United States Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), by: (1) Oxford University’s Computational Propaganda Project 
and Graphika; and (2) New Knowledge, provide considerable new information and analysis about the 
Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) influence operations targeting American citizens. 
By early 2019 it became apparent that a number of influential and successful high-growth social media 
platforms had been used by nation states for propaganda purposes. Over two years earlier, Russia was 
called out by the U.S. intelligence community for their meddling with the 2016 American presidential 
elections. The extent to which prominent social media platforms have been used, either willingly or 
without their knowledge, by foreign powers continues to be investigated as this Article goes to press. 
Reporting by The New York Times suggests that it was not until the Facebook board meeting held 
September 6, 2017 that board audit committee chairman, Erskin Bowles, became aware of Facebook’s 
internal awareness of the extent to which Russian operatives had utilized the Facebook and Instagram 
platforms for influence campaigns in the United States. As this Article goes to press, the degree to which 
the allure of advertising revenues blinded Facebook to their complicit role in offering the highest bidder 
access to Facebook users is not yet fully known. This Article cannot be a complete chapter in the corporate 
governance challenge of managing, monitoring, and oversight of individual privacy issues and content 
integrity on prominent social media platforms. The full extent of Facebook’s experience is just now 
becoming known, with new revelations yet to come. All interested parties: Facebook users; shareholders; 
the board of directors at Facebook; government regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and Congress must now figure out 
what has transpired and what to do about it. These and other revelations have resulted in a crisis for 
Facebook. American democracy has been and continues to be under attack. This article contributes to the 
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I. OVERVIEW 
In November 2018, The New York Times ran a front-page story describing how 
Facebook concealed knowledge and disclosure of Russian-linked activity and 
exploitation resulting in Kremlin-led disruption of the 2016 U.S. elections, 
“broadcast [of] viral propaganda and inspir[ing] deadly campaigns of hate across the 
globe.”1 By mid-December 2018, it became clear that the Russian efforts leading up 
to the 2016 U.S. elections were much more extensive than previously thought. Two 
studies conducted for the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
(SSCI), by: (1) Oxford University’s Computational Propaganda Project and 
Graphika,2 and (2) New Knowledge,3 provide considerable new information and 
analysis about the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) influence operations 
targeting American citizens. 
By early 2019, it became apparent that a number of influential and successful 
high-growth social media platforms have been used by nation states for propaganda 
purposes. Over two years earlier, the U.S. intelligence community called out Russia 
for their meddling with the 2016 American presidential elections.4 The extent to 
which prominent social media platforms have been used either willingly or without 
their knowledge by foreign powers continue to be investigated. Reporting by The 
New York Times suggests that it wasn’t until the Facebook board meeting held 
September 6, 2017 that board audit committee chairman, Erskin Bowles, became 
aware of Facebook’s internal awareness of the extent to which Russian operatives 
had used the Facebook and Instagram platforms to influence campaigns in the United 
States.5 As this Article goes to press, the degree to which the allure of advertising 
revenues blinded Facebook to their complicit role in offering the highest bidder 
access to Facebook users is not yet fully known. This Article will not be a complete 
chapter in the corporate governance challenge of managing, monitoring, and 
oversight of individual privacy issues and content integrity of prominent social 
media platforms. The full extent of Facebook’s experience is just now becoming 
known, with new revelations yet to come. All interested parties—Facebook users; 
                                                          
1 Sheera Frenkel et al., Delay, Deny, Deflect: How Facebook Leaders Leaned Out in Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2018, at A1. 
2 Philip N. Howard et al., The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 
2012–2018 (U. of Oxford Computational Propaganda Res. Project, Working Paper No. 2018.2, 2018). 
3 Renee DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency, NEW KNOWLEDGE 
(2018), https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformation-report/NewKnowledge-
Disinformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf. 
4 Elias Groll, United States Accuses Russia of Using Hacking to Meddle in Election, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Oct. 7, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/07/united-states-accuses-russia-of-using-
hacking-to-meddle-in-election/. 
5 See Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
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shareholders; the board of directors at Facebook; government regulatory agencies 
such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC); and Congress—must now figure out what has transpired and 
what to do about it. These and other revelations have resulted in a crisis for Facebook, 
the leading global social media platform. American democracy has been and 
continues to be under attack. As revelations of growing concern about Facebook’s 
systematic lax privacy practices cascaded during the first half of 2019, the author’s 
challenge has been to constantly edit and discard text of less value. An attempt to 
provide a roadmap for those readers desiring a deeper dive into various topics is 
offered in footnotes. This manuscript contributes to the literature about national 
security, privacy, and social media by providing background and an account of what 
is known about Facebook’s privacy crisis and posits recommendations for corrective 
action. 
This Article proceeds as follows: First, is a brief description of Facebook’s 
business. Second, an overview of the duties and responsibilities of corporate 
directors is presented. Third, is a description of Facebook’s corporate governance 
scheme. Fourth, is a look at how Facebook describes perceived risk factors. Fifth, a 
chronology of what is now known about Facebook’s privacy crisis is presented. 
Sixth, revelations about Facebook from the Mueller Report are explored. Seventh, 
depicts coverage of how Facebook’s privacy crisis escalates during 2018 and 2019. 
Eighth, I discuss several recommendations for corrective action. Ninth, Mark 
Zuckerberg’s strategy announcement of March 6, 2019 is presented, along with 
reaction and commentary from certain thought leaders. Tenth, a few observations 
about the current status of Facebook’s privacy crisis governance is presented. 
Finally, a brief conclusion. 
II. THE BUSINESS OF FACEBOOK 
Like their expanding user base, the data collected 
on Facebook users has also skyrocketed. They have 
moved on from schools, likes, and relationship status. 
Today, Facebook has access to dozens of data points, 
ranging from ads you’ve clicked on, events you’ve 
attended, and your location based on your mobile device. 
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It is no secret that Facebook makes money off this 
data through advertising revenue, although many seem 
confused by, or altogether unaware, of this fact. 
Facebook generated $40 billion in revenue in 2017, with 
about 98 percent coming from advertising across 
Facebook and Instagram. 
Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
April 10, 20186 
First, an overview of the business of Facebook, primarily as described in the 
company’s disclosure documents is pertinent. The genesis of the social media 
platform that would become Facebook has become well known from the popular 
movie The Social Network,7 based upon the bestselling book by Ben Mezrich.8 The 
creation of Facebook dates back to Mark Zuckerberg’s 2003 alcohol-enhanced 
Harvard dorm room all-nighter creation of Facemash.9 This involved the hacking and 
collecting of student pictures of females from various Harvard University databases, 
followed with a vote “on which one was hotter—then [to be] watched as some 
complex algorithms calculated who were the hottest . . . on campus.”10 Facemash 
had gone viral across the Harvard campus: “In under two hours, the site had already 
logged twenty-two thousand votes.”11 Just a few months later, after navigating 
disciplinary action from Harvard for improper database hacking and use of student 
pictures, Mark Zuckerberg’s efforts had produced Thefacebook.12 By early 2004, 
Thefacebook was gaining traction with a management team consisting of Mark 
Zuckerberg (founder and CEO), Eduardo Saverin (CFO), Dustin Moskovitz (VP 
programming) and Chris Hughes (director of PR).13 The entity now known as 
Facebook, Inc. (or, hereinafter “The Company”), was incorporated in Delaware in 
July 2004 and became publicly-traded by virtue of its initial public offering in May 
                                                          
6 Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary 
Comm. and S. Comm. on Comm., Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Sen. Chuck 
Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
7 THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010). 
8 BEN MEZRICH, THE ACCIDENTAL BILLIONAIRES: THE FOUNDING OF FACEBOOK (Anchor Books 
2009). 
9 Id. passim. 
10 Id. at 56. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 95. 
13 Id. at 118. 
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2012.14 Having its principal executive offices located at 1601 Willow Road, Menlo 
Park, California, the Company reported 43,030 full-time employees as of 
November 30, 2019.15 
A. Business 
Describing its mission as “to give people the power to build community and 
bring the world closer together,” according to Facebook, “[our] top priority is to build 
useful and engaging products that enable people to connect and share with friends 
and family through mobile devices, personal computers, and other surfaces.”16 In 
addition: 
We also help people discover and learn about what 
is going on in the world around them, enable people to 
share their opinions, ideas, photos and videos, and other 
activities with audiences ranging from their closest 
friends to the public at large, and stay connected 
everywhere by accessing our products, including: 
● Facebook. Facebook enables people to connect, 
share, discover, and communicate with each other 
on mobile devices and personal computers. There 
are a number of different ways to engage with 
people on Facebook, the most important of which is 
News Feed which displays an algorithmically-
ranked series of stories and advertisements 
individualized for each person. 
● Instagram. Instagram is a community for sharing 
visual stories through photos, videos, and direct 
messages. Instagram is also a place for people to 
stay connected with the interests and communities 
that they care about. 
● Messenger. Messenger is a messaging application 
that makes it easy for people to connect with other 
people, groups and businesses across a variety of 
platforms and devices. 
● WhatsApp. WhatsApp is a fast, simple, and reliable 
messaging application that is used by people around 
the world to connect securely and privately. 
                                                          
14 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter 2017 Form 10-K]; 
see also NIALL FERGUSON, THE SQUARE AND THE TOWER: NETWORKS AND POWER, FROM THE 
FREEMASONS TO FACEBOOK 352–59 (2018) (providing historical account of Facebook and networks 
development). 
15 Company Info, FACEBOOK, https://about.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (for 
employee count); Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Jan. 31, 2019) [hereinafter 2018 Form 
10-K] (for headquarters address). 
16 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 5. 
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● Oculus. Our Oculus virtual reality technology and 
content platform power products that allow people 
to enter a completely immersive and interactive 
environment to train, learn, play games, consume 
content, and connect with others. 
We generate substantially all of our revenue from 
selling advertising placements to marketers. Our ads 
enable marketers to reach people based on a variety of 
factors including age, gender, location, interests, and 
behaviors. Marketers purchase ads that can appear in 
multiple places including on Facebook, Instagram, 
Messenger, and third-party applications and websites. We 
are also investing in a number of longer-term initiatives, 
such as connectivity efforts, artificial intelligence 
research, and augmented and virtual reality, to develop 
technologies that we believe will help us better serve our 
communities and pursue our mission to give people the 
power to build community and bring the world closer 
together.17 
B. Competition 
Facebook discloses, “[o]ur business is characterized by innovation, rapid 
change, and disruptive technologies. We compete with companies that sell 
advertising, as well as with companies that provide social, media, and 
communication products and services that are designed to engage users on mobile 
devices and online.”18 In addition: 
We face significant competition in every aspect of 
our business, including from companies that facilitate 
communication and the sharing of content and 
information, companies that enable marketers to display 
advertising, companies that distribute video and other 
forms of media content, and companies that provide 
development platforms for applications developers. We 
compete to attract, engage, and retain people who use our 
products, to attract and retain marketers, and to attract and 
retain developers to build compelling mobile and web 
applications that integrate with our product. . . . 
As we introduce or acquire new products, as our 
existing products evolve, or as other companies introduce 
new products and services, we may become subject to 
additional competition.19 
                                                          
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
 
 
 
T H E  F A C E B O O K  P R I V A C Y  C R I S I S  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.234 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
III. GOVERNANCE: THE BASICS 
In theory, the need for corporate governance rests 
on the idea that when separation exists between the 
ownership of a company and its management, self-
interested executives have the opportunity to take actions 
that benefit themselves, with shareholders and 
stakeholders bearing the cost of these actions. This 
scenario is typically referred to as the agency problem, 
with the costs resulting from this problem described as 
agency costs. Executives make investment, financing, and 
operating decisions that better themselves at the expense 
of other parties related to the firm. To lessen agency costs, 
some type of control or monitoring system is put in place 
in the organization. That system of checks and balances 
is called corporate governance. 
David Larcker and Brian Tayan 
Stanford University20 
Lessons learned from Facebook’s privacy and content manipulation provide a 
valuable teaching moment for all others engaged in using the Internet for marketing, 
or hosting user generated content on their sites. I have written elsewhere about every 
board’s responsibility for governance during times of crisis.21 A brief discussion 
regarding corporate governance; the duties of loyalty and care; business judgment 
rule; and Facebook’s board composition follows. 
A. Board Authority 
Legal authority for corporations is created by state-granted charters, their 
governance dictated by state law, with the responsibility for managing the affairs of 
the corporation delegated to corporate directors.22 Delaware courts, for example, 
have stated that the business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
                                                          
20 DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS 4 (FT Press 2011). 
21 See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corporate Boards? Texas 
Corporate Directors: Who They Are and What They Do, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44 (2016). 
22 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (“The business and affairs of a corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). While more than half of all 
publicly owned United States corporations are chartered under the laws of the state of Delaware, corporate 
counsel and directors will want to closely examine the laws of relevant states when considering any 
particular matter; see also Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: 
Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 248 (Feb. 1989) (“Delaware corporate 
law . . . governs the largest proportion of the largest business transactions in history”); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”23 It is this business judgment rule, according to professor Stephen M. 
Bainbridge that “pervades every aspect of state corporate law.”24 Under Delaware 
law, directors owe their corporation and shareholders fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty.25 Discussing “The Role of Corporate Directors in Dealing with Corporate 
Crises” several former SEC commissioners and seasoned legal experts observe that 
when in crisis, “Whatever the cause, the Board is expected to act quickly and 
effectively to mitigate the damage to the company.”26 The foundation of corporate 
governance is built upon the duty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty of good faith. 
B. Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty stands for the proposition that directors, “must act in good 
faith and must not allow his [or her] personal interests to prevail over the interests of 
the corporation.”27 It is really as simple as no self-dealing. 
                                                          
23 Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information 
Technology Governance, 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 322 (2011), citing Unitrin, Inc. 
v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 75 (Del. 
1992)). See also Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in 
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1–73 (2005). 
24 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
83 (2004) (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (fiduciary duties of controlling 
shareholder); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1868) (operational decision)). See also 
Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule - the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631 
(2002); Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. (2005); 
Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy, 16 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2011). 
25 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 23, at 313 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858 (Del. Supr. 1985)); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good 
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are 
There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1213 (2010); Bernard S. Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties 
of Outside Directors, ASIA BUS. L. REV. 3 (2001); but see William T. Allen, Modern Corporate 
Governance and the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law, CLPE Research 
Paper No. 06/2008 (Mar. 12, 2008); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial 
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983); 
Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209 (2011); Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside 
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006). 
26 Cynthia Glassman, Alan Beller, John Olson, Lawrence Trautman & Laura Unger, Panelists at 
the George Washington University School of Law Denit Trust Challenges in Corporate Governance 
Series: The Role of Corporate Directors in a Crisis (Oct. 21, 2013). 
27 See Byron F. Egan, Remarks at 37th Annual Conference on Security Regulation & Business Law 
in Dallas, Texas: How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and Officers of Delaware 
and Texas Corporations, at 7 (Feb. 13, 2015) (transcript available courtesy of Bryon F. Egan) (citing 
Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719 n.4; Christopher M. Bruner, The Fiduciary Enterprise of Corporate Law, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 790 (2017)); Deborah DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 847 (2017); Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward a Horizontal Fiduciary Duty in 
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C. Duty of Care 
A careful, diligent approach to the effective discharge of every director’s 
individual duties and responsibilities is required to discharge the legal Duty of Care. 
As discussed by professors Lyman P.Q. Johnson and Mark Sides, it is the duty of 
care that: 
specifies the manner in which directors must discharge 
their legal responsibilities . . . includ[ing] electing, 
evaluating, and compensating corporate officers; 
reviewing and approving corporate strategy, budgets, and 
capital expenditures; monitoring internal financial 
information systems and financial reporting obligations, 
and complying with legal requirements; making 
distributions to shareholders; approving transactions not 
in the ordinary course of business; appointing members to 
committees and discharging committee assignments, 
including the important audit, compensation and 
nominating committees. . . . 
The duty of due care arises in both the discrete 
decision-making context and in the oversight and 
monitoring areas [my emphasis added]. . . . In the 
decision-making-setting—whether it involves directors 
making a routine business decision or responding to a 
high-stakes unsolicited bid for corporate control—the 
duty of care inquiry clearly focuses on a board’s 
“decision-making process.”28 Directors in that setting are 
under an obligation to obtain and act with due care on all 
material information reasonably available.29 
                                                          
Corporate Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 101 (2019); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF 
CARE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018); Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, EVAN J. 
CRIDDLE, PAUL B. MILLER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF EDS., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
(New York: Oxford University Press 2019); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century 
Evolution of Director’s Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 63 (2009); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, The Import of 
History to Corporate Law, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 683 (2015); Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: 
Implementing Loyalty and Care, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. 
Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
28 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 23, at 313 (citing Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. 
Sides, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary 
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1197 (2004) and Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 
569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989)); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Due care in the decision 
making context is process due care only.”). 
29 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 23, at 231 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994)). See also Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls 
After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 949–73 (2006); Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? 
Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027 (2013); William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. 
Strine, Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique 
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The Delaware Supreme Court found in the landmark 1985 case of Smith v. Van 
Gorkom,30 that the experienced and sophisticated directors31 of Trans Union 
Corporation were not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule32 and 
had breached their fiduciary duty to their shareholders when considering acquisition 
of Trans Union, “(1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information 
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the Pritzker 
merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material information such as a 
reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding whether to approve the 
Pritzker offer.”33 Absent accompanying disloyal acts, it was generally accepted that 
“courts had rarely found individual directors liable for breaching their duty of care,” 
before this decision involving the Trans Union board.34 
                                                          
of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002); Lynn 
A. Stout & Margaret M. Blair, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business 
Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Joseph E. Bachelder, Roel C. 
Campos, Byron S. Georgiou, Alan G. Hevesi, William Lerach, Robert Mendelsohn, Robert A.G. Monks, 
Toby Myerson, John F. Olson, Leo E. Strine & John C. Wilcox, Director Liability, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1011 (2006). 
30 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 23 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom). See also Steven 
A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343 (2006); Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell, 
Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589 (2006); Cheryl Lyn Wade, What Independent Directors 
Should Expect from Inside Directors: Smith v. Van Gorkom as a Guide to Intra-Firm Governance, 45 
WASHBURN L.J. 367 (2006); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Twenty Years after Smith v. Van Gorkom: An 
Essay on the Limits of Civil Liability of Corporate Directors and the Role of Shareholder Inspection 
Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Smith v. Van Gorkom, Law-Econ 
Research Paper No. 08-13 (2008), UCLA Sch. of Law; Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 287 (2008); Bernard S. Sharfman, Being Informed Does 
Matter: Fine Tuning Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years after Van Gorkom, 62 BUS. LAW. 135 (2006). 
31 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 23, at 313 (citing Peter V. Letsou, Cases and 
Materials on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions n.21 at 643 (2006) (observing “Trans Union’s five 
‘inside’ directors had backgrounds in law and accounting, 116 years of collective employment by the 
company and 68 years of combined experience on its Board. Trans Union’s five ‘outside’ directors 
included four chief executives of major corporations and an economist who was a former dean of a major 
school of business and chancellor of a university. The ‘outside’ directors had 78 years of combined 
experience as chief executive officers of major corporations and 50 years of cumulative experience of 
Trans Union. Thus, defendants argue that the Board was eminently qualified to reach an informed 
judgment on the proposed ‘sale’ of Trans Union notwithstanding their lack of any advance notice on the 
proposal, the shortness of their deliberation, and their determination not to consult with their investment 
banker or to obtain a fairness opinion.”) 
32 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 23, at 313 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858 (Del. Supr. 1985)). 
33 Letsou, supra note 30, at 644. 
34 Jacqueline M. Veneziani, Note & Comment: Causation and Injury in Corporate Control 
Transactions: Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1194 n.3 (1994) (“Before Van 
Gorkom was decided, one commentator had stated that ‘[t]he search for cases in which directors . . . have 
been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self dealing is a search for a very 
small number of needles in a very large haystack.’”); see also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and 
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D. Duty of Good Faith 
For a director to have the protection of the business judgment rule against a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a director must be able to demonstrate that she 
acted in “good faith.”35 Many factors “define what it means for a corporate director 
to act in good faith . . . includ[ing] the judicial application of state corporate law, 
federal and state legislation, shareholder activism . . . corporate governance ratings, 
and the expectations of the public in response to the media’s treatment of current 
issues in corporate governance.”36 Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., holds that 
the board of directors of a Delaware corporation is charged with the legal 
responsibility to manage its business for the benefit of the corporation and its 
shareholders with “due care, good faith, and loyalty.”37 Delaware Chief Justice E. 
Norman Veasey observes: 
The evolving business and judicial expectations of 
director conduct over the years are part of the common 
law grist for the fiduciary duty mill. As Chancellor Allen 
stressed in Caremark, the kind of sustained inattention of 
directors exemplified by the failure to institute law 
compliance programs contemplated by the federal 
sentencing guidelines and expected of prudent businesses 
could be held to be a violation of fiduciary duty of good 
faith. That standard of conduct—good faith—is key to 
director conduct, and it must be considered when one 
looks at the directors’ processes and motivations to be 
certain that they are honest and not disingenuous or 
reckless.38 
                                                          
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 
1099 (1968). 
35 Byron Egan, Director Duties: Process and Proof, TexasBarCLE Webcast: Corporate 
Minutes/Director Duties n.45 (Oct. 23, 2008), www.jw.com/site/jsp/publicationinfo.jsp?id=1044; see 
also Leo E. Strine, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core 
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010); Sean J. Griffith, 
Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 
(2005); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); 
A. Sale, Good Faith’s Procedure and Substance, in re Caremark International Inc., Derivative Litigation, 
THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW (Macey ed., West/Thomson 2008); Christopher M. Bruner, Good 
Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1131 (2006). 
36 Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corporate Governance: The Duty of Good Faith and Its Impact 
on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2005–2006); see also Hillary A. Sale, 
Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004). 
37 Id. at 1045 (citing Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 611 S.E. 2d 600, 606 (2005) (quoting 
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)). 
38 E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance Principles, 56 
SMU L. REV. 2135, 2141 (2003); see also Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, Illinois Program in 
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IV. GOVERNANCE AT FACEBOOK 
What we have learned over the past few months is 
alarming. We have seen how foreign actors are abusing 
social media platforms, like Facebook, to interfere in 
elections and taking millions of Americans’ personal 
information without their knowledge to manipulate public 
opinion and target individual voters. 
Specifically, on February 16th [2018], Special 
Counsel Mueller issued an indictment against the Russia-
based Internet Research Agency and thirteen of its 
employees for “interference operations targeting the 
United States.” 
Senator Dianne Feinstein 
Ranking Member, Senate 
Judiciary Committee 
April 10, 201839 
Presented below is a brief description of Facebook’s board of directors, 
including age, position and certain biographical information. 
A. Board Composition 
The Facebook board of directors as of March 31, 2018 consists of the following 
individuals: 
Name     Age  Positions 
________________________ ___  _______________________________ 
Mark Zuckerberg   33  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
Sheryl K. Sandberg   48  Chief Operating Officer and Director 
Marc L. Andreessen(1)(2)  46  Director 
Erskine B. Bowles(1)   72  Director 
Kenneth I. Chenault   66  Director 
Susan D. Desmond-Hellmann*(1) 60  Director 
Reed Hastings(2)    57  Director 
Jan Koum     42  Director 
Peter A. Thiel(2)    50  Director 
__________ 
* Lead Independent Director 
(1) Member of the audit committee 
                                                          
Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS14-09 (2013); Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability 
for Risk Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (2011). 
39 Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Before the Joint Hearing of 
the S. Judiciary Comm. and S. Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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(2) Member of the compensation and governance committee 
The Company discloses the following biographical information and provides a 
statement for each of its directors in its proxy solicitation materials provided for the 
annual meeting to be held on May 31, 2018:40 
Mark Zuckerberg is our founder and has served as 
our Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and as a member of 
our board of directors since July 2004. Mr. Zuckerberg 
has served as Chairman of our board of directors since 
January 2012. Mr. Zuckerberg attended Harvard 
University where he studied computer science. . . . 
Sheryl K. Sandberg has served as our Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) since March 2008 and as a 
member of our board of directors since June 2012. From 
November 2001 to March 2008, Ms. Sandberg served in 
various positions at Google, Inc., most recently as Vice 
President, Global Online Sales & Operations. 
Ms. Sandberg also is a former Chief of Staff of the U.S. 
Treasury Department and previously served as a 
consultant with McKinsey & Company, a management 
consulting company, and as an economist with The World 
Bank. In addition to serving as our COO, Ms. Sandberg 
has been a member of the board of directors of 
SurveyMonkey since July 2015. Ms. Sandberg previously 
served as a member of the boards of directors of Starbucks 
Corporation from March 2009 to March 2012 and the 
Walt Disney Company from March 2010 to March 2018. 
Ms. Sandberg holds an A.B. in economics from Harvard 
University and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business 
School. . . . 
Marc L. Andreessen has served as a member of our 
board of directors since June 2008. Mr. Andreessen is a 
co-founder and has been a General Partner of Andreessen 
Horowitz, a venture capital firm, since July 2009. 
Previously, Mr. Andreessen co-founded and served as the 
Chairman of the board of directors of Opsware, Inc. 
(formerly known as Loudcloud Inc.), a software 
company. He also served as Chief Technology Officer of 
America Online, Inc., an Internet services company. 
Mr. Andreessen was a co-founder of Netscape 
Communications Corporation, a software company, 
serving in various positions, including Chief Technology 
Officer and Executive Vice President of Products. In 
addition to serving on our board of directors, 
Mr. Andreessen currently serves as a member of the 
boards of directors of several private companies. 
Mr. Andreessen previously served as a member of the 
                                                          
40 Facebook, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Apr. 13, 2018) at 10–12 [hereinafter 
Facebook 2018 Proxy Statement]. 
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boards of directors of eBay Inc. from September 2008 to 
October 2014, Hewlett-Packard Company from 
September 2009 to October 2015, and Hewlett Packard 
Enterprise Company from November 2015 to April 2018. 
Mr. Andreessen holds a B.S. in computer science from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. . . . 
Erskine B. Bowles has served as a member of our 
board of directors since September 2011. Mr. Bowles is 
President Emeritus of the University of North Carolina 
and served as President from January 2006 through 
December 2010. Mr. Bowles has also been a Senior 
Advisor and non-executive vice chairman of BDT Capital 
Partners, LLC, a private, investment firm, since January 
2012. From February 2010 until December 2010, he 
served as Co-Chair of the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform. Mr. Bowles was Managing 
Director of Carousel Capital LLC, a private investment 
firm, from 1999 to 2001, and was a Senior Advisor for the 
firm from 2001 to 2015. He was also a partner of 
Forstmann Little & Co., an investment firm, from 1999 to 
2001. Mr. Bowles began his career in corporate finance at 
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC and subsequently helped 
found and ultimately served as Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of Bowles Hollowell Connor & Co., an 
investment banking firm. He also was a founder of Kitty 
Hawk Capital, a venture capital firm. Mr. Bowles served 
as White House Chief of Staff from 1996 to 1998 and 
Deputy White House Chief of Staff from 1994 to 1995. In 
addition to serving on our board of directors, Mr. Bowles 
currently serves as a member of the board of directors of 
Norfolk Southern Corporation. Mr. Bowles also served as 
a member of the board of directors of General Motors 
Company from June 2005 to April 2009, Cousins 
Properties Incorporated from August 2003 to May 2012, 
Belk, Inc. from May 2011 to November 2015, and 
Morgan Stanley from December 2005 to February 2018. 
Mr. Bowles holds a B.S. in business from the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an M.B.A. from 
Columbia University Graduate School of Business. . . . 
Kenneth I. Chenault has served as a member of our 
board of directors since February 2018. Mr. Chenault has 
served as Chairman and a Managing Director of General 
Catalyst, a venture capital firm, since February 2018. 
Mr. Chenault previously served as Chief Executive 
Officer of American Express Company, a financial 
services company, from January 2001 to February 2018, 
and as Chairman of American Express Company from 
April 2001 to February 2018. Mr. Chenault joined 
American Express in 1981 as Director of Strategic 
Planning and served subsequently in a number of 
increasingly senior positions, including Vice Chairman 
and President and Chief Operating Officer, until his 
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appointment as Chief Executive Officer. Mr. Chenault 
also serves on the boards of directors of International 
Business Machines Corporation and The Procter & 
Gamble Company. Mr. Chenault holds a B.A. in history 
from Bowdoin College and a J.D. from Harvard Law 
School. . . . 
Susan D. Desmond-Hellmann has served as a 
member of our board of directors since March 2013. 
Dr. Desmond-Hellmann has served as the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation since May 2014. Prior to the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, Dr. Desmond-Hellmann was the 
Chancellor at University of California, San Francisco 
(UCSF) from August 2009 to May 2014. From 2004 
through 2009, Dr. Desmond-Hellmann served as 
President of Product Development at Genentech, where 
she was responsible for pre-clinical and clinical 
development, business development, and product 
portfolio management. She joined Genentech in 1995. 
Prior to joining Genentech, Dr. Desmond-Hellmann was 
associate director of clinical cancer research at Bristol-
Myers Squibb Pharmaceutical Research Institute. In 
addition to serving on our board of directors, 
Dr. Desmond-Hellmann previously served as a member 
of the board of directors of The Procter & Gamble 
Company from December 2010 until October 2016. 
Dr. Desmond-Hellmann holds a B.S. in pre-med and an 
M.D. from the University of Nevada, Reno, and an 
M.P.H. from the University of California, Berkeley. . . . 
Reed Hastings has served as a member of our board 
of directors since June 2011. Mr. Hastings has served as 
the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the board of 
directors of Netflix, Inc., a provider of an Internet 
subscription service for movies and television shows, 
since 1999. Prior to Netflix, Mr. Hastings served as Chief 
Executive Officer of Technology Network, a political 
service organization for the technology industry. 
Mr. Hastings served as Chief Executive Officer of Pure 
Atria Software, a maker of software development tools, 
from 1991 until it was acquired by Rational Software 
Corporation in 1997. Mr. Hastings previously served as a 
member of the board of directors of Microsoft 
Corporation from March 2007 to November 2012. 
Mr. Hastings holds a B.A. in mathematics from Bowdoin 
College and an M.S.C.S. in computer science from 
Stanford University. . . . 
Jan Koum has served as a member of our board of 
directors since October 2014. Since February 2009, 
Mr. Koum has served and continues to serve as co-
founder and Chief Executive Officer of WhatsApp Inc. 
(WhatsApp), a cross-platform mobile messaging 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.234 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
application company and our wholly-owned subsidiary. 
Mr. Koum attended San Jose State University where he 
studied math and computer science. Mr. Koum left San 
Jose State University before achieving a degree. . . . 
Peter A. Thiel has served as a member of our board 
of directors since April 2005. Mr. Thiel has served as 
President of Thiel Capital, an investment firm, since 2011 
and a Partner of Founders Fund, a venture capital firm, 
since 2005. In 1998, Mr. Thiel co-founded PayPal, Inc., 
an online payment company, where he served as Chief 
Executive Officer, President, and Chairman of its board 
of directors from 2000 until its acquisition by eBay in 
2002. Mr. Thiel holds a B.A. in philosophy from Stanford 
University and a J.D. from Stanford Law School. . . .41 
B. Board Leadership Structure and Controlled-Company Status 
Facebook provides the following description of its board leadership structure 
in its proxy materials for to their meeting of shareholders to be held May 31, 2018: 
Mark Zuckerberg, our founder and CEO, serves as 
Chairman of our board of directors, presides over 
meetings of the board of directors, and holds such other 
powers and carries out such other duties as are 
customarily carried out by the Chairman of our board of 
directors. Mr. Zuckerberg brings valuable insight to our 
board of directors due to the perspective and experience 
he brings as our founder and CEO, and as our largest and 
controlling stockholder. Dr. Desmond-Hellmann 
currently serves as our Lead Independent Director and 
presides over portions of regularly scheduled meetings at 
which only our independent directors are present, serves 
as a liaison between the Chairman and the independent 
directors, and performs such additional duties as the board 
of directors may otherwise determine and delegate. 
Generally, each regular meeting of our board of directors 
includes a meeting of our independent directors without 
management present. 
Controlled Company Status 
Because Mr. Zuckerberg controls a majority of our 
outstanding voting power, we are a “controlled company” 
under the corporate governance rules of The Nasdaq 
Stock Market LLC (Nasdaq). Therefore, we are not 
required to have a majority of our board of directors be 
independent, nor are we required to have a compensation 
committee or an independent nominating function. In 
light of our status as a controlled company, our board of 
                                                          
41 Id. 
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directors has determined not to have an independent 
nominating function and to have the full board of 
directors be directly responsible for nominating members 
of our board.42 
C. Director Independence 
The Company provides the following disclosures regarding director 
independence in its proxy materials for their meeting of shareholders to be held 
May 31, 2018: 
The rules of Nasdaq generally require that a 
majority of the members of a listed company’s board of 
directors be independent. In addition, the Nasdaq rules 
generally require that, subject to specified exceptions, 
each member of a listed company’s audit, compensation, 
and governance committees be independent. Although we 
are a “controlled company” under the corporate 
governance rules of Nasdaq and, therefore, are not 
required to comply with certain rules requiring director 
independence, we have nevertheless opted, under our 
corporate governance guidelines, to have a majority of the 
members of our board of directors be independent. 
Audit committee members must also satisfy the 
independence criteria set forth in Rule 10A-3 under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange 
Act). In order to be considered independent for purposes 
of Rule 10A-3, a member of an audit committee of a listed 
company may not, other than in his or her capacity as a 
member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or 
any other board committee: accept, directly or indirectly, 
any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from 
the listed company or any of its subsidiaries; or be an 
affiliated person of the listed company or any of its 
subsidiaries. 
[The Facebook] board of directors has determined 
that none of our non-employee directors has a relationship 
that would interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director 
and that each of these directors is “independent” as that 
term is defined under the rules of Nasdaq. Our board of 
directors has also determined that Messrs. Andreessen 
and Bowles, and Dr. Desmond-Hellmann, who comprise 
our audit committee, and Messrs. Andreessen, Hastings, 
and Thiel, who comprise our compensation & governance 
committee, satisfy the independence standards for those 
                                                          
42 Id. at 13. 
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committees established by applicable SEC rules and 
Nasdaq rules.43 
D. Committee Structure 
Boards of directors organize their work through committees.44 Facebook 
discloses that the board “has established an audit committee and a compensation and 
governance committee, each of which have the composition and responsibilities 
described below. Members serve on these committees until their resignations or until 
otherwise determined by our board of directors. Each of these committees has a 
written charter.”45 
E. Audit Committee 
In its proxy materials for their meeting of shareholders to be held May 31, 2018, 
Facebook provides the following description of its audit committee: 
Our audit committee is comprised of Messrs. 
Andreessen and Bowles, and Dr. Desmond-Hellmann. 
Mr. Bowles is the chairman of our audit committee, is our 
audit committee financial expert, as that term is defined 
under SEC rules, and possesses financial sophistication as 
defined under the rules of Nasdaq. The designation does 
not impose on Mr. Bowles any duties, obligations or 
liabilities that are greater than are generally imposed on 
members of our audit committee and our board of 
directors. Our board of directors has adopted a charter for 
our audit committee. As more fully described in its 
charter, our audit committee is directly responsible for, 
among other things: 
● selecting the independent registered public 
accounting firm to audit our financial statements; 
● ensuring the independence of the registered public 
accounting firm; 
● discussing the scope and results of the audit with 
the independent registered public accounting firm, 
and reviewing, with management and that firm, our 
interim and year-end operating results; 
● developing procedures to enable submission of 
anonymous concerns about accounting or auditing 
matters; 
                                                          
43 Id. 
44 Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director Selection and 
Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012). 
45 Facebook 2018 Proxy Statement, supra note 40, at 14. 
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● considering the adequacy of our internal accounting 
controls and audit procedures; 
● reviewing related party transactions; 
● reviewing our program for promoting and 
monitoring compliance with applicable legal and 
regulatory requirements; 
● reviewing our legal, financial, and enterprise risk 
exposures, and the steps management has taken to 
monitor and control such exposures; 
● pre-approving all audit and non-audit services to be 
performed by the independent registered public 
accounting firm; and 
● overseeing our internal audit function. 
During 2017, the audit committee met in person or by 
telephone or videoconference, or acted by unanimous 
written consent, ten times.46 
F. Compensation and Governance Committee 
A comprehensive discussion of Facebook’s compensation governance and 
compensation-setting process is beyond the scope and not this focus of this single 
journal article. Nevertheless, Facebook provides the following description of its 
compensation and governance committee in its proxy materials for their meeting of 
shareholders to be held May 31, 2018: 
Our compensation & governance committee is 
comprised of Messrs. Andreessen, Hastings, and Thiel. 
Mr. Hastings is the chairman of our compensation & 
governance committee. Each member of this committee 
is a non-employee director, as defined pursuant to Rule 
16b-3 promulgated under the Exchange Act, and an 
outside director, as defined under Section 162(m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Our board 
of directors has adopted a charter for our compensation & 
governance committee. As more fully described in its 
charter, our compensation & governance committee is 
responsible for, among other things: 
● evaluating the performance of our executive 
officers; 
● evaluating, recommending, approving and 
reviewing executive officer compensation 
                                                          
46 Facebook 2018 Proxy Statement, supra note 40, at 14–15; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Who 
Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 205 (2013); Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe, Corporate 
Information Technology Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRAT. & INT’L STUD. 105 (2013). 
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arrangements, plans, policies and programs 
maintained by us; 
● administering our equity-based compensation plans 
and our annual bonus plan; 
● considering and making recommendations 
regarding non-employee director compensation; 
● considering and making recommendations to our 
board of directors regarding its remaining 
responsibilities relating to executive compensation; 
● monitoring succession planning for certain of our 
key executives; 
● developing and recommending corporate 
governance guidelines and policies; 
● overseeing the evaluation process for our board of 
directors and committees thereof; 
● reviewing and granting proposed waivers of the 
code of conduct for executive officers; and 
● advising our board of directors on corporate 
governance matters and board of director 
performance matters, including recommendations 
regarding the structure and composition of our 
board of directors and committees thereof.47 
V. RISK FACTORS 
Something is awry. It is true that many capitalists, 
including surveillance capitalists, vigorously employ 
these century-old justifications for their freedom when 
they reject regulatory, legislative, judicial, societal, or 
any other form of public interference in their methods of 
operation. 
Soshana Zuboff 
The Charles Edward Wilson 
Professor Emerita 
Harvard Business School 
201948 
In its proxy materials for their meeting of shareholders to be held May 31, 2018, 
the Company provides the following introductory discussion about the board’s role 
in risk oversight: 
                                                          
47 Facebook 2018 Proxy Statement, supra note 40, at 15. 
48 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN 
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 497 (2019). 
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Our board of directors as a whole has responsibility 
for overseeing our risk management and believes that a 
thorough and strategic approach to risk oversight is 
critical. The board of directors exercises this oversight 
responsibility directly and through its committees. The 
oversight responsibility of the board of directors and its 
committees is informed by regular reports from our 
management team, including senior personnel that lead a 
variety of functions across the business, and from our 
internal audit department, as well as input from external 
advisors, as appropriate. These reports are designed to 
provide timely visibility to the board of directors and its 
committees about the identification and assessment of key 
risks, our risk mitigation strategies, and ongoing 
developments. 
The full board of directors has primary 
responsibility for evaluating strategic and operational risk 
management, and for CEO succession planning. Our audit 
committee has the responsibility for overseeing our major 
financial, legal, and regulatory risk exposures, which span 
a variety of areas including litigation, regulatory 
compliance, reputational and policy matters, platform 
integrity efforts, financial reporting, cybersecurity, and 
international operations. Our audit committee also 
oversees the steps our management has taken to monitor 
and control these exposures, including policies and 
procedures for assessing and managing risk and related 
compliance efforts. Finally, our audit committee oversees 
our internal audit function. Our compensation & 
governance committee evaluates risks arising from our 
corporate governance and compensation policies and 
practices. . . .49 
A discussion of all risk factors identified by Facebook as material or having the 
potential to become material is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, a 
number of these factors that are most significant to the Company or of particular 
importance to the discussion of privacy issues are presented below. Factors dealing 
with issues such as tax liabilities, capital structure, reliance on key employees, or 
changes in accounting practices are ignored for purposes of this assessment but may 
be found in the source documents. 
                                                          
49 Facebook 2018 Proxy Statement, supra note 40, at 16. 
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A. Business and Industry Related Risks 
Facebook lists a large number of risk factors that “may have a material adverse 
effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operations.”50 This list of 
risk factors and uncertainties is not exhaustive and the Company discloses that 
“additional risks and uncertainties that we are aware of, or that we currently believe 
are not material, may also become important factors that adversely affect our 
business.”51 Setting aside risk factors related to items such as, tax liabilities, capital 
structure, reliance on key employees, some of the Company’s primary perceived risk 
factors include: 
1. If we fail to retain existing users or add new users, or if our users 
decrease their level of engagement with our products, our revenue, 
financial results, and business may be significantly harmed. 
2. We generate substantially all of our revenue from advertising. The 
loss of marketers, or reduction in spending by marketers, could 
seriously harm our business. 
3. Our user growth, engagement, and monetization on mobile devices 
depend upon effective operation with mobile operating systems, 
networks, and standards that we do not control. 
4. Our business is highly competitive. Competition presents an 
ongoing threat to the success of our business. 
5. Action by governments to restrict access to Facebook or our other 
products in their countries could substantially harm our business and 
financial results. 
6. Our new products and changes to existing products could fail to 
attract or retain users or generate revenue and profits. 
7. We make product and investment decisions that may not prioritize 
short-term financial results and may not produce the long-term 
benefits that we expect. 
8. If we are not able to maintain and enhance our brands, or if events 
occur that damage our reputation and brands, our ability to expand 
our base of users, marketers, and developers may be impaired, and 
our business and financial results may be harmed. 
                                                          
50 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 8. See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, 
D&O Insurance: A Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337 (2012) (for discussion of insurance in mitigating 
corporate risk). 
51 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 8. 
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9. Security breaches and improper access to or disclosure of our data 
or user data, or other hacking and phishing attacks on our systems, 
could harm our reputation and adversely affect our business. 
10. Unfavorable media coverage could negatively affect our business. 
11. Our financial results will fluctuate from quarter to quarter and are 
difficult to predict. 
12. We expect our rates of growth to decline in the future. 
13. Our costs are continuing to grow, which could reduce our operating 
margin and profitability. If our investments are not successful, our 
business and financial performance could be harmed. 
14. Given our levels of share-based compensation, our tax rate may vary 
significantly depending on our stock price. 
15. Our business is subject to complex and evolving U.S. and foreign 
laws and regulations regarding privacy, data protection, content, 
competition, consumer protection, and other matters. Many of these 
laws and regulations are subject to change and uncertain 
interpretation, and could result in claims, changes to our business 
practices, monetary penalties, increased cost of operations, or 
declines in user growth or engagement, or otherwise harm our 
business. 
16. We have been subject to regulatory and other government 
investigations, enforcement actions, and settlements, and we expect 
to continue to be subject to such proceedings and other inquires in 
the future, which could cause us to incur substantial costs or require 
us to change our business practices in a manner materially adverse 
to our business. 
17. We are currently, and expect to be in the future, party to patent 
lawsuits and other intellectual property rights claims that are 
expensive and time consuming and, if resolved adversely, could 
have a significant impact on our business, financial condition, or 
results of operations. 
18. We are involved in numerous class action lawsuits and other 
litigation matters that are expensive and time consuming, and, if 
resolved adversely, could harm our business, financial condition, or 
results of operations. 
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19. We may incur liability as a result of information retrieved from or 
transmitted over the Internet or published using our products or as a 
result of claims related to our products. 
20. Our CEO has control over key decision making as a result of his 
control of a majority of the voting power of our outstanding capital 
stock. 
21. We plan to continue to make acquisitions, which could harm our 
financial condition or results of operations and may adversely affect 
the price of our common stock. 
22. We may not be able to successfully integrate our acquisitions, and 
we may incur significant costs to integrate and support the 
companies we acquire. 
23. If our goodwill or finite-lived intangible assets become impaired, we 
may be required to record a significant charge to earnings. 
24. Our business is dependent on our ability to maintain and scale our 
technical infrastructure, and any significant disruption in our service 
could damage our reputation, result in a potential loss of users and 
engagement, and adversely affect our financial results. 
25. We could experience unforeseen difficulties in building and 
operating key portions of our technical infrastructure. 
26. Our products and internal systems rely on software that is highly 
technical, and if it contains undetected errors or vulnerabilities, our 
business could be adversely affected. 
27. Technologies have been developed that can block the display of our 
ads, which could adversely affect our financial results. 
28. Real or perceived inaccuracies in our user and other metrics may 
harm our reputation and negatively affect our business. 
29. We cannot assure you that we will effectively manage our growth. 
30. The loss of one or more of our key personnel, or our failure to attract 
and retain other highly qualified personnel in the future, could harm 
our business. 
31. We may not be able to continue to successfully grow usage of and 
engagement with mobile and web applications that integrate with 
Facebook and our other products. 
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32. We currently generate substantially all of our Payments revenue 
from developers that use Facebook on personal computers, and we 
expect that our Payments revenue will continue to decline as usage 
of Facebook on personal computers continues to decline. 
33. Payment transactions may subject us to additional regulatory 
requirements and other risks that could be costly and difficult to 
comply with or that could harm our business. 
34. We have significant international operations and plan to continue 
expanding our operations abroad where we have more limited 
operating experience, and this may subject us to increased business 
and economic risks that could affect our financial results. 
35. We face design, manufacturing, and supply chain risks that, if not 
properly managed, could adversely impact our financial results. 
36. We may face inventory risk with respect to our Oculus products.52 
B. Failure to Retain Existing Users or Add New Users 
Facebook recognizes that the failure “to retain existing users or add new users, 
or if our users decrease their level of engagement with our products, our revenue, 
financial results, and business may be significantly harmed.” The Company 
discloses: 
The size of our user base and our users’ level of 
engagement are critical to our success. Our financial 
performance has been and will continue to be 
significantly determined by our success in adding, 
retaining, and engaging active users of our products, 
particularly for Facebook and Instagram. We anticipate 
that our active user growth rate will continue to decline 
over time as the size of our active user base increases, and 
it is possible that the size of our active user base may 
fluctuate or decline in one or more markets, particularly 
in markets where we have achieved higher penetration 
rates. . . . 
If we are unable to maintain or increase our user 
base and user engagement, our revenue and financial 
results may be adversely affected. Any decrease in user 
retention, growth, or engagement could render our 
products less attractive to users, marketers, and 
                                                          
52 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 8–24. See also Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives 
Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-commerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2018) (for discussion of risk perception by Google, Facebook’s major competitor in 
behavioral surplus). 
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developers, which is likely to have a material and adverse 
impact on our revenue, business, financial condition, and 
results of operations. If our active user growth rate 
continues to slow, we will become increasingly 
dependent on our ability to maintain or increase levels of 
user engagement and monetization in order to drive 
revenue growth.53 
C. Material Decline in Advertising Revenue 
The lure of advertising revenue is central to any understanding of Facebook’s 
complicit involvement with issues of “fake news”; whether the Company knowingly 
or should have known of Russian or other foreign or domestic agents improperly 
seeking to influence the 2016 U.S. elections through illegal advertising on any of the 
Facebook platforms or, issues involving the compromising of individual privacy for 
advertising revenues. In the case of Facebook, “following the money” means 
following the advertising revenues. Materially all Facebook revenue: 
Substantially all of our revenue is currently 
generated from third parties advertising on Facebook and 
Instagram. For 2017, 2016, and 2015, advertising 
accounted for 98%, 97% and 95%, respectively, of our 
revenue. As is common in the industry, our marketers do 
not have long-term advertising commitments with us. 
Many of our marketers spend only a relatively small 
portion of their overall advertising budget with us. 
Marketers will not continue to do business with us, or they 
will reduce the budgets they are willing to commit to us, 
if we do not deliver ads in an effective manner, or if they 
do not believe that their investment in advertising with us 
will generate a competitive return relative to other 
alternatives. In addition, our advertising revenue growth 
has become increasingly dependent upon increased 
pricing of our ads. If we are unable to provide marketers 
with a suitable return on investment, the pricing of our ads 
may not increase, or may decline, in which case our 
revenue and financial results may be harmed. 
Our advertising revenue could also be adversely 
affected by a number of other factors, including: 
● decreases in user engagement, including time spent 
on our products; 
● our inability to continue to increase user access to 
and engagement with our mobile products; 
● product changes or inventory management 
decisions we may make that change the size, 
format, frequency, or relative prominence of ads 
                                                          
53 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 8–9. 
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displayed on our products or of other unpaid 
content shared by marketers on our products; 
● our inability to maintain or increase marketer 
demand, the pricing of our ads, or both; 
● our inability to maintain or increase the quantity or 
quality of ads shown to users, including as a result 
of technical infrastructure constraints; 
● reductions of advertising by marketers due to our 
efforts to implement advertising policies that 
protect the security and integrity of our platform; 
● changes to third-party policies that limit our ability 
to deliver or target advertising on mobile devices; 
● the availability, accuracy, and utility of analytics 
and measurement solutions offered by us or third 
parties that demonstrate the value of our ads to 
marketers, or our ability to further improve such 
tools; 
● loss of advertising market share to our competitors, 
including if prices for purchasing ads increase or if 
competitors offer lower priced or more integrated 
products; 
● adverse government actions or legal developments 
relating to advertising, including legislative and 
regulatory developments and developments in 
litigation; 
● decisions by marketers to reduce their advertising 
as a result of adverse media reports or other 
negative publicity involving us, our advertising 
metrics or tools, content on our products, 
developers with mobile and web applications that 
are integrated with our products, or other 
companies in our industry; 
● reductions of advertising by marketers due to 
objectionable content published on our products by 
third parties; 
● the effectiveness of our ad targeting or degree to 
which users opt out of certain types of ad targeting, 
including as a result of product changes and 
controls that may be implemented in connection 
with the GDPR or other regulation or regulatory 
action; 
● the degree to which users cease or reduce the 
number of times they engage with our ads; 
● changes in the way advertising on mobile devices 
or on personal computers is measured or priced; and 
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● the impact of macroeconomic conditions, whether 
in the advertising industry in general, or among 
specific types of marketers or within particular 
geographies. 
The occurrence of any of these or other factors could result in a reduction in 
demand for our ads, which may reduce the prices we receive for our ads, or cause 
marketers to stop advertising with us altogether, either of which would negatively 
affect our revenue and financial results.54 
D. Dependence Upon Mobile Operating Systems, Networks & Standards 
According to Facebook, “Our user growth, engagement, and monetization on 
mobile devices depend upon effective operation with mobile operating systems, 
networks, and standards that we do not control.”55 In addition: 
The substantial majority of our revenue is generated from 
advertising on mobile devices. There is no guarantee that 
popular mobile devices will continue to feature Facebook 
or our other products, or that mobile device users will 
continue to use our products rather than competing 
products. We are dependent on the interoperability of 
Facebook and our other products with popular mobile 
operating systems, networks, and standards that we do not 
control, such as the Android and iOS operating systems. 
Any changes, bugs, or technical issues in such systems, 
or changes in our relationships with mobile operating 
system partners, handset manufacturers, or mobile 
carriers, or in their terms of service or policies that 
degrade our products’ functionality, reduce or eliminate 
our ability to distribute our products, give preferential 
treatment to competitive products, limit our ability to 
deliver, target, or measure the effectiveness of ads, or 
charge fees related to the distribution of our products or 
our delivery of ads could adversely affect the usage of 
Facebook or our other products and monetization on 
mobile devices.56 
E. Competition 
Facebook warns that “our business is highly competitive. Competition presents 
an ongoing threat to the success of our business.”57 As to details: 
We compete with companies that sell advertising, 
as well as with companies that provide social, media, and 
                                                          
54 Id. at 9–10. 
55 Id. at 10. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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communication products and services that are designed to 
engage users on mobile devices and online. We face 
significant competition in every aspect of our business, 
including from companies that facilitate communication 
and the sharing of content and information, companies 
that enable marketers to display advertising, companies 
that distribute video and other forms of media content, 
and companies that provide development platforms for 
applications developers. We compete with companies that 
offer products across broad platforms that replicate 
capabilities we provide. . . . 
We believe that our ability to compete effectively 
depends upon many factors both within and beyond our 
control, including: 
● the popularity, usefulness, ease of use, 
performance, and reliability of our products 
compared to our competitors’ products; 
● the size and composition of our user base; 
● the engagement of users with our products and 
competing products; 
● the timing and market acceptance of products, 
including developments and enhancements to our 
or our competitors’ products; 
● our ability to distribute our products to new and 
existing users; 
● our ability to monetize our products; 
● the frequency, size, format, quality, and relative 
prominence of the ads displayed by us or our 
competitors; 
● customer service and support efforts; 
● marketing and selling efforts, including our ability 
to measure the effectiveness of our ads and to 
provide marketers with a compelling return on their 
investments; 
● our ability to establish and maintain developers’ 
interest in building mobile and web applications 
that integrate with Facebook and our other 
products; 
● our ability to establish and maintain publisher 
interest in integrating their content with Facebook 
and our other products; 
● changes mandated by legislation, regulatory 
authorities, or litigation, some of which may have a 
disproportionate effect on us; 
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● acquisitions or consolidation within our industry, 
which may result in more formidable competitors; 
● our ability to attract, retain, and motivate talented 
employees, particularly software engineers, 
designers, and product managers; 
● our ability to cost-effectively manage and grow our 
operations; and 
● our reputation and brand strength relative to those 
of our competitors. 
If we are not able to compete effectively, our user 
base and level of user engagement may decrease, we may 
become less attractive to developers and marketers, and 
our revenue and results of operations may be materially 
and adversely affected.58 
F. Government Restrictions 
The Company observes, “Action by governments to restrict access to Facebook 
of our other products in their countries could substantially harm our business and 
financial results.”59 For example: 
It is possible that governments of one or more countries 
may seek to censor content available on Facebook or our 
other products in their country, restrict access to our 
products from their country entirely, or impose other 
restrictions that may affect the accessibility of our 
products in their country for an extended period of time 
or indefinitely. For example, user access to Facebook and 
certain of our other products has been or is currently 
restricted in whole or in part in China, Iran, and North 
Korea. In addition, government authorities in other 
countries may seek to restrict user access to our products 
if they consider us to be in violation of their laws or a 
threat to public safety or for other reasons, and certain of 
our products have been restricted by governments in other 
countries from time to time. It is also possible that 
government authorities could take action to restrict our 
ability to sell advertising. In the event that content shown 
on Facebook or our other products is subject to 
censorship, access to our products is restricted, in whole 
or in part, in one or more countries.60 
                                                          
58 Id. at 10. 
59 Id. at 13. 
60 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 13; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, American Entrepreneur 
in China: Potholes on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 427 
(2012). 
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G. New Products 
Facebook states, “Our new products and changes to existing products could fail 
to attract or retain users or generate revenue and products.”61 Accordingly: 
Our ability to retain, increase, and engage our user base 
and to increase our revenue depends heavily on our ability 
to continue to evolve our existing products and to create 
successful new products, both independently and in 
conjunction with developers or other third parties. We 
may introduce significant changes to our existing 
products or acquire or introduce new and unproven 
products, including using technologies with which we 
have little or no prior development or operating 
experience. . . . We have also invested, and expect to 
continue to invest, significant resources in growing our 
WhatsApp and Messenger products.62 
H. Product and Investment Decisions and Financial Results 
With a focus toward disruptive technological products, Facebook observes, 
“We make product and investment decisions that may not prioritize short-term 
financial results and may not produce the long-term benefits that we expect.”63 
According to Facebook: 
We frequently make product and investment decisions 
that may not prioritize short-term financial results if we 
believe that the decisions are consistent with our mission 
and benefit the aggregate user experience and will thereby 
improve our financial performance over the long term. 
For example, from time to time we may change the size, 
frequency, or relative prominence of ads in order to 
improve ad quality and overall user experience. . . . From 
time to time, we have also made, and expect to continue 
to make, other changes to our products which may 
adversely affect the distribution of content of publishers, 
marketers, and developers, and could reduce their 
incentive to invest in their efforts on Facebook. . . . In 
addition, we plan to continue focusing on growing users 
and engagement on Instagram, Messenger, and 
WhatsApp, and we may also introduce other stand-alone 
applications in the future. These efforts may reduce 
engagement with the core Facebook application, where 
we have the most proven means of monetization and 
which serves as the platform for many of our new user 
                                                          
61 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 13. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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experiences. These decisions may adversely affect our 
business and results of operations and may not produce 
the long-term benefits that we expect.64 
I. Reputation and Brands 
Facebook warns, “If we are not able to maintain and enhance our brands, or if 
events occur that damage our reputation and brands, our ability to expand our base 
of users, marketers, and developers may be impaired, and our business and financial 
results may be harmed.”65 The Company continues: 
We believe that our brands have significantly contributed 
to the success of our business. We also believe that 
maintaining and enhancing our brands is critical to 
expanding our base of users, marketers, and developers. 
Many of our new users are referred by existing users. 
Maintaining and enhancing our brands will depend 
largely on our ability to continue to provide useful, 
reliable, trustworthy, and innovative products, which we 
may not do successfully. . . . We will also continue to 
experience media, legislative, or regulatory scrutiny of 
our decisions regarding user privacy, content, advertising, 
and other issues, which may adversely affect our 
reputation and brands. For example, we previously 
announced our discovery of certain ads and other content 
previously displayed on our products that may be relevant 
to government investigations relating to Russian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. We 
also may fail to respond expeditiously to the sharing of 
objectionable content on our services or objectionable 
practices by advertisers, or to otherwise address user 
concerns, which could erode confidence in our brands. 
Our brands may also be negatively affected by the actions 
of users that are deemed to be hostile or inappropriate to 
other users, by the actions of users acting under false or 
inauthentic identities, by the use of our products or 
services to disseminate information that is deemed to be 
misleading (or intended to manipulate opinions), by 
perceived or actual efforts by governments to obtain 
access to user information for security-related purposes or 
to censor certain content on our platform, or by the use of 
our products or services for illicit, objectionable, or illegal 
ends. Maintaining and enhancing our brands may require 
us to make substantial investments and these investments 
may not be successful. Certain of our past actions have 
eroded confidence in our brands, and if we fail to 
                                                          
64 Id. at 14. 
65 Id. 
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successfully promote and maintain our brands or if we 
incur excessive expenses in this effort, our business and 
financial results may be adversely affected.66 
J. Security Breaches, Hacking, and Phishing Attacks 
Relevant to the inquiry into privacy issues and Russian meddling into the 2016 
and 2018 U.S. elections, Facebook warns, “Security breaches and improper access 
to or disclosure of our data or users data, or other hacking and phishing attacks on 
our systems, could harm our reputation and adversely affect our business.”67 
Accordingly: 
Our industry is prone to cyber-attacks by third 
parties seeking unauthorized access to our data or users’ 
data or to disrupt our ability to provide service. Any 
failure to prevent or mitigate security breaches and 
improper access to or disclosure of our data or user data, 
including personal information, content or payment 
information from users, could result in the loss or misuse 
of such data, which could harm our business and 
reputation and diminish our competitive position. In 
addition, computer malware, viruses, social engineering 
(predominantly spear phishing attacks), and general 
hacking have become more prevalent in our industry, 
have occurred on our systems in the past, and will occur 
on our systems in the future. We also regularly encounter 
attempts to create false or undesirable user accounts, 
purchase ads, or take other actions on our platform for 
purposes such as spamming, spreading misinformation, 
or other objectionable ends. As a result of our 
prominence, the size of our user base, and the types and 
volume of personal data on our systems, we believe that 
we are a particularly attractive target for such breaches 
and attacks. Such attacks may cause interruptions to the 
services we provide, degrade the user experience, cause 
users to lose confidence and trust in our products, impair 
our internal systems, or result in financial harm to us. . . . 
Cyber-attacks continue to evolve in sophistication and 
volume, and inherently may be difficult to detect for long 
periods of time. Although we have developed systems and 
                                                          
66 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 1. See also Lawrence J. Trautman et al., Beginning to Think 
About Ethics and Values in an Age of Rapid Technological Change (Aug. 21, 2018) (discussing social 
media ethical issues). 
67 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 14; see also Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, 
WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging Threat to Corporations, 86(2) TENN. L. REV. 503 (2019); 
Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and 
the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 
33(2) SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The Next Pearl 
Harbor?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 232 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. 
Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341 (2015); David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The 
Dark Web and Employer Liability, 18(1) COLO. TECH. L.J. 1 (2019). 
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processes that are designed to protect our data and user 
data, to prevent data loss, to disable undesirable accounts 
and activities on our platform, and to prevent or detect 
security breaches, we cannot assure you that such 
measures will provide absolute security, and we may 
incur significant costs in protecting against or remediating 
cyber-attacks. 
In addition, some of our developers or other 
partners, such as those that help us measure the 
effectiveness of ads, may receive or store information 
provided by us or by our users through mobile or web 
applications integrated with Facebook. . . . 
Affected users or government authorities could 
initiate legal or regulatory actions against us in 
connection with any security breaches or improper 
disclosure of data, which could cause us to incur 
significant expense and liability or result in orders or 
consent decrees forcing us to modify our business 
practices. Such incidents may also result in a decline in 
our active user base or engagement levels. Any of these 
events could have a material and adverse effect on our 
business, reputation, or financial results.68 
K. Impact of Unfavorable Media Coverage 
Facebook highlights as a risk factor that “Unfavorable media coverage could 
negatively affect our business,”69 as we will see demonstrated in (Infra §§ VI and 
VIII). Accordingly: 
We receive a high degree of media coverage around the 
world. Unfavorable publicity regarding, for example, our 
privacy practices, terms of service, product changes, 
product quality, litigation or regulatory activity, 
government surveillance, the actions of our advertisers, 
the actions of our developers whose products are 
integrated with our products, the use of our products or 
services for illicit, objectionable, or illegal ends, the 
actions of our users, the quality and integrity of content 
shared on our platform, or the actions of other companies 
that provide similar services to us, has in the past, and 
could in the future, adversely affect our reputation. Such 
negative publicity also could have an adverse effect on the 
size, engagement, and loyalty of our user base and result 
                                                          
68 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 14. 
69 Id. at 15. 
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in decreased revenue, which could adversely affect our 
business and financial results.70 
L. Financial Results Fluctuate 
The Company devotes considerable language to the various reasons accounting 
for difficult to predict quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in financial results.71 Space 
limitations require that I omit an additional comment on this topic. 
M. Decline Expected in Future Growth Rate 
Facebook discloses, “We expect our rates of growth to decline in the future.”72 
Much like the natural laws involving Earth’s gravity: 
We expect that our user growth and revenue growth rates 
will decline over time as the size of our active user base 
increases, and it is possible that the size of our active user 
base may fluctuate or decline in one or more markets, 
particularly as we achieve greater market penetration. We 
expect our revenue growth rate will generally decline 
over time as our revenue increases to higher levels. As our 
growth rates decline, investors’ perceptions of our 
business may be adversely affected. . . .73 
N. Costs Continuing to Grow 
The Company reports, “Our costs are continuing to grow, which could reduce 
our operating margin and profitability. If our investments are not successful, our 
business and financial performance could be harmed.”74 Accordingly: 
Operating our business is costly, and we expect our 
expenses to continue to increase in the future as we 
broaden our user base, as users increase the amount and 
types of content they consume and the data they share 
with us, for example with respect to video, as we develop 
and implement new products, as we continue to expand 
our technical infrastructure, as we continue to invest in 
new and unproven technologies, and as we continue to 
hire additional employees to support our expanding 
operations. We will continue to invest in our messaging, 
security, video content, and global connectivity efforts, as 
well as other initiatives that may not have clear paths to 
monetization. . . . In addition, if our investments are not 
                                                          
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 17. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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successful, our ability to grow revenue will be harmed, 
which could adversely affect our business and financial 
performance.75 
O. Laws and Regulations 
According to Facebook, “Our business is subject to complex and evolving U.S. 
and foreign laws regarding privacy, data protection, content, competition, consumer 
protection, and other matters.”76 In addition, “many of these laws and regulations are 
subject to change and uncertain interpretation, and could result in claims, changes to 
our business practices, monetary penalties, increased cost of operations, or declines 
in user growth or engagement, or otherwise harm our business.”77 For example: 
We are subject to a variety of laws and regulations 
in the United States and abroad that involve matters 
central to our business, including privacy, data protection 
and personal information, rights of publicity, content, 
intellectual property, advertising, marketing, distribution, 
data security, data retention and deletion, electronic 
contracts and other communications, competition, 
protection of minors, consumer protection, 
telecommunications, product liability, taxation, economic 
or other trade prohibitions or sanctions, securities law 
compliance, and online payment services. The 
introduction of new products, expansion of our activities 
in certain jurisdictions, or other actions that we may take 
may subject us to additional laws, regulations, or other 
government scrutiny. In addition, foreign data protection, 
privacy, content, competition, and other laws and 
regulations can impose different obligations or be more 
restrictive than those in the United States. 
These U.S. federal and state and foreign laws and 
regulations, which in some cases can be enforced by 
private parties in addition to government entities, are 
constantly evolving and can be subject to significant 
change. As a result, the application, interpretation, and 
enforcement of these laws and regulations are often 
uncertain, particularly in the new and rapidly evolving 
industry in which we operate, and may be interpreted and 
applied inconsistently from country to country and 
inconsistently with our current policies and practices. For 
example, regulatory or legislative actions affecting the 
manner in which we display content to our users or obtain 
consent to various practices could adversely affect user 
growth and engagement. Such actions could affect the 
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 2017 Form 10-K supra note 14, at 6. See also Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The 
SEC and the Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262 (2014). 
77 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 6. 
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manner in which we provide our services or adversely 
affect our financial results. 
We are also subject to laws and regulations that 
dictate whether, how, and under what circumstances we 
can transfer, process and/or receive certain data that is 
critical to our operations, including data shared between 
countries or regions in which we operate and data shared 
among our products and services. For example, in 2016, 
the European Union and United States agreed to an 
alternative transfer framework for data transferred from 
the European Union to the United States, called the 
Privacy Shield, but this new framework is subject to an 
annual review that could result in changes to our 
obligations and also may be challenged by national 
regulators or private parties. In addition, the other bases 
upon which Facebook relies to legitimize the transfer of 
such data, such as standard Model Contractual Clauses 
(MCCs), have been subjected to regulatory and judicial 
scrutiny. For example, the Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner has challenged the legal grounds for 
transfers of user data to Facebook, Inc., and the Irish High 
Court has agreed to refer this challenge to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union for decision. We also face 
multiple inquiries, investigations, and lawsuits in Europe, 
India, and other jurisdictions regarding the August 2016 
update to WhatsApp’s terms of service and privacy policy 
and its sharing of certain data with other Facebook 
products and services, including a lawsuit currently 
pending before the Supreme Court of India. If one or more 
of the legal bases for transferring data from Europe to the 
United States is invalidated, if we are unable to transfer 
data between and among countries and regions in which 
we operate, or if we are prohibited from sharing data 
among our products and services, it could affect the 
manner in which we provide our services or adversely 
affect our financial results. 
Proposed or new legislation and regulations could 
also significantly affect our business. There currently are 
a number of proposals pending before federal, state, and 
foreign legislative and regulatory bodies. In addition, the 
new European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) [took] effect in May 2018 and will apply to all of 
our products and services that provide service in Europe. 
The GDPR will include operational requirements for 
companies that receive or process personal data of 
residents of the European Union that are different than 
those currently in place in the European Union. For 
example, we may be required to implement measures to 
change our service or limit access to our service for 
minors under the age of 16 for certain countries in Europe 
that maintain the minimum age of 16 under the GDPR. 
We may also be required to obtain consent and/or offer 
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new controls to existing and new users in Europe before 
processing data for certain aspects of our service. In 
addition, the GDPR will include significant penalties for 
non-compliance. Similarly, there are a number of 
legislative proposals in the United States, at both the 
federal and state level, that could impose new obligations 
in areas affecting our business, such as liability for 
copyright infringement by third parties. In addition, some 
countries are considering or have passed legislation 
implementing data protection requirements or requiring 
local storage and processing of data or similar 
requirements that could increase the cost and complexity 
of delivering our services. 
These laws and regulations, as well as any 
associated inquiries or investigations or any other 
government actions, may be costly to comply with and 
may delay or impede the development of new products, 
result in negative publicity, increase our operating costs, 
require significant management time and attention, and 
subject us to remedies that may harm our business, 
including fines or demands or orders that we modify or 
cease existing business practices.78 
P. Regulatory and Other Governmental Investigations 
Facebook reports being “subject to regulatory and other government 
investigations, enforcement actions, and settlements, and we expect to continue to 
be subject to such proceedings and other inquires . . . which could cause us to incur 
substantial costs or require us to change our business practices in a manner materially 
adverse to our business.”79 For example: 
From time to time, we receive formal and informal 
inquiries from government authorities and regulators 
regarding our compliance with laws and regulations, 
many of which are evolving and subject to interpretation. 
We are and expect to continue to be the subject of 
investigations, inquiries, data requests, actions, and audits 
in the United States, Europe, and around the world, 
                                                          
78 2017 Form 10-K supra note 14, at 17. See also Darcy Allen et al., Some Economic Consequences 
of the GDPR, 39(2) ECON. BULL. (2019); Marco Almada, Human Intervention in Automated Decision-
Making: Toward the Construction of Contestable Systems (2019); Jonathan Andrew, Location Data and 
Human Mobility: An Evaluation of a Dissonance that Frames Data Protection and Privacy Rights, EUI 
doctoral thesis (2018), Emre Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions in the GDPR: An 
Attempt for Systemisation (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3097653; Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel, 
Law in Books and Law in Action: The Readability of Privacy Policies and the GDPR, CONSUMER L. & 
ECON., Klaus Mathis & Avishalom Tor eds., Consumer Law and Economics (Springer 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3334095; Jean-Sylvestre Bergé et al., The ‘Datasphere’, Data Flows Beyond 
Control, and the Challenges for Law and Governance, 5(2) EURO. J. COMP. L. & GOVERN. (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3185943. 
79 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 18; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional 
Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who and How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016). 
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particularly in the areas of privacy, data protection, law 
enforcement, consumer protection, and competition, as 
we continue to grow and expand our operations. For 
example, several data protection authorities in the 
European Union have initiated actions, investigations, or 
administrative orders seeking to assert jurisdiction over 
Facebook, Inc. and our subsidiaries and to restrict the 
ways in which we collect and use information, and other 
data protection authorities may do the same. Orders 
issued by, or inquiries or enforcement actions initiated by, 
government or regulatory authorities could cause us to 
incur substantial costs, expose us to unanticipated civil 
and criminal liability or penalties (including substantial 
monetary fines), or require us to change our business 
practices in a manner materially adverse to our business.80 
Of particular concern at present, The New York Times states, “Regulators and 
law enforcement officials in the United States and Europe are investigating 
Facebook’s conduct with Cambridge Analytica, a political data firm that worked 
with Mr. Trump’s 2016 campaign, opening up the company to fines and other 
liability.”81 As a result of the 2016 and subsequent election advertising, “[b]oth the 
Trump administration and lawmakers have begun crafting proposals for a national 
privacy law, setting up a years-long struggle over the future of Facebook’s data-
hungry business model.”82 (See §§ VI and IX, infra). 
Q. Protection of Intellectual Property 
Facebook warns, “If we are unable to protect our intellectual property, the value 
of our brands and other intangible assets may be diminished, and our business may 
be adversely affected.”83 In addition: 
We rely and expect to continue to rely on a combination 
of confidentiality, assignment, and license agreements 
with our employees, consultants, and third parties with 
whom we have relationships, as well as trademark, 
copyright, patent, trade secret, and domain name 
protection laws, to protect our proprietary rights. In the 
United States and internationally, we have filed various 
applications for protection of certain aspects of our 
intellectual property, and we currently hold a significant 
number of registered trademarks and issued patents in 
multiple jurisdictions and have acquired patents and 
                                                          
80 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 18. 
81 Frenkel et al., supra note 1, at A1. 
82 Id. 
83 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 19. 
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patent applications from third parties. Third parties may 
knowingly or unknowingly infringe our proprietary 
rights, third parties may challenge proprietary rights held 
by us, and pending and future trademark and patent 
applications may not be approved. . . . Although we have 
generally taken measures to protect our proprietary rights, 
there can be no assurance that others will not offer 
products or concepts that are substantially similar to ours 
and compete with our business. . . .84 
R. Liability from Internet Transmissions or Publications 
The Company warns, “We may incur liability as a result of information 
retrieved from or transmitted over the Internet or published using our products or as 
a result of claims related to our products.”85 
We have faced, currently face, and will continue to face 
claims relating to information that is published or made 
available on our products. In particular, the nature of our 
business exposes us to claims related to defamation, 
dissemination of misinformation or news hoaxes, 
discrimination, intellectual property rights, rights of 
publicity and privacy, personal injury torts, or laws 
regulating hate speech or other types of content. This risk 
is enhanced in certain jurisdictions outside the United 
States where our protection from liability for third-party 
actions may be unclear or where we may be less protected 
under local laws than we are in the United States. In 
addition, there have been various Congressional efforts to 
restrict the scope of the protections available to online 
platforms under Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, and our current protections from liability 
for third-party content in the United States could decrease 
or change. We could incur significant costs investigating 
and defending such claims and, if we are found liable, 
significant damages. We could also face fines or orders 
restricting or blocking our services in particular 
geographies as a result of content hosted on our services. 
For example, recently enacted legislation in Germany 
may impose significant fines for failure to comply with 
certain content removal and disclosure obligations. If any 
of these events occur, our business and financial results 
could be adversely affected.86 
                                                          
84 Id. 
85 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 20. 
86 Id. 
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S. Disruption of Technical Infrastructure, Undetected Vulnerabilities 
Of particular importance to our discussion, Facebook highlights recognition 
that, “Our business is dependent on our ability to maintain and scale our technical 
infrastructure, and any significant disruption in our service could damage our 
reputation, result in a potential loss of users and engagement, and adversely affect 
our financial results.”87 Other technological risks include, “unforeseen difficulties in 
building and operating key portions of our technical infrastructure. . . . Our products 
and internal systems rely on software that is highly technical, and if it contains 
undetected errors or vulnerabilities, our business could be adversely affected.”88 
Accordingly: 
Our reputation and ability to attract, retain, and 
serve our users is dependent upon the reliable 
performance of our products and our underlying technical 
infrastructure. . . . If our products are unavailable when 
users attempt to access them, or if they do not load as 
quickly as expected, users may not use our products as 
often in the future, or at all, and our ability to serve ads 
may be disrupted. As our user base and engagement 
continue to grow, and the amount and types of 
information shared on Facebook and our other products 
continue to grow and evolve, such as increased 
engagement with video, we will need an increasing 
amount of technical infrastructure, including network 
capacity and computing power, to continue to satisfy the 
needs of our users and advertisers. . . . A substantial 
portion of our network infrastructure is provided by third 
parties. Any disruption or failure in the services we 
receive from these providers could harm our ability to 
handle existing or increased traffic and could significantly 
harm our business. Any financial or other difficulties 
these providers face may adversely affect our business, 
and we exercise little control over these providers, which 
increases our vulnerability to problems with the services 
they provide. 
We could experience unforeseen difficulties in 
building and operating key portions of our technical 
infrastructure. . . . 
Our products and internal systems rely on 
software that is highly technical, and if it contains 
undetected errors or vulnerabilities, our business could 
be adversely affected. . . . 
                                                          
87 Id. at 21. 
88 Id. at 22. 
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Technologies have been developed that can block 
the display of our ads, which could adversely affect our 
financial results. . . .89 
T. Real or Perceived Inaccuracies in User and Other Metrics 
Facebook discloses that “real or perceived inaccuracies in our user and other 
metrics may harm our reputation and negatively affect our business.”90 
The numbers for our key metrics, which include our 
DAUs, MAUs, and average revenue per user (ARPU), are 
calculated using internal company data based on the 
activity of user accounts. While these numbers are based 
on what we believe to be reasonable estimates of our user 
base for the applicable period of measurement, there are 
inherent challenges in measuring usage of our products 
across large online and mobile populations around the 
world. In addition, we are continually seeking to improve 
our estimates of our user base, and such estimates may 
change due to improvements or changes in our 
methodology. 
We regularly evaluate these metrics to estimate the 
number of “duplicate” and “false” accounts among our 
MAUs. A duplicate account is one that a user maintains 
in addition to his or her principal account. We divide 
“false” accounts into two categories: (1) user-
misclassified accounts, where users have created personal 
profiles for a business, organization, or non-human entity 
such as a pet (such entities are permitted on Facebook 
using a Page rather than a personal profile under our terms 
of service); and (2) undesirable accounts, which represent 
user profiles that we determine are intended to be used for 
purposes that violate our terms of service, such as 
spamming. The estimates of duplicate and false accounts 
are based on an internal review of a limited sample of 
accounts, and we apply significant judgment in making 
this determination. For example, to identify duplicate 
accounts we use data signals such as similar IP addresses 
or usernames, and to identify false accounts we look for 
names that appear to be fake or other behavior that 
appears inauthentic to the reviewers. Our estimates may 
change as our methodologies evolve, including through 
the application of new data signals or technologies, which 
may allow us to identify previously undetected duplicate 
or false accounts and may improve our ability to evaluate 
a broader population of our users. As such, our estimation 
of duplicate or false accounts may not accurately 
represent the actual number of such accounts. In 
                                                          
89 Id. at 21. 
90 Id. at 22. 
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particular, duplicate accounts are very difficult to 
measure at our scale, and it is possible that the actual 
number of duplicate accounts may vary significantly from 
our estimates. 
In the fourth quarter of 2017, we estimate that 
duplicate accounts may have represented approximately 
10% of our worldwide MAUs. We believe the percentage 
of duplicate accounts is meaningfully higher in 
developing markets such as India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, as compared to more developed markets. In 
the fourth quarter of 2017, we estimate that false accounts 
may have represented approximately 3–4% of our 
worldwide MAUs. Our estimation of false accounts can 
vary as a result of episodic spikes in the creation of such 
accounts, which we have seen originate more frequently 
in specific countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, and 
Vietnam. From time to time, we may make product 
changes or take other actions to reduce the number of 
duplicate or false accounts among our users, which may 
also reduce our DAU and MAU estimates in a particular 
period.91 
U. Payment Transactions 
Facebook warns, “payment transactions may subject us to additional regulatory 
requirements and other risks that could be costly and difficult to comply with or that 
could harm our business.92 Technology thought leaders Ben Thompson and James 
Allworth contend that “payments” built around blockchain technology will likely 
become a major foundational building block for Facebook’s future strategy.93 The 
Company explains: 
Our users can purchase virtual and digital goods from 
developers that offer applications using our Payments 
infrastructure on the Facebook website. In addition, 
certain of our users can use our Payments infrastructure, 
including on Messenger, for other activities, such as 
sending money to other users and making donations to 
                                                          
91 Id. 
92 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 23; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual 
Currencies, and the Struggle of Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018); 
Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic Payment System 
Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (Spring 2016). 
93 See Ben Thompson & James Allworth, Mark Zuckerberg’s Projected Self, EXPONENT, Episode 
165 (Mar. 8, 2019) (discussing Facebook’s future strategy of cross selling ease of use payments function), 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/exponent/id826420969?mt=2&i=1000431353735; Lawrence J. 
Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for Blockchain, 88(1) UMKC L. REV. 1 (2019); Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 232 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty 
Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014). 
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certain charitable organizations. We are subject to a 
variety of laws and regulations in the United States, 
Europe, and elsewhere, including those governing anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, money 
transmission, gift cards and other prepaid access 
instruments, electronic funds transfer, charitable 
fundraising, and import and export restrictions. . . . In 
addition, we may be subject to a variety of additional risks 
as a result of Payments transactions, including: 
● increased costs and diversion of management time 
and effort and other resources to deal with bad 
transactions or customer disputes; 
● potential fraudulent or otherwise illegal activity by 
users, developers, employees, or third parties; 
● restrictions on the investment of consumer funds 
used to transact Payments; and 
● additional disclosure and reporting requirements.94 
V. International Operations 
The Company notes, “we have significant international operations and plan to 
continue expanding our operations abroad where we have more limited operating 
experience, and this may subject us to increased business and economic risks that 
could affect our financial results.”95 In addition: 
We have significant international operations and plan to 
continue the international expansion of our business 
operations and the translation of our products. We 
currently make Facebook available in more than 100 
different languages, and we have offices or data centers 
in more than 30 different countries. We may enter new 
international markets where we have limited or no 
experience in marketing, selling, and deploying our 
products. Our products are generally available globally 
through the web and on mobile, but some or all of our 
products or functionality may not be available in certain 
markets due to legal and regulatory complexities. For 
example, Facebook and certain of our other products are 
not generally available in China . . . we are subject to a 
variety of risks inherent in doing business internationally, 
including: 
● Political, social, or economic instability; 
                                                          
94 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 23. 
95 2017 Form 10-K, supra note 14, at 23. See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Rapid Technological 
Change and U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in International Markets: Focus on Bribery and Corruption 
(2017). 
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● risks related to legal, regulatory, and other 
government scrutiny applicable to U.S. companies 
with sales and operations in foreign jurisdictions, 
including with respect to privacy, tax, law 
enforcement, content, trade compliance, 
intellectual property, and terrestrial infrastructure 
matters; 
● potential damage to our brand and reputation due to 
compliance with local laws, including potential 
censorship or requirements to provide user 
information to local authorities; 
● fluctuations in currency exchange rates and 
compliance with currency controls; 
● foreign exchange controls and tax and other 
regulations and orders that might prevent us from 
repatriating cash earned in countries outside the 
United States or otherwise limit our ability to move 
cash freely, and impede our ability to invest such 
cash efficiently; 
● higher levels of credit risk and payment fraud; 
● enhanced difficulties of integrating any foreign 
acquisitions; 
● burdens of complying with a variety of foreign 
laws; 
● reduced protection for intellectual property rights in 
some countries; 
● difficulties in staffing, managing, and overseeing 
global operations and the increased travel, 
infrastructure, and legal compliance costs 
associated with multiple international locations; 
● compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, the U.K. Bribery Act, and similar laws in other 
jurisdictions; and 
● compliance with statutory equity requirements and 
management of tax consequences. 
If we are unable to expand internationally and manage the 
complexity of our global operations successfully, our 
financial results could be adversely affected.96 
                                                          
96 2017 Form 10-K supra note 14, at 24. See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-
Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145 (2011); 
Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Update on 
Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 241 (2013); Lawrence J. Trautman & Joanna 
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VI. THE FACEBOOK PRIVACY CRISIS 
The Facebook matter involving Aleksander Kogan and 
Cambridge Analytica shed a bright light on the data 
practices of some of our largest technology companies. 
Although advertisers and political campaigns have 
collected and used data for years, the public seemed 
generally unaware. This story has forced both the public 
and lawmakers to confront serious issues that need to be 
addressed, including what role Congress should play in 
promoting transparency for consumers regarding data 
collection and use, while ensuring a well-functioning 
marketplace for our data-dependent technologies to drive 
further innovation. 
Senator Chuck Grassley, 
Chairman, Senate Judiciary 
Committee 
May 16, 201897 
Recently, many legal scholars have been focused on issues related to the impact 
by social media on individual privacy rights.98 Any discussion of the Facebook 
privacy crisis must start with an attempt to understand the revolutionary change in 
the societal and economic ecosystem that is now less than two decades old. 
A. Surveillance Capitalism 
Harvard Business School Emerita Professor Soshana Zuboff has provided 
perhaps the most comprehensive analysis yet about how our world has been 
disrupted by the dark side of a technological future.99 In her influential book, The 
                                                          
Kimbell, Bribery and Corruption: The COSO Framework, FCPA, and U.K. Bribery Act, 30 FLA. J. INT’L 
L. 191 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns and Money—The 
Bribery Problem and U.K. Bribery Act, 47 INT’L LAW. 481 (2013). 
97 Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Sen. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/cambridge-analytica-and-the-future-of-data-privacy. 
98 See Patricia Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy 
and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63 (2012); Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R. 
Taylor & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 52 J. ECON. LIT. (2016); Derek E. Bambauer, 
Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014); Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1457 (2012); Jordan M. Blanke, The Legislative Response to Employers’ Requests for Password 
Disclosure, 14 SUFFOLK U. J. HIGH TECH. L. (2014); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform 
Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27 (2019); Christopher Borchert, 
Fernando M. Pinguelo & David Thaw, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Settings: Social Media and 
the Stored Communications Act, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 36 (2015); Danah Boyd & Alice E. Marwick, 
Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies, Symposium, A Decade 
in Internet Time: Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society (2011), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1925128; Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014). 
99 See ZUBOFF, supra note 48. 
 
 
 
 
T H E  F A C E B O O K  P R I V A C Y  C R I S I S  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.234 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
Age of Surveillance Capitalism, published in 2019, Professor Zuboff writes, “At its 
core, surveillance capitalism is parasitic and self-referential. It revives Karl Marx’s 
old image of capitalism as a vampire that feeds on labor, but with an unexpected 
turn. Instead of labor, surveillance capitalism feeds on every aspect of every human’s 
experience.”100 In sum: 
Surveillance capitalism operates through unprecedented 
asymmetries in knowledge and the power that accrues to 
knowledge. Surveillance capitalists know everything 
about us, whereas their operations are designed to be 
unknowable to us. They accumulate vast domains of new 
knowledge from us, but not for us. They predict our 
futures for the sake of others’ gain, not ours. As long as 
surveillance capitalism and its behavioral futures markets 
are allowed to thrive, ownership of the new means of 
behavioral modification eclipse ownership of the means 
of production as the fountainhead of capitalist wealth and 
power in the twenty-first century.101 
Building upon the teachings of Meyer, Planck, Skinner, Friedrich Hayek and 
Adam Smith, Professor Zuboff discusses the linking by Smith and Hayek of freedom 
and ignorance: 
In Hayek’s framing, the mystery of the market is 
that a great many people can behave effectively while 
remaining ignorant of the whole. Individuals not only can 
choose freely, but they must freely choose their own 
pursuits because there is no alternative, no source of total 
knowledge or conscious control to guide them. “Human 
design” is impossible, Hayek says, because the relevant 
information flows are “beyond the span of the control of 
any one mind.” The market dynamic makes it possible for 
people to operate in ignorance without “anyone having to 
tell them what to do.” 
Hayek chose the market over democracy, arguing 
that the market system enabled not only the division of 
labor but also “the coordinated utilization of resources 
based on equally divided knowledge.” This system, he 
argued, is the only one compatible with freedom.102 
Professor Zuboff writes, “[w]hen it comes to surveillance capitalist operations, 
the ‘market’ is no longer invisible, certainly not in the way that Smith or Hayek 
imagined. The competitive struggle among surveillance capitalists produces the 
                                                          
100 Id. at 9. 
101 Id. at 11. 
102 Id. at 497. 
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compulsion toward totality.”103 Therefore, in a dramatic rebuke of the foundational 
concept of the “market” being intrinsically unknowable—Professor Zuboff observes, 
“[t]otal information tends toward certainty and the promise of guaranteed outcomes. 
These operations mean that the supply and demand of behavioral futures markets are 
rendered in infinite detail. Surveillance capitalism thus replaces mystery with 
certainty as it substitutes rendition, behavioral modification, and prediction for the 
old ‘unsurveyable pattern.’”104 Professors Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal 
Roberts observe that after 2016: 
Something fundamental was happening to threaten 
democracy, and our collective eye fell on the novel and 
rapidly changing—technology. Technological processes 
beyond the control of any person or country—the 
convergence of social media, algorithmic news curation, 
bots, artificial intelligence, and big data analysis—were 
creating echo chambers that reinforce our biases, were 
removing indicia of trustworthiness, and were generally 
overwhelming our capacity to make sense of the world, 
and with it our capacity to govern ourselves as reasonable 
democracies.105 
To help us better understand this pervasive economic engine that is just a few 
decades old, Professor Zuboff writes that “Google is to surveillance capitalism what 
the Ford Motor Company and General Motors were to mass-production-based 
managerial capitalism. New economic logics and their commercial models are 
discovered by people in a time and place and then perfected through trial and 
error.”106 In recent years, “Google became the pioneer, discoverer, elaborator, 
experimenter, lead practitioner, role model, and diffusion hub of surveillance 
capitalism.”107 UC Berkeley professor and longtime Google chief economist Hal 
Varian is credited with providing the logic of surveillance capitalism in four primary 
uses: “(1) data extraction and analysis; (2) new contractual forms due to better 
monitoring; (3) personalization and customization; and (4) continuous 
experiments.”108 Professor Zuboff writes, “[i]t’s not just that the cards have been 
                                                          
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND 
RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (2018). 
106 ZUBOFF, supra note 48. 
107 Id. 
108 ZUBOFF, supra note 48 (citing Hal R. Varian, Computer Mediated Transactions, 100 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1 (2010)); Hal R. Varian, Beyond Big Data, 49 BUS. ECON. 27 (2014). See also Gregory Day & 
Abbey Stemler, Supracompetitive Privacy, 107 IOWA L. REV. 61 (2019) (discussion regarding capturing 
and extracting value from data). 
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reshuffled; the rules of the game have been transformed into something that is both 
unprecedented and unimaginable outside the digital milieu and the vast resources of 
wealth and scientific prowess that the new applied utopianists bring to the table.”109 
As just one of the many remaining insights provided by professor Zuboff: 
Surveillance capitalisms command and control of the 
division of learning in society are the signature feature 
that breaks with the old justifications of the invisible hand 
and its entitlements. The combination of knowledge and 
freedom works to accelerate the asymmetry of power 
between surveillance capitalists and the societies in which 
they operate. This cycle will be broken only when we 
acknowledge as citizens, as societies, and indeed as a 
civilization that surveillance capitalists know too much to 
qualify for freedom.110 
B. Fake News 
By now, much has been written about “fake news.”111 Professor Shoshana 
Zuboff traces this rather recent development to “Facebook’s and Google’s 
overreaching ambitions to supplant professional journalism on the Internet.112 Both 
corporations inserted themselves between publishers and their populations, 
subjecting journalistic ‘content’ to the same categories of equivalence that dominate 
                                                          
109 ZUBOFF, supra note 48, at 499. 
110 Id. 
111 See Christoph Aymanns, Jakob Foerster & Co-Pierre Georg, Fake News in Social Networks 1–
24 (U. St. Gallen, School of Fin., Paper No. 2018/4, 2017); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic 
Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149 
(2018); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59 (2018); 
Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, 
and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753 (2018); Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, 
Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035 (2018); Michael C. Dorf 
& Sidney Tarrow, Stings and Scams: ‘Fake News,’ the First Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism 
1–31 (Cornell Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 17-02, 2017); James Grimmelmann, The Platform is the 
Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 217 (2018); Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to 
American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200 (2018); Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting 
Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 629 (2018); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Eduard 
Meleshinsky, Native Advertising and Endorsement: Schema, Source-Based Misleadingness, and 
Omission of Material Facts, 2015121503 TECH. SCI. (2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015121503; Dan 
M. Kahan, Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition 1–9 (Yale L. 
Sch., Pub. L. Research Paper No. 605, 2017); Jacob Nelson & Harsh Taneja, The Small, Disloyal Fake 
News Audience: The Role of Audience Availability in Fake News Consumption, 20 NEW MEDIA & 
SOCIETY 3720 (2018); Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer & Jane R. Yakowitz Bambauer, Identifying 
and Countering Fake News 1–33 (Ariz. Legal Stud., Discussion Paper No. 17-15, 2017); Ari Ezra 
Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 101 (2018); Abby K. Wood & Ann M. 
Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating ‘Fake News’ and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227 
(2018). 
112 Keach Hagey, Lukas I. Alpert & Yaryna Serkez, Local News Fades Out: A Divide Between 
Newspaper Haves and Have-Nots, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2019, at B1. 
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surveillance capitalism’s other landscapes.”113 Professor Zuboff states that the job of 
the journalist, “is to produce news and analysis that separate truth from falsehood . . . 
Facebook’s decision to standardize the presentation of its News Feed content so that 
‘all news stories looked roughly the same as each other . . . [assisted] organized 
political disinformation campaigns . . . during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election.’”114 
C. Facebook Privacy Crisis 
During recent years, disagreements about privacy issues at Facebook appear to 
have resulted in several high-profile departures, including: Elliot Schrange, who 
previously served as vice president for global communications, marketing, and 
public policy; and security chief Alex Stamos.115 Facebook top management, in 
particular Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg, have “cast their company as a 
force for social good. Facebook’s lofty aims were emblazoned even on security 
filings: ‘Our mission is to make the world more open and connected.’”116 As a 
business model, “Facebook had positioned itself as a platform, not a publisher. 
Taking responsibility for what users posted, or acting to censor it, was expensive and 
complicated. Many Facebook executives worried that any such effort would 
backfire.”117 
D. Congressional Hearings 
Earlier drafts of this manuscript stressed many concerns voiced by members of 
Congress during hearings held in 2018. Nevertheless, many of these concerns were 
eclipsed by developments during early 2019, and a considerable amount of language 
was removed from earlier drafts of this manuscript to make room for discussion of 
more recent developments as new revelations were uncovered. In their annual report 
for the period ending December 31, 2018, Facebook starts to talk about their “privacy 
crisis” by disclosing: 
Beginning on March 20, 2018, multiple putative 
class actions and derivative actions were filed in state and 
federal courts in the United States and elsewhere against 
us and certain of our directors and officers alleging 
violations of securities laws, breach of fiduciary duties, 
and other causes of action in connection with our platform 
and user data practices as well as the misuse of certain 
                                                          
113 ZUBOFF, supra note 48, at 506. 
114 Id. at 507; see also Erin Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and Privacy in the 
Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69 (2017). 
115 See Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
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data by a developer that shared such data with third parties 
in violation of our terms and policies, and seeking 
unspecified damages and injunctive relief. Beginning on 
July 27, 2018, two putative class actions were filed in 
federal court in the United States against us and certain of 
our directors and officers alleging violations of securities 
laws in connection with the disclosure of our earnings 
results for the second quarter of 2018, and seeking 
unspecified damages. These two actions subsequently 
were transferred and consolidated in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California with the 
putative securities class action described above relating to 
our platform and user data practices. We believe these 
lawsuits are without merit, and we are vigorously 
defending them. In addition, our platform and user data 
practices, as well as the events surrounding the misuse of 
certain data by a developer, became the subject of U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, state attorneys general, and other 
government inquiries in the United States, Europe, and 
other jurisdictions. Any such inquiries could subject us to 
substantial fines and costs, require us to change our 
business practices, divert resources and the attention of 
management from our business, or adversely affect our 
business. 
Beginning on September 28, 2018, multiple 
putative class actions were filed in state and federal courts 
in the United States and elsewhere against us alleging 
violations of consumer protection laws and other causes 
of action in connection with a third-party cyber-attack 
that exploited a vulnerability in Facebook’s code to steal 
user access tokens and access certain profile information 
from user accounts on Facebook, and seeking unspecified 
damages and injunctive relief. We believe these lawsuits 
are without merit, and we are vigorously defending them. 
In addition, the events surrounding this cyber-attack 
became the subject of Irish Data Protection Commission, 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission and other government 
inquiries in the United States, Europe, and other 
jurisdictions. Any such inquiries could subject us to 
substantial fines and costs, require us to change our 
business practices, divert resources and the attention of 
management from our business, or adversely affect our 
business. 
In addition, from time to time, we are subject to 
litigation and other proceedings involving law 
enforcement and other regulatory agencies, including in 
particular in Brazil and Europe, in order to ascertain the 
precise scope of our legal obligations to comply with the 
requests of those agencies, including our obligation to 
disclose user information in particular circumstances. A 
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number of such instances have resulted in the assessment 
of fines and penalties against us.118 
1. Congressional Hearings of April 10 and 11, 2018 
By early 2018 Facebook was in a full privacy crisis as demonstrated by the 
aggressive Congressional examination of Mr. Zuckerberg, “repeatedly cutting off 
the Facebook CEO so he couldn’t ‘filibuster,’ as Representative Martha Blackburn 
put it. Representatives from both parties came back time and again to what Facebook 
knows, what Facebook tells users about what it knows, and what Facebook lets 
advertisers do with what it knows.”119 Mr. Zuckerberg stated, “For most of our 
existence, we focused on all the good that connecting people can bring. . . . After 
Hurricane Harvey, people raised more than $20 million for relief. And more than 70 
million small businesses now use Facebook to grow and create jobs.”120 And then, 
Mr. Zuckerberg states: 
But it’s clear now that we didn’t do enough to prevent 
these tools from being used for harm as well. That goes 
for fake news, foreign interference in elections, and hate 
speech, as well as developers and data privacy. We didn’t 
take a broad enough view of our responsibility, and that 
was a big mistake. It was my mistake, and I am sorry. I 
started Facebook, I run it, and I am responsible for what 
happens here.121 
Following these highly publicized Congressional Hearings, on June 8, 2018122 
and June 29, 2018 Facebook provided responses to questions from the legislators, 
stating “we received over 2,000 questions from the Senate and House Committees 
before which we testified on April 10 and 11, 2018.”123 
                                                          
118 2018 Form 10-K, supra note 15, at 30. 
119 See Alexis C. Madrigal, The Most Important Exchange of the Zuckerberg Hearing, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/04/the-most-
important-exchange-of-the-zuckerberg-hearing/557795/. 
120 Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary and S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) 
(statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and CEO, Facebook), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ 
meetings/facebook-social-media-privacy-and-the-use-and-abuse-of-data. 
121 Id. 
122 Letter from Facebook, Inc. to Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman, and Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm. (June 28, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ 
imo/media/doc/Zuckerberg%20Responses%20to%20Judiciary%20Committee%20QFRs.pdf. 
123 Letter from Facebook, Inc. to Rep. Chairman Gregory Walden and Ranking Member Rep. Frank 
Pallone, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (June 29, 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/ 
20180411/108090/HHRG-115-IF00-Wstate-ZuckerbergM-20180411.pdf (containing 752 pages of 
answers to congressional questions). 
 
 
 
 
T H E  F A C E B O O K  P R I V A C Y  C R I S I S  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.234 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
2. Senate Judiciary Hearings on Cambridge Analytica of May 16, 2018 
As Professor Sarah Haan describes, “With the benefit of hindsight, a federal 
indictment, and a growing body of research, we now know that political discourse 
on social media in 2015 and 2016 was influenced by fake accounts run by foreign 
state actors.”124 
In his opening remarks, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley 
observed, “The Facebook story first broke in December 2015, when The Guardian 
identified that Dr. Kogan had transferred Facebook data to Cambridge Analytica in 
violation of Facebook’s data policy.”125 By now, over three years after its first 
awareness of Facebook’s role in Russian election meddling, many scholars have 
written about this Cambridge Analytica story that continues to unfold.126 Space 
limitations prohibit more coverage of this topic here. 
3. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearings of September 5, 2018 
Journalist Katy Steinmetz writes, “Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg faced 
grilling from lawmakers on issues ranging from user privacy and hate speech to the 
integrity of their business models and criminals who use platforms to paddle 
drugs.”127 In her prepared opening testimony, Ms. Sandberg states: 
As this committee’s bipartisan report states, in 
January 2017, the CIA, NSA, and FBI “revealed key 
elements of a comprehensive and multifaceted Russian 
campaign against the United States.” The Committee’s 
subsequent investigation “has exposed a far more 
extensive Russian effort to manipulate social media 
outlets to sow discord and to interfere in the 2016 election 
and American society,” as well as additional examples of 
                                                          
124 Sarah C. Haan, Bad Actors (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
125 See Statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, supra note 97. 
126 See, e.g., ANATOLIY GRUZD, JENNA JACOBSON, PHILIP MAI & ELIZABETH DUBOIS, SOCIAL 
MEDIA PRIVACY IN CANADA (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3195503; DAPHNE KELLER, TOWARD A 
CLEARER CONVERSATION ABOUT PLATFORM LIABILITY, Knight First Amendment Institute’s “Emerging 
Threats” essay series (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186867; SHAUN B. SPENCER, THE PROBLEM OF 
ONLINE MANIPULATION (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341653; YAN SHVARTZSHNAIDER, NOAH 
APTHORPE, NICK FEAMSTER & HELEN F. NISSENBAUM, ANALYZING PRIVACY POLICIES USING 
CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY ANNOTATIONS (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244876; HAMID AKIN 
UNVER, DIGITAL OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A PRIMER, EDAM RES. 
RPTS, CYBER GOVN. & DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331638. 
127 Katy Steinmetz, Lawmakers Hint at Regulating Social Media During Hearing With Facebook 
and Twitter Execs, TIME (Sept. 5, 2018), http://time.com/5387560/senate-intelligence-hearing-facebook-
twitter/; see also Natasha Lomas, Highlights from the Senate Intelligence Hearing with Facebook and 
Twitter, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 5, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/05/highlights-from-the-senate-
intelligence-hearing-with-facebook-and-twitter/. 
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Russia’s attempts to “interfere in U.S. elections and those 
of our allies.” 
We were too slow to spot this and too slow to act. 
That’s on us. This interference was completely 
unacceptable. It violated the values of our company and 
of the country we love. . . . 
We’re investing heavily in people and technology 
to keep our community safe and keep our service secure. 
This includes using artificial intelligence to help find bad 
content and locate bad actors. We’re shutting down fake 
accounts and reducing the spread of false news. We’ve 
put in place new ad transparency policies, ad content 
restrictions, and documentation requirements for political 
ad buyers. We’re getting better at anticipating risks and 
taking a broader view of our responsibilities. And we’re 
working closely with law enforcement and our industry 
peers to share information and make progress together.128 
E. New York Times Disclosures of November 2018 
On November 15, 2018, The New York Times ran a front-page story describing 
how Facebook covered up knowledge and disclosure of Russian-linked activity and 
exploitation resulting in Kremlin led disruption of the 2016 U.S. elections, 
“broadcast [of] viral propaganda and inspir[ing] deadly campaigns of hate across the 
globe.”129 Other topics receiving particular attention in this New York Times article 
include: the President Trump Muslim ban; hate speech; opposition research; and 
focused attack on enemies and competitors. These and other revelations have 
resulted in a crisis for the leading global social media platform. According to The 
New York Times, “Mr. Zuckerberg and Ms. Sandberg stumbled. Bent on growth, the 
pair ignored warning signs and then sought to conceal them from public view. At 
critical moments over the last three years, they were distracted by personal projects, 
and passed off security and policy decisions to subordinates. . . .”130 
The New York Times article states, 
when Facebook users learned last spring [2018] that the 
company had compromised their privacy in its rush to 
expand, allowing access to the information of tens of 
millions of people to a political data firm linked to 
                                                          
128 Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Sheryl 
Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer, Facebook, Inc.), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-
hearing-foreign-influence-operations%E2%80%99-use-social-media-platforms-company-witnesses. 
129 Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
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President Trump, Facebook sought to deflect blame and 
mask the extent of the problem.131 
During March 2018 The Guardian and New York Times reported that consulting firm 
Cambridge Analytica successfully harvested personal data from a Facebook quiz app 
to identify potential Donald Trump voters.132 At that time, CEO Mark Zuckerberg 
stated, “I started this place, I run it . . . I’m responsible for what happens here. . . . 
Facebook has 15,000 people working on security and reviewing content, and will 
have 20,000 by the end of the year [2018].”133 
The New York Times observes, “as the company’s stock price plummeted and 
its disclosures set off a consumer backlash—Facebook went on the attack.”134 
Accordingly: 
While Mr. Zuckerberg has conducted a public apology 
tour in the last year, Ms. Sandberg has overseen an 
aggressive lobbying campaign to combat Facebook’s 
critics, shift public anger toward rival companies and 
ward off damaging regulation. Facebook employed a 
Republican opposition-research firm to discredit activist 
protesters, in part by linking them to the liberal financier 
George Soros. It also tapped its business relationships, 
persuading a Jewish civil rights group to cast some 
criticism of the company as anti-Semitic.135 
F. 2016 Russian Election Meddling 
Professors Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts have written, “[o]n 
January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a report 
that blamed Russia of running a disinformation campaign aimed to influence the U.S. 
election with the aim of helping Donald Trump get elected.”136 We now know that, 
about a year earlier, engineers at Facebook discovered Russian-linked activity during 
                                                          
131 Id. 
132 See Michelle Castillo, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg: “I’m Responsible for What Happened” 
With data Privacy Issues, CNBC.COM (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/04/mark-
zuckerberg-facebook-user-privacy-issues-my-mistake.html. 
133 Id. 
134 Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
135 Id. 
136 YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND 
RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (2018) (citing to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions 
in Recent US Elections,” Intelligence Community Assessment (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/ 
files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.); see also Michael Morley, The Channels of Foreign Interference in 
American Elections (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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spring of 2016 that was designed to disrupt the U.S. presidential election.137 The New 
York Times reports, “a company expert on Russian cyberwarfare spotted something 
worrisome. He reached out to his boss, Mr. [Alex] Stamos. Mr. Stamos’s team 
discovered that Russian hackers appeared to be probing Facebook accounts for 
people connected to the presidential campaigns, said two employees.”138 The New 
York Times further reports, “Months later, as Mr. Trump battled Hillary Clinton in 
the general election, the team also found Facebook accounts linked to Russian 
hackers who were messaging journalists to share information from the stolen 
emails.”139 
Mr. Stamos, a computer science engineer by academic training, has conducted 
research, published on the subject of cybersecurity,140 and occupies by virtue of his 
tenure at Yahoo the distinction of likely having the most personal hands-on crisis 
experience with cyberbreaches of major social media enterprises.141 Mr. Stamos 
reportedly informed Facebook’s general counsel about the Russian hacker discovery, 
and according to The New York Times, “at the time, Facebook had no policy on 
disinformation or any resources dedicated to searching for it. Mr. Stamos, acting on 
his own, then directed a team to scrutinize the extent of Russian activity on 
Facebook.”142 Then, according to The New York Times, “In December 2016, after 
Mr. Zuckerberg publicly scoffed at the idea that fake news on Facebook had helped 
elect Mr. Trump, Mr. Stamos—alarmed that the company’s chief executive seemed 
unaware of his team’s findings—met with Mr. Zuckerberg, Ms. Sandberg and other 
top Facebook leaders.”143 The New York Times reports: 
Ms. Sandberg was angry. Looking into the Russian 
activity without approval, she said, had left the company 
exposed legally. Other executives asked Mr. Stamos why 
they had not been told sooner. 
Still, Ms. Sandberg and Mr. Zuckerberg decided to 
expand on Mr. Stamos’s work, creating a group called 
Project P, for “propaganda,” to study false news on the 
site, according to people involved in the discussions. By 
January 2017, the group knew that Mr. Stamos’s original 
                                                          
137 Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See CENTER FOR NAT’L SEC. & COOPERATION, Stanford U., Alex Stamos, Adjunct Professor, 
William J. Perry Fellow, Visiting Scholar Hoover Institution, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/people/alex-
stamos-0. 
141 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and Officers’ 
Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (2017). 
142 Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
143 Id. 
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team had only scratched the surface of Russian activity on 
Facebook, and pressed to issue a public paper about their 
findings. 
But Mr. Kaplan and other Facebook executives 
objected. Washington was already reeling from an official 
finding by American intelligence agencies that Vladimir 
V. Putin, the Russian president, had personally ordered an 
influence campaign aimed at helping elect Mr. Trump. 
If Facebook implicated Russia further, Mr. Kaplan 
said, Republicans would accuse the company of siding 
with Democrats. And if Facebook pulled down the 
Russians’ fake pages, regular Facebook users might also 
react with outrage at having been deceived: His own 
mother-in-law, Mr. Kaplan said, had followed a 
Facebook page created by Russian trolls. . . . 
Throughout the spring and summer of 2017, 
Facebook officials repeatedly played down Senate 
investigator’s concerns about the company, while 
publicly claiming there had been no Russian effort of any 
significance on Facebook. 
But inside the company, employees were tracing 
more ads, pages and groups back to Russia. That June 
[2017], a reporter for The New York Times provided 
Facebook a list of accounts with suspected ties to Russia, 
asking about their provenance. By August 2017, 
Facebook executives concluded that the situation had 
become what one called a “five-alarm-fire,” said a person 
familiar with the discussions.144 
Facebook’s quarterly meeting of its board of directors on September 6, 2017 
proves to be a pivotal moment in the company’s disclosure saga. In discharging their 
duty of care, Facebook directors are required to monitor and be informed.145 
The New York Times reports that Mr. Zuckerberg and Ms. Sandberg, “asked 
Mr. Stamos and Mr. Stretch [general counsel] to brief the board’s audit committee, 
whose chairman is Erskine Bowles, the patrician investor and White House 
veteran.”146 According to The New York Times account: 
Mr. Stretch and Mr. Stamos went into more detail 
with the audit committee than planned, warning that 
Facebook was likely to find even more evidence of 
Russian interference. 
                                                          
144 Frenkel et al., supra note 1, at A14. 
145 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 945 (1989). 
146 Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
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The disclosures set off Mr. Bowles, who after years 
in Washington could anticipate how lawmakers might 
react. He grilled the two men, occasionally cursing, on 
how Facebook had allowed itself to become a tool for 
Russian interference. He demanded to know why it had 
taken so long to uncover the activity, and why Facebook 
directors were only now being told. 
When the full board gathered later that day, 
Mr. Bowles pelted questions at Facebook’s founder and 
second-in-command. Ms. Sandberg, visibly unsettled, 
apologized. Mr. Zuckerberg, stone-faced, whirred 
through technical fixes, said three people who attended or 
were briefed on the proceedings. 
Later that day the company’s abbreviated blog post 
went up . . . disclosing only that Russian agents had spent 
roughly $100,000—a relatively tiny sum—on 
approximately 3,000 ads. 
Just one day after the company’s carefully sculpted 
admission, The Times published an investigation of 
further Russian activity on Facebook, showing how 
Russian intelligence had used fake accounts to promote 
stolen Democratic emails.147 
The New York Times devotes a considerable amount of ink to a description of 
how these revelations by Facebook were met with an “infuriated” reception by both 
Democrats and Republicans in Congress—and “after stalling for weeks, Facebook 
eventually agreed to hand over the Russian posts to Congress. Twice in October 
2017, Facebook was forced to revise its public statements, finally acknowledging 
that close to 126 million people had seen the Russian posts.”148 Also during October 
2017, Senators Klobuchar and Warner “introduced legislation to compel Facebook 
and other Internet firms to disclose who bought political ads on their sites—a 
significant expansion of federal regulation over tech companies.”149 
G. Global Hate Speech 
The New York Times reports, “as Facebook grew, so did the hate speech, 
bullying and other toxic content on the platform. When researchers and activists in 
Myanmar, India, Germany and elsewhere warned that Facebook had become an 
                                                          
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Frenkel et al., supra note 1. 
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instrument of government propaganda and ethnic cleansing, the company largely 
ignored them.”150 
Just one of the latest examples of Facebook finding itself in the uncomfortable 
position of playing a role in a terrorist hate crime takes place on March 15, 2019, as 
49 are murdered by a self-proclaimed white supremist gunman in New Zealand.151 
As reported by The New York Times, it was “a massacre apparently motivated by 
white extremist hatred, streamed live on Facebook and calculated to go viral.”152 The 
Wall Street Journal reports, “a Facebook, Inc. spokes-woman said the company 
removed the video after New Zealand police flagged it, and deleted the Facebook 
and Instagram accounts belonging to the alleged shooter, Brenton Tarrant, who has 
been charged with murder.”153 Journalist Yoree Koh reports about the shooting spree 
that “only 10 people were tuned into [the shooter’s] live broadcast of the rampage 
on Facebook Live, according to archived versions of his page. But the video, which 
shows dozens of people inside the Al Noor mosque in Christchurch being gunned 
down, has likely been viewed millions of times in various formats across the 
Internet.”154 The Wall Street Journal states: 
Facebook says it has blocked 1.2 million attempts to 
repost the footage on its site, while taking down 300,000 
more that made it past its filter that screens for such 
violent content. . . . The Internet allows people with 
deranged views to find one another and feel like they 
belong to a movement. Disturbing material that used to 
exist underground is now a click away.155 
Social media platforms, including Facebook, “could face new legal issues 
because of the video, and not only in New Zealand. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
of New Zealand has vowed to investigate the role that social media played in the 
attack and to take action, possibly alongside other countries, against the sites that 
broadcast it.”156 The Wall Street Journal’s Dan Gallagher observes, “[w]hile it is 
                                                          
150 Id. 
151 See Kevin Roose, A Shooting Disturbingly Rooted in the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2019, 
at A1; Damien Cave, In Mosque Attacks, Quick Action and Courage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2019, at A1. 
152 Richard Pérez-Peńa, Extremist Hate Fuels New Zealand Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2019, 
at A1. 
153 Jon Emont, Georgia Wells & Mike Cherney, Massacre Roils New Zealand, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 16–17, 2019, at A1. 
154 Yoree Koh, Why Video of Shooting Endures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2019, at A11. 
155 Opinion, The Internet and Evil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2019, at A18. 
156 See Charlotte Graham-McLay, Where Sharing Violent Videos Is Against Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2019, at A1. 
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unclear whether real-time video content is a main draw for Facebook’s 2.3 billion 
users, it has been a central area of investment for the company. The value proposition 
now seems questionable.”157 For example, just days after the New Zealand event, 
“AirAsia CEO Tony Fernandes tweeted on Sunday that he closed his Facebook 
account, which had over half a million followers, as a result of Friday’s live video of 
the Christchurch massacre.”158 
1. President Trump’s Muslim Ban 
Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential election campaign was littered with racial 
slurs.159 For example, then candidate Trump famously stated, “When Mexico sends 
its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re sending people that have lots 
of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. 
They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”160 
As I have written elsewhere: 
The Los Angeles Times has stated, “if we harbor latent 
racism or if we fear attacks by Muslim extremists, then 
[Trump] elevates a rumor into a public debate: Was 
Barack Obama born in Kenya, and is he therefore not 
really president?” . . . The Huffington Post observes that, 
“Trump’s retaliation against the parents of a Muslim U.S. 
Army officer who died while serving in the Iraq War was 
a low point in a campaign full of hateful rhetoric.” In 
addition, The Huffington Post considers that “the most 
memorable moment” of the 2016 Democratic National 
Convention was when “Khizr Khan, the father of the late 
Army Captain Humayun Khan, spoke out against 
Trump’s bigoted rhetoric and disregard for civil 
liberties.”161 
2. How to Treat a President’s Hate Speech? 
With respect to Facebook, The New York Times reports that candidate Trump, 
“described Muslim immigrants and refugees as a danger to America, and in 
                                                          
157 Dan Gallagher, Facebook’s Live Video Is A Liability, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2019, at B12. 
158 Id. 
159 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Grab ‘Em By the Emoluments: The Crumbling Ethical Foundation 
of Donald Trump’s Presidency, 17 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 31 (2018) [hereinafter Trautman, Emoluments] 
(depicting Mexican and Muslim slurs); Lawrence J. Trautman, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Incapacity 
and Ability to Discharge the Powers and Duties of Office?, 67(3) CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373 (2019); Lawrence 
J. Trautman, Presidential Impeachment: A Contemporary Analysis, 44(3) U. DAYTON L. REV. 529 (2019). 
160 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and 
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December 2015 posted a statement on Facebook calling for ‘a total and complete 
shutdown’ on Muslims entering the United States.”162 As just one example of 
Facebook’s ability to spread racist speech, “Mr. Trump’s call to arms—widely 
condemned by Democrats and some prominent Republicans—was shared more than 
15,000 times on Facebook.”163 According to The New York Times: 
Mr. Zuckerberg, who had helped found a nonprofit 
dedicated to immigration reform, was appalled, said 
employees who spoke to him or were familiar with the 
conversation. He asked Ms. Sandberg and other 
executives if Mr. Trump had violated Facebook’s terms 
of service. . . . 
Some at Facebook viewed Mr. Trump’s attack on 
Muslims as an opportunity to finally take a stand against 
the hate speech coursing through its platform. But 
Ms. Sandberg, who was edging back to work after the 
death of her husband several months earlier, delegated the 
matter to Mr. Schrange and Monika Bickert, a former 
prosecutor whom Ms. Sandberg had recruited as the 
company’s head of global policy management. . . . 
In video conference calls between the Silicon 
Valley headquarters and Washington, the three officials 
construed their task narrowly. They parsed the company’s 
terms of service to see if the post, or Mr. Trump’s 
account, violated Facebook’s rules. 
Mr. Kaplan argued that Mr. Trump was an 
important public figure and that shutting down his 
account or removing the statement could be as obstructing 
free speech, said three employees who knew of the 
discussions. He also said it could also stoke a conservative 
backlash. 
Mr. Schrage concluded that Mr. Trump’s language 
had not violated Facebook’s rules and that the candidate’s 
views had public value. “We were trying to make a 
decision based on all the legal and technical evidence 
before us,” he said in an interview. 
In the end, Mr. Trump’s statement and account 
remained on the site.164 
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H. The CNN Interviews 
The subject of considerable CNN coverage during 2018, including an interview 
airing on November 21, Mr. Zuckerberg is reported as having “resisted growing calls 
for changes to Facebook’s C-suite, reiterated Facebook’s potential as a force for 
good, and pushed back at some of the unrelenting critical coverage of his company 
after a year of negative headlines about fake news, election meddling and privacy 
concerns.”165 When asked, “Did you and other leaders try to minimize Russia’s role 
in spreading propaganda on the platform,” Mr. Zuckerberg replied: 
In 2016, there’s no doubt that we missed something 
really important, right? The Russian effort to try to have 
these coordinated information operations on Facebook 
and also the Internet and more broadly was not something 
that we were expecting. Elections are always a very high 
security event. And we were expecting certain kinds of 
cyber-attacks. 
And we found them, right? The Russians were 
trying to hack into specific accounts. And we told the 
people and we told the FBI and all that. But we weren’t 
on top of these coordinating information operations. 
So we’ve spent a lot of the last couple of years now 
basically building up our systems and strengthening them 
to be able to address this. 
But we’ve been very focused on this and have 
invested a lot in it. And anyone who wants to say that 
upon learning about this we haven’t been very focused on 
trying to both address it and also that we have—I think 
anyone who says that we haven’t made a lot of progress, 
I just think that that’s not right.166 
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VII. THE MUELLER REPORT 
Russia poses a very serious counterintelligence threat, 
certainly in the cyber arena, certainly what we call the 
malign foreign influence territory. Certainly in the 
presence of foreign intelligence officers in this 
country. . . . 
Christopher Wray 
FBI Director 
April 26, 2019167 
In a heavily redacted chapter titled “Russian ‘Active Measures’ Social Media 
Campaign,” the Mueller Report states, “The first form of Russian election influence 
came principally from the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russian 
organization . . . conduct[ing] social media operations targeted at large U.S. 
audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.”168 Having a 
goal of influencing global affairs, these activities were known as “active 
measures.”169 According to the Mueller Report: 
The IRA and its employees began operations 
targeting the United States as early as 2014. Using 
fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social 
media accounts and group pages designed to attract U.S. 
audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed 
divisive U.S. political and social issues, falsely claimed to 
be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these social 
media accounts became a means to reach large U.S. 
audiences. . . . 
IRA employees posted derogatory information 
about a number of candidates in the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA 
operations included supporting the Trump Campaign and 
disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made 
various expenditures to carry out those activities, 
including buying political advertisements on social media 
in the name of U.S. persons and entities. . . . 
By the end of the 2016 election, the IRA had the 
ability to reach millions of U.S. persons through their 
social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlled 
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Facebook groups and Instagram accounts had hundreds of 
thousands of U.S. participants . . . . In November 2017, a 
Facebook representative testified that Facebook had 
identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that 
collectively made 80,000 posts between January 2015 and 
August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as 
many as 126 million persons through its Facebook 
accounts.170 
While a more comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of Russian efforts to 
meddle in the 2016 and 2018 U.S. election process far exceeds the scope and 
available word count for this single law review article, according to the Mueller 
Report, “Many IRA operations used Facebook accounts created and operated by its 
specialists.”171 In addition, “To reach larger U.S. audiences, the IRA purchased 
advertisements from Facebook that promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of 
U.S. audience members. According to Facebook, The IRA purchased over 3,500 
advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately $100,000.”172 The 
Mueller Report observes: 
Collectively, the IRA’s social media accounts reached 
tens of millions of U.S. persons. Individual IRA social 
media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of 
followers. For example, at the time they were deactivated 
by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA’s “United Muslims of 
America” Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, 
the “Don’t Shoot Us” Facebook group had over 250,000 
followers, the “Being Patriotic” Facebook group had over 
200,000 followers, and the “Secured Borders” Facebook 
group had over 130,000 followers. According to 
Facebook, in total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 
80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, 
and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S. persons 
and “may have reached an estimated 126 million 
people.”173 
In his April 26, 2019 remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, FBI 
Director Christopher Wray describes ongoing Russian Active Measures efforts as 
“the use of social media, fake news, propaganda, false personas, etc., to spin us up, 
pit us against each other, sow divisiveness and discord, undermine Americans’ faith 
in democracy . . . is not just an election cycle threat [but] a 365 days-a-year threat 
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[and] has absolutely continued.”174 The most likely future, Director Wray observes, 
“We recognize that our adversaries are going to keep adapting and upping their 
game, so we are viewing 2018 as just a dress rehearsal for 2020 [elections].”175 
During his July 24, 2019 testimony before Congress, former special counsel Robert 
Mueller states, “over the course of my career, I’ve seen a number of challenges to 
our democracy. The Russian government’s effort to interfere in our election is among 
the most serious.”176 
VIII. FACEBOOK PRIVACY PROBLEMS ESCALATE 
The historical link between privacy and the forces of 
wealth creation helps explain why privacy is under siege 
today. It reminds us, first, that mass privacy is not a basic 
feature of human existence but a byproduct of a specific 
economic arrangement—and therefore a contingent and 
impermanent state of affairs. And it reminds us, second, 
that in a capitalist country, our baseline of privacy 
depends on where the money is. And today that has 
changed. 
Tim Wu 
Julius Silver Professor of Law, 
Science and Technology 
Columbia Law School177 
Facebook privacy issues continue to multiply and constitute a major 
governance issue. As privacy concerns and social media involvement of foreign 
powers in U.S. elections becomes more widely publicized during 2018 and 2019, a 
public relations and communications crisis grows at Facebook.178 For example, in 
discussing Facebook’s second quarter 2018 earnings announcement, The Wall Street 
Journal’s “Heard on the Street” columnist Dan Gallagher writes, “Facebook said that 
future growth would slow further, in part because it is giving users more power to 
keep their data private. That affects its advertising business. The stock plunged after 
hours following the report.”179 Mr. Gallagher explains, “users and advertisers had 
continued flocking to it despite a growing number of scandals related to Facebook’s 
                                                          
174 FBI Director Wray on Global Threats, supra note 167, at 16:28. 
175 Id. 
176 Sadie Gurman & Aruna Viswanatha, Mueller Sticks to His Report, Rejects “Witch Hunt” 
Rebuke, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2019, at A1. 
177 Tim Wu, Opinion, The Way Capitalism Betrayed the Right to Be Left Alone, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2019, at SR3. 
178 Byron Tau, Big Tech Companies to Testify on Russia, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2018, at A6. 
179 Dan Gallagher, Facebook Loses Some of Its Best Customers, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2018, at B1. 
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past handling of user data as well as controversies over the powerful role it now plays 
in news distribution and public discourse.”180 During August 2018, Facebook 
announced that it dismantled bogus Russian and Iranian pages.181 Also, about this 
time, Apple informed Facebook that the Facebook data-security App available at the 
Apple app store “violated new rules . . . designed to limit data collection by app 
developers.”182 News accounts surfaced that Facebook had for years sought “users’ 
sensitive financial information.”183 In late September 2018, Facebook had to disclose 
“hackers gained access to nearly 50 million accounts in what amounts to the largest-
ever security breach . . . at a time when it is working to regain the trust of its more 
than 2 billion users.”184 During November 2018, it was reported that “Facebook 
failed to prevent its platform from being used to ‘foment division and incite offline 
violence in [Myanmar],’”185 and that Robert Mercer of Cambridge Analytica “had 
improperly obtained and exploited Facebook data from as many as 87 million users 
around the globe.”186 On November 17, 2018 The New York Times ran an editorial 
titled “Facebook Cannot Be Trusted.”187 Another report states, “Mark Zuckerberg 
gathered about 50 of his top lieutenants . . . and told them that Facebook Inc. was at 
war and he planned to lead the company accordingly.”188 Other headlines read, 
“Growth At Any Cost: Top Facebook Executive Defended Data Collection In 2016 
Memo—And Warned That Facebook Could Get People Killed”;189 “How Trickery 
                                                          
180 Id. 
181 Deepa Seetharaman & Dustin Volz, Facebook Pulls Fake Iran, Russian Pages, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 22, 2018, at A3; see also Farhad Manjoo, Hack, Hack, Hacking at America’s Roots, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2018, at B1. 
182 Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Cuts Security App from Apple Store, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2018, 
at B4. 
183 AnnaMaria Andriotis & Emily Glazer, Facebook Sought Users’ Financial Data for Years, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2018, at B1. 
184 Deepa Seetharaman & Robert McMillan, Facebook Hackers Access Nearly 50 Million Accounts, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29–30, 2018, at A1. 
185 Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook Admits Role Platform Had in Fueling Violence in Myanmar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2018, at B2. 
186 Adam Satariano & Nicholas Confessore, Watchdog Finds Cambridge Analytica Misused Data, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2018, at B2. 
187 Facebook Cannot Be Trusted, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2018, at A26; see also Nicholas 
Confessore & Matthew Rosenberg, Top Democrats Voice Distrust of Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2018, at A1. 
188 Deepa Seetharaman, Zuckerberg’s New Leadership Style Sparks Turmoil at Top, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 2018, at A1. 
189 Ryan Mac, Charlie Warzel & Alex Kantrowitz, Growth At Any Cost: Top Facebook Executive 
Defended Data Collection In 2016 Memo—And Warned That Facebook Could Get People Killed, 
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Became Part of Playbook For Big Tech.”190 Next came new assertions that Facebook 
“violated the European Union’s new data-privacy law with the way it tracks users’ 
locations.”191 Other negative headlines include: “Facebook Considered Selling Data 
Access”;192 “Facebook Emails Shed Light on Tactics”;193 “Facebook’s Emails Tell 
A Cutthroat Tale: No Gentle Giant, But a Juggernaut Playing Hardball”;194 
“Facebook’s Emails Tell A Cutthroat Tale: Leveraging User Data To Show 
Favoritism Among Its Partners”;195 “Facebook Censors at Random”;196 “Facebook’s 
in the News, And No, It’s Not Good”;197 “Facebook Criticized For Betraying Users’ 
Data”;198 “Washington, D.C., Sues Facebook Over Privacy”;199 “Russian Trolls Hit 
U.S. Businesses”;200 “Why Privacy At Facebook Is Eyed Anew By the F.T.C.”;201 
and “How Facebook Controls What World Can Say.”202 
                                                          
BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/growth-at-any-cost-
top-facebook-executive-defended-data. 
190 Jack Nicas, How Trickery Became Part of Playbook for Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2018, 
at B1; see also Deepa Seetharaman, Soros Aide Urges Facebook Review, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2018, at 
B4. 
191 Daniel Michaels & Stu Woo, Europe Fires on Google, Facebook, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2018, 
at B4; see also Adam Satariano, Zuckerberg Snubs a Multinational Inquiry into Facebook’s Practices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2018, at B3. 
192 Deepa Seetharaman & Kirsten Grind, Facebook Considered Selling Data Access, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 29, 2018, at B1. 
193 Deepa Seetharaman & Stu Woo, Facebook Emails Shed Light on Tactics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 
2018, at B1. 
194 Kevin Roose, Facebook’s Emails Tell A Cutthroat Tale: No Gentle Giant, but a Juggernaut 
Playing Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2018, at B1. 
195 Adam Satariano & Mike Isaac, Facebook’s Emails Tell A Cutthroat Tale: Leveraging User Data 
to Show Favoritism Among Its Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2018, at B1. 
196 Daniel Gallant, Opinion, Facebook Censors at Random, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2018, at A17. 
197 Brian X. Chen, Facebook’s in the News, And No, It’s Not Good, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2018, at 
B7. 
198 Michael LaForgia, Nicholas Confessore & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Facebook Criticized for 
Betraying Users’ Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2018, at B1. 
199 Sheera Frenkel & Matthew Rosenberg, Washington, D.C., Sues Facebook Over Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2018, at B3. 
200 Shelby Holliday & Rob Berry, Russian Trolls Hit U.S. Businesses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22–23, 
2018, at A4. 
201 Natasha Singer, Why Privacy at Facebook Is Eyed Anew by the F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2018, at B1. 
202 Max Fisher, How Facebook Controls What World Can Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2018, at A1. 
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With the start of 2019, Facebook continued to suffer from negative news 
headlines, such as: “Suicide Watch On Facebook Raises Issues”;203 “2nd Effort at 
Social Media Fakery Is Uncovered in Alabama Race”;204 “See You in Court, 
Facebook”;205 “Facebook Deletes Pages of Russian Propaganda”;206 “F.T.C. Is Said 
To Consider Hefty Fines For Facebook”;207 “Questions Persist About a Viral Video 
Perfect Storm”;208 “Calculating How Much of Facebook Is Phony”;209 “Germany 
Moves to Rein In Facebook Data Gathering”;210 “When Facebook Spread Lies, a 
German Cop Spread Truth”;211 “Facebook labelled ‘digital gangsters’ by report on 
fake news”;212 “New York Governor Orders Probe Into Facebook Access to Data 
From Other Apps”;213 “You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They 
Tell Facebook”;214 “Apps Send User Secrets to Facebook”;215 “Probe Seeks 
Facebook Data Documents”;216 “Criminal Investigation Digs Into Facebook’s Data-
                                                          
203 Natasha Singer, Suicide Watch on Facebook Raises Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2019, at A1. 
204 Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, 2nd Effort at Social Media Fakery Is Uncovered in Alabama Race, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2019, at A1. 
205 Neema Singh Guliani, See You in Court, Facebook, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2019, at A23. 
206 Adam Satariano, Facebook Deletes Pages of Russian Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2019, 
at B4. 
207 Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Is Said to Consider Hefty Fines for Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2019, 
at B1. 
208 Sheera Frenkel, Questions Persist About a Viral Video Perfect Storm, This Week in Tech, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2019, at B3. 
209 Jack Nicas, Calculating How Much of Facebook Is Phony, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2019, at B1. 
210 Natasha Singer, Germany Moves to Rein in Facebook Data Gathering, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2019, at B1. 
211 Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, When Facebook Spread Lies, a German Cop Spread Truth, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2019, at A7. 
212 David Pegg, Facebook Labelled ‘Digital Gangsters’ by Report on Fake News, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/18/facebook-fake-news-
investigation-report-regulation-privacy-law-dcms. 
213 Jonathan Stempel & Katie Paul, New York Governor Orders Probe into Facebook Access to 
Data from Other Apps, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-new-
york/new-york-governor-orders-probe-into-facebook-access-to-data-from-other-apps-
idUSKCN1QB2AJ. 
214 Sam Schechner, You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-
information-then-they-tell-facebook-11550851636. 
215 Sam Schechner & Mark Secada, Apps Send User Secrets to Facebook, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23–
24, 2019, at A1. 
216 Sam Schechner, Probe Seeks Facebook Data Documents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2019, at B4. 
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Sharing Deals”;217 “Facebook Stored Users’ Passwords Improperly”;218 “Fake News 
Roils WhatsApp in India”;219 “Facebook’s Zuckerberg Is Making Enemies, Not 
Friends”;220 “Facebook’s Scandal of Fake celebrity News”;221 “Regulators 
Everywhere Are Circling Facebook: Fines, constraints and penalties for Zuckerberg 
are on the table”;222 “Call for Easter Attack Stayed on Facebook”;223 and many, many 
more. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) lists 450 pages of correspondence 
between Facebook and the FTC for the period March 10, 2011 through March 20, 
2018.224 As this article nears completion during late 2019, The New York Times 
reports that, “After Facebook was hit. . . with a fine of around $5 billion for privacy 
violations, critics immediately said it escaped largely unscathed: The settlement 
neither bruised its bottom line nor severely restricted its ability to collect people’s 
data.”225 Facebook reported that “it was setting aside $3 billion to pay for any 
potential settlement with the FTC”;226 now, “regulators and lawmakers in 
Washington, Europe and in countries including Canada have already begun multiple 
investigations and proposing new restrictions against Facebook that will probably 
embroil it in policy debates and legal wrangling for years to come.”227 This follows 
                                                          
217 Michael LaForgia, Matthew Rosenberg & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Criminal Investigation Digs into 
Facebook’s Data-Sharing Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2019, at A1. 
218 Jeff Horwitz & Robert McMillan, Facebook Stored Users’ Passwords Improperly, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 22, 2019, at A1. 
219 Newley Purnell, Fake News Roils WhatsApp in India, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2019, at A1. 
220 Laura Forman, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Is Making Enemies, Not Friends, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 
2019, at B12. 
221 Mehmet Oz & Kai Falkenberg, Opinion, Facebook’s Scandal of Fake Celebrity News, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2019, at A15. 
222 Cecilia Kang & Adam Satariano, Regulators Everywhere Are Circling Facebook: Fines, 
Constraints and Penalties for Zuckerberg are on the Table, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2019, at B1. 
223 Newley Purnell, Call for Easter Attack Stayed on Facebook, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2019, at A7. 
224 FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN FTC AND FACEBOOK, March 10, 2011 
through March 20, 2018 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/frequently-requested-records/ 
facebook. 
225 Adam Satariano, Facebook Misses Out on a Bullet, But Not Pain, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/facebook-privacy-investigations.html; see also Celilia 
Kang, Facebook Fine Could Total Billions If F.T.C. Talks Lead to a Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/technology/facebook-ftc-settlement.html. 
226 Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, FTC Ruling on Facebook Probe Looms Over Big Tech, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2019, at A2; see also Mike Isaac & Cecilia Kang, Hefty Penalty for Facebook Over 
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2019, at A1. 
227 Adam Satariano, Facebook Misses Out on a Bullet, But Not Pain, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/facebook-privacy-investigations.html. 
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a 2011 agreement where Facebook “agreed to settle charges that it had deceived 
consumers on privacy.”228 
By late March 2019, Facebook is accused of violating the Fair Housing Act.229 
Additional unauthorized Facebook user records continue to surface.230 The Wall 
Street Journal reports “the U.K. government plans to create a regulatory body to 
force the removal of harmful content from the Internet, one of the most far-reaching 
proposals from a host of countries trying to put a tighter leash on global technology 
companies.”231 New global regulations now seem a certainty.232 During mid-year 
2019, additional negative headlines abound: criticizing Facebook’s “unintended 
consequences”;233 continued front page coverage about the F.T.C.’s likely landmark 
penalty;234 co-founder Chris Hughes advocates a Facebook break-up;235 “Tech 
Backlash Puts Silicon Valley on Edge”;236 “To Curb Online Bullying, Instagram Has 
to Spot It”;237 “For Sale on Facebook: ‘Loot to Order’ Antiquities From War 
                                                          
228 Natasha Singer, Why the F.T.C. Is Taking a New Look at Facebook Privacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/22/technology/facebook-consent-decree-
details.html. 
229 Katie Benner, Glenn Thrush & Mike Isaac, U.S. Claims Ad Practices at Facebook Discriminate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2019, at B1; Josh D. McKinnon & Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Accused of Aiding Bias 
in Housing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2019, at A1. 
230 See Sarah Frier, Matt Day & Josh Eidelson, Millions of Facebook Records Found on Amazon 
Cloud Servers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
04-03/millions-of-facebook-records-found-on-amazon-cloud-servers. 
231 See Sam Schechner & Parmy Olson, U.K. Tightens Hold on Social Media, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 
2019, at B4. 
232 See Jamie Condliffe, Who Will Write the Rules for Big Tech?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2019, at B5; 
see also Sam Schechner, Facebook Bends to EU Demands, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2019, at B3; see also 
Maya Uppaluru, The U.S. Needs a New Paradigm for Data Governance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 16, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/the-u-s-needs-a-new-paradigm-for-data-governance. 
233 Bret Stephens, Opinion, Facebook’s Unintended Consequences, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2019, at 
A19. 
234 Cecilia Kang, A Severe Penalty Awaits Facebook, But How Severe?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2019, 
at A1. 
235 Chris Hughes, Opinion, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-zuckerberg.html. 
236 Robert McMillan & Jeff Horowitz, Tech Backlash Puts Silicon Valley on Edge, WALL ST. J., 
May 10, 2019, at B4. 
237 Kevin Roose, To Curb Online Bullying, Instagram Has to Spot It, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2019, 
at B1. 
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Zones”;238 “How Hackers Broke Whatsapp With Just a Phone Call”;239 “Facebook 
Privacy Settlement Delayed”;240 “Pelosi Says Facebook Enabled Russian 
Interference in Election”;241 “Tech Titans Face Tough Scrutiny From All Sides: 
Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon May Face Inquiries”;242 “Tech Titans Build 
Lobbyist Army, Trying to Repel Threats to Power”;243 “Facebook Bolsters Antitrust 
Defenses”;244 “Overthrow the Prince of Facebook”;245 “When Free Is Too High A 
Price: Most Ills from Facebook and Google Trace Back to Their No-cost Models”;246 
“Emails Stoke Worry at Facebook Amid Probe”;247 “Report Points Finger at Russia 
Over E.U. Vote Disinformation”;248 “Facebook Turns to Ads for Image Repair”;249 
“Refugees Discover There’s No Escape From Facebook”;250 “Suddenly, an Interest 
in Tech Antitrust”;251 “Reprimands Of Big Tech Cross Aisle”;252 “Justice Dept. Is 
                                                          
238 Karen Zraick, For Sale on Facebook: ‘Loot to Order’ Antiquities from War Zones, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 2019, at A10. 
239 Lily Hay Newman, How Hackers Broke WhatsApp With Just a Phone Call, WIRED (May 14, 
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/whatsapp-hack-phone-call-voip-buffer-overflow/. 
240 John D. McKinnon, Facebook Privacy Settlement Delayed, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2019, at A2. 
241 Cecilia Kang, Pelosi Says Facebook Enabled Russian Interference in Election, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 30, 2019, at B4. 
242 Cecilia Kang, David Streitfeld & Annie Karni, Tech Titans Face Tough Scrutiny from All Sides: 
Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon May Face Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2019, at A1. 
243 Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P. Vogel, Tech Titans Build Lobbyist Army, Trying to Repel Threats 
to Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2019, at A1. 
244 See Deepa Seetharaman & Jeff Horowitz, Facebook Bolsters Antitrust Defenses, WALL ST. J., 
June 7, 2019, at B1. 
245 Peggy Noonan, Opinion, Overthrow the Prince of Facebook, WALL ST. J., June 8–9, 2019, at 
A15. 
246 Christopher Mimms, When Free Is Too High A Price: Most Ills from Facebook and Google 
Trace Back to Their No-cost Models, WALL ST. J., June 8–9, 2019, at B1. 
247 John D. McKinnon, Emily Glazer, Deepa Seetharaman & Jeff Horwitz, Emails Stoke Worry at 
Facebook Amid Probe, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2019, at A1. 
248 Adam Satariano, Report Points Finger at Russia Over E.U. Vote Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2019, at A1. 
249 Alexandra Bruell, Facebook Turns to Ads for Image Repair, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2019, at B3. 
250 Vindu Goel & Shaikh Azizur Rahman, Refugees Discover There’s No Escape from Facebook, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2019, at B1. 
251 Jim Kerstetter & Pui-Wing Tam, Suddenly, an Interest in Tech Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2019, at B3. 
252 Steve Lohr, Mike Isaac & Nathaniel Popper, Reprimands of Big Tech Cross Aisle, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2019, at B1. 
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Set to Put Internet Giants Under Antitrust Scrutiny”;253 “Zuckerberg Is Required to 
Certify Compliance”;254 “Privacy Flaw Found in Facebook App”;255 “Facebook 
Settles in 2 Inquiries. Now For Round 3: After Fines Over Data, a New Antitrust 
Investigation”;256 “Facebook to Pay $100 Million for Misleading Investors About 
the Risks It Faced From Misuse of User Data”;257 “Facebook Brand Value Falls 
Again”;258 “Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Police Political Speech”;259 and 
“Dissent Erupts at Facebook.”260 
A. Litigation Starts 
The Delaware Court of Chancery Vice Chancellor, Joseph R. Slights III, 
observes that numerous lawsuits have been filed against Facebook, “some as direct 
consumer class actions, some as government enforcement actions and some as 
derivative actions against Facebook fiduciaries—alleging that Facebook’s 
implementation of a business model that exposed private user data to unauthorized 
third-party access has caused harm to consumers and harm to the Company.”261 For 
                                                          
253 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Katie Benner & Steve Lohr, Justice Dept. Is Set to Put Internet Giants 
Under Antitrust Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2019, at A1. 
254 Ryan Tracy & John D. McKinnon, Facebook Settlement Requires Mark Zuckerberg to Certify 
Privacy Protections, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2019, 8:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-
settlement-requires-mark-zuckerberg-to-certify-compliance-11563923987. 
255 Sarah E. Needleman, Flaw in Facebook’s Messenger Kids Exposed Children to Unauthorized 
Chats, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2019, 11:14 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/flaw-in-facebooks-
messenger-kids-exposed-children-to-unauthorized-chats-11563894874. 
256 Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, Facebook, Penalized in 2 Inquiries, Faces a 3rd, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 2019, at A1. 
257 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Facebook to Pay $100 Million for Misleading Investors 
About the Risks It Faced From Misuse of User Data (July 24, 2019) (on file with author), https:// 
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-140. 
258 Nat Ives, Amazon Surges and Facebook Falls Again in Report on Brand Value, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 16, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-surges-and-facebook-falls-again-in-
report-on-brand-value-11571266801. 
259 Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Police Political Speech, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2019, at B1. 
260 Mike Isaac, Dissent Erupts at Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2019, at B1. 
261 See In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., CV 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. May 30, 2019), as revised (May 31, 2019), judgment entered sub nom. In re Facebook, Inc., (Del. Ch. 
2019) [hereinafter Opinion by Vice Chancellor Slights] (citing e.g., Sbriglio v. Zuckerberg, C.A. No. 
2018-0307-JRS (derivative action in Delaware); Leagre v. Zuckerberg, C.A. No. 2018-0675-JRS; In re 
Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., C.A. No. 3:18-md02843 (a multidistrict privacy 
litigation in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California); Yuan v. Facebook, Inc. et al., 
C.A. No. 3:18-cv-01725 (a federal securities action pending in the U.S. District Court in the Northern 
District of California); District of Columbia v. Facebook, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-CA-008715 (a consumer 
class action brought by the United States Government pending in the District of Columbia); State of 
Illinois ex rel. Foxx v. Facebook Inc. et al., Case No. 2018-CH-03868 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct.) (a consumer 
action brought by the Cook County State’s Attorney in Illinois). 
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the benefit of privacy scholars and policymakers, Vice Chancellor Slight’s § 220 
analysis, where he concludes that “Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated Proper Purposes 
for Inspection,” is included here as follows: 
The preponderance of the evidence presented at 
trial provides a credible basis to infer the Board and 
Facebook senior executives failed to oversee Facebook’s 
compliance with the Consent Decree and its broader 
efforts to protect the private data of its users. I summarize 
that evidence below. 
First, Plaintiffs presented the Parliamentary Report 
where, after summarizing emails, meeting minutes, 
witness interviews and other evidence, the Parliamentary 
Committee concluded the “Cambridge Analytica Scandal 
was facilitated by Facebook’s policies and the incident 
displays the fundamental weakness of Facebook in 
managing its responsibilities to the people whose data is 
used for its own Commercial purposes.” According to the 
Parliamentary Report, 
“[i]f [Facebook] had fully complied with the 
[Consent Decree], [the Cambridge Analytica scandal] . . . 
would not have happened.” The Parliamentary Report 
went on to summarize evidence that Facebook had 
implemented a business plan to override its users’ privacy 
settings in order to transfer data to some app developers’ 
and “to charge high prices . . . for the exchange of that 
data.” And, importantly, the Parliamentary Report 
concluded that the Board was aware of data privacy 
breaches but attempted “to deflect attention” from these 
breaches to avoid scrutiny. 
Second, the Consent Decree demonstrates that an 
enforceable regulatory order mandated that the 
Company’s management and its Board implement and 
monitor Facebook’s compliance with specifically 
identified and detailed data privacy procedures. Lest there 
be any doubt about whether the Board was aware of the 
specific requirements of the Consent Decree, the 
document itself makes clear that it is to be 
“deliver[ed] . . . to . . . all current and future principals, 
officers, directors, and managers[.]” While there is 
certainly room to defend the claim, there is some evidence 
the Board knew of the Company’s obligations to 
implement data security measures, knew the Company 
had not implemented or maintained those measures as 
required by the Consent Decree and, nevertheless, 
condoned the Company’s monetization of its users’ 
private data in violation of the Consent Decree. The 
Consent Decree was an affirmative obligation imposed on 
the Company much like positive law. The legal academy 
has observed that Delaware courts are more inclined to 
find Caremark oversight liability at the board level when 
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the company operates in the midst of obligations imposed 
upon it by positive law yet fails to implement compliance 
systems, or fails to monitor existing compliance systems, 
such that a violation of law and resulting liability occurs. 
Professor Elizabeth Pollman aptly describes this as a 
circumstance where the board acts with “disobedience.” 
Our law does not countenance board level disobedience. 
Stated differently, Delaware law does not charter law 
breakers. Delaware law allows corporations to pursue 
diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical 
statutory floor, which is the requirement that Delaware 
corporations only pursue “lawful business” by “lawful 
acts.” As a result, a fiduciary of a Delaware corporation 
cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by knowingly 
causing it to seek profit by violating the law . . . . Telling 
your parents that all the kids are getting caught 
shoplifting, cheating, or imbibing illegal substances is 
not, fortunately, a good excuse. For fiduciaries of 
Delaware corporations, there is no room to flout the law 
governing the corporation’s affairs. If the fiduciaries of a 
Delaware corporation do not like the applicable law, they 
can lobby to get it changed. But until it is changed, they 
must act in good faith to ensure that the corporation tries 
to comply with its legal duties. Plaintiffs have presented 
a credible basis to infer that the Board acted with 
disobedience by allowing Facebook to violate the 
Consent Decree. They are entitled to inspect books and 
records to investigate that potential wrongdoing. 
Third, Plaintiffs point to information released to the 
public sphere since they initiated their Demand indicating 
that a key component of Facebook’s business plan was to 
monetize access to user data through agreements with 
partners based on “reciprocity,” even after entering into 
the Consent Decree. Facebook’s long-term business 
model was to “go with full reciprocity and access to app 
friends,” permitting business partners to obtain full 
information from users, including users’ Facebook 
friends. There is some evidence Facebook whitelisted 
these business partners, giving them unauthorized access 
to the Facebook platform and Facebook’s user data for a 
substantial fee. All the while, its users were left in the 
dark. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs presented a credible basis to infer 
the Board knew the Company was allowing unauthorized 
third-party access to user data. The New York Times 
reported Erskine Bowles, chairman of the Audit 
Committee, received a report from Stamos, then Chief 
Information Security Officer, and Colin Stretch, 
Facebook’s General Counsel, about Russian interference 
with the Facebook platform and potential data privacy 
violations. On the same day, Bowles questioned 
Zuckerberg and Sandberg at a full Board meeting 
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regarding the extent to which they, and other Facebook 
senior management, had been transparent with the Board 
regarding data privacy issues. At that meeting, Stamos 
expressed concerns that the Company had not monitored 
the protection of user data carefully, prompting Sandberg, 
as noted above, to accuse Stamos of “throw[ing] us under 
the bus!” According to The New York Times, the 
Company’s failure adequately to address data privacy 
ultimately led Whatsapp co-founder, Jan Koum, to resign 
from the Board. 
Fifth, Plaintiffs have provided evidence that 
multiple regulatory authorities have opened 
investigations into Facebook’s data privacy lapses. 
Perhaps most troubling, following the Cambridge 
Analytica breach, the FTC opened an investigation to 
determine the extent to which Facebook violated the 
Consent Decree. News outlets have recently reported the 
investigation could result in a multibillion dollar fine 
against Facebook––the largest fine ever imposed by the 
FTC. 
After the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the ICO 
fined Facebook the maximum fine permitted under 
British law, £500,000, for permitting third party 
developers to access user information without sufficient 
consent. In addition, the Parliamentary Report revealed 
the ICO concluded that Facebook’s “business practices 
and the way applications interact with data on the 
platform have contravened data protections law.” 
Finally, Facebook is subject to numerous lawsuits 
based on the same underlying misconduct. These 
complaints further support Plaintiffs’ credible basis to 
infer wrongdoing. 
In light of the low Section 220 evidentiary 
threshold, I am satisfied Plaintiffs have proven 
“legitimate issues of wrongdoing.” [internal citations 
omitted]262 
                                                          
262 See Opinion by Vice Chancellor Slights, supra note 261, at 39 (citing James D. Cox & Randall 
S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, 
95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 55–56 (2016)); Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year 
Lookback, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 727, 735 (2018); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 
709, 756 (2019). 
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B. Proposed Cryptocurrency Libra 
On June 18, 2019 Facebook announced a new digital currency named Libra, 
along with a digital wallet called Calibra.263 The Guardian reports that Libra is 
described “as a means to connect people who do not have access to traditional 
banking platforms. With close to 2.4 billion people using Facebook each month, 
Libra could be a financial game changer, but will face close scrutiny as Facebook 
continues to reel from a series of privacy scandals.”264 Soon after Facebook’s 
announcement, Jerome H. Powell, chair of the Federal Reserve said the U.S. central 
bank had “serious concerns” about Libra.265 Other negative headlines read 
“Facebook Confronts Broad Resistance to Crypto Plans,”266 “The Trouble Starts If 
Facebook’s New Currency Succeeds;”267 and “Facebook, Grilled By Lawmakers, 
Defends Cryptocurrency.”268 During hearings held before the House Committee on 
Financial Services on July 17, 2019, on “Examining Facebook’s Proposed 
Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and the American Financial 
System,” Georgetown University Law Professor Chris Brummer testified that: 
● The Libra White Paper fails, most fundamentally, 
to inform potential holders in unambiguous terms 
that they can lose money, and that runs on the coin 
are possible. 
● The White Paper fails to clearly disclose that Libra 
holders will be exposed to counterparty risk in the 
form of mismanagement of reserve investments. 
● The White Paper fails to disclose governance risks, 
including the negative impact Libra Association 
decisions, and conflicts of interest, could have on 
the nature and value of Libra coins. 
                                                          
263 Press Release, Facebook, Inc., Coming in 2020: Calibra (June 18, 2019) (on file with author), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/06/coming-in-2020-calibra/. 
264 Kari Paul, Libra: Facebook Launches Cryptocurrency in Bid to Shake Up Global Finance, THE 
GUARDIAN, (June 18, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/18/libra-
facebook-cryptocurrency-new-digital-money-transactions. 
265 Alan Rappeport & Nathaniel Popper, Trump Administration Warns of Threats with 
Cryptocurrencies, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2019, at B3. 
266 Dave Michaels, Kate Davidson & Sam Schechner, Facebook Confronts Bipartisan Resistance 
to Cryptocurrency Plans, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2019, 10:14 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
facebook-says-libra-cryptocurrency-to-be-regulated-by-swiss-financial-authorities-11563208951. 
267 Eric Posner, The Trouble Starts If Facebook’s New Currency Succeeds, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/dont-trust-libra-facebooks-new-
cryptocurrency/592450/. 
268 Nathaniel Popper & Mike Isaac, Facebook, Grilled by Lawmakers, Defends Cryptocurrency, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2019, at B3. 
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● The White Paper fails to disclose how the 
decentralized application interfaces it is 
envisioning could compromise the “secure, 
scalable, and reliable blockchain” Facebook is 
promising, as well as AML compliance and 
cybersecurity. 
● Depending on how the White Paper is interpreted, 
Libra potentially comprises a source of systemic 
risk.269 
Columbia Law Professor Katharina Pistor warns, “existing legal and regulatory 
frameworks . . . were not designed to govern digital currencies . . . [and] Many of the 
activities associated with managing Libra and its reserve will be beyond the reach of 
regulators in the United States, or any other country for that matter.”270 Former 
Chairman of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Under Secretary of 
the Treasury for Domestic Finance, and assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Gary 
Gensler states, “Facebook’s Libra proposal comes in the midst of important public 
policy debates on how best to protect consumers and their data privacy in the face of 
rapidly advancing technologies and data analytics.”271 
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Although there is nothing unusual about the prospect of 
capitalist enterprises seeking every kind of knowledge 
advantage in a competitive marketplace, the surveillance 
capitalist capabilities that translate ignorance into 
knowledge are unprecedented. . . surveillance capital 
derives from the dispossession of human experience, 
operationalized in its unilateral and pervasive programs 
of rendition: our lives are scraped and sold to fund their 
                                                          
269 Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and 
the American Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) 
(statement of Chris Brummer, Professor of Law, Georgetown University), https://docs.house.gov/ 
meetings/BA/BA00/20190717/109821/HHRG-116-BA00-Wstate-BrummerC-20190717.pdf. 
270 Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and 
the American Financial System Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of 
Katharina Pistor, Law Professor, Columbia Law School), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA00/ 
20190717/109821/HHRG-116-BA00-Wstate-PistorK-20190717-U1.pdf. 
271 Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and 
the American Financial System Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of 
Gary Gensler, Professor of Practice, MIT Sloan School of Management); see also AnnaMaria Andriotis, 
Peter Rudegeair & Liz Hoffman, Inside Facebook’s Botched Bid to Launch a New Currency, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 17, 2019, at A1; Cecilia Kang & Nathaniel Popper, Facebook Sticks to a Full-Court Press on 
Libra, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2019, at B1; Peter Rudegair & Ryan Tracy, Facebook Chief Stands Firm on 
Plans for Libra, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2019, at B1. 
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freedom and our subjugation, their knowledge and our 
ignorance about what they know. 
Soshana Zuboff 
The Charles Edward Wilson 
Professor Emerita 
Harvard Business School 
2019272 
A. NIST Privacy Framework 
As this manuscript nears completion, the voluntary NIST Privacy Framework 
is still in discussion draft stage.273 The Core of the Framework is designed to promote 
“communicating prioritized privacy protection activities and outcomes across the 
organization,” and “consists of five concurrent and continuous functions—Identify, 
Protect, Control, Inform, and Respond.”274 Upon completion, it seems likely that the 
“Privacy Framework” may have a major influence on future privacy legislation.275 
B. Proposed Internet Bill of Rights 
Kara Swisher, journalist for The New York Times writes, “it has become ever 
clearer with every misstep—including but not limited to Russian Interference on 
social media platforms, the amplification of hate speech and fake news, and the 
misuse of personal information—that tech’s freedom has come at a steep price to the 
American people.”276 Sir Tim Berners-Lee, credited as “the inventor of the world 
wide web and founder of the Web Foundation” states: 
If the Internet is to live up to its potential as a force for 
good in the world, we need safeguards that ensure 
fairness, openness and human dignity. This bill of rights 
provides a set of principles that are about giving users 
more control of their online lives while creating a 
healthier Internet economy. This is a bipartisan issue with 
broad public support, giving leaders an opportunity to 
work together to make the Internet work for everyone.277 
                                                          
272 See ZUBOFF, supra note 48, at 498. 
273 NAT’L INST. OF STDS. & TECH., DISCUSSION DRAFT, NIST PRIVACY FRAMEWORK: AN 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL (Apr. 30, 2019) [hereinafter NIST Privacy Framework], 
https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2019/04/30/nist-privacy-framework-discussion-draft.pdf. 
274 Id. at 4. 
275 See NIST Privacy Framework, supra note 273. 
276 Kara Swisher, Opinion, Introducing the Internet Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/ro-khanna-internet-bill-of-rights.html. 
277 Press Release, Office of Representative Ro Khanna, Rep. Khanna Releases “Internet Bill of 
Rights” Principles, Endorsed by Sir Tim Berners-Lee (Oct. 4, 2018), https://khanna.house.gov/media/ 
press-releases/release-rep-khanna-releases-internet-bill-rights-principles-endorsed-sir-tim. 
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Representing the 17th District of California, which covers communities in 
Silicon Valley, U.S. Congressman Ro Khanna introduced the following set of 
principles for an Internet Bill of Rights: 
You should have the right: 
(1) To have access to and knowledge of all collection and 
uses of personal data by companies; 
(2) To opt-in consent to the collection of personal data by 
any party and to the sharing of personal data with a third 
party; 
(3) Where context appropriate and with a fair process, to 
obtain, correct, or delete personal data controlled by any 
company and to have those requests honored by third 
parties; 
(4) To have personal data secured and to be notified in a 
timely manner when a security breach or unauthorized 
access of personal data is discovered; 
(5) To move all personal data from one network to the 
next; 
(6) To access and use the [I]nternet without [I]nternet 
service providers blocking, throttling, engaging in paid 
prioritization, or otherwise unfairly favoring content, 
applications, services, or devices. 
(7) To [I]nternet service without the collection of data that 
is unnecessary for providing the requested service absent 
opt-in consent; 
(8) To have access to multiple viable, affordable 
[I]nternet platforms, services, and providers with clear 
and transparent pricing; 
(9) Not to be unfairly discriminated against or exploited 
based on your personal data; and 
(10) To have an entity that collects your personal data 
have reasonable business practices and accountability to 
protect your privacy.278 
C. Senator Elizabeth Warren 
On March 8, 2019 Senator Elizabeth Warren stated in an online post, “Today’s 
big tech companies have too much power—too much power over our economy, our 
society and our democracy. . . . They’ve bulldozed competition, used our private 
                                                          
278 Id. 
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information for profit and tilted the playing field against everyone else.”279 In brief, 
the Warren proposal consists of two primary parts: 
First, it called for regulating dominant tech platforms like 
Google and Facebook as utilities and prohibiting them 
from both operating the platforms and owning and 
operating related businesses that run on those platforms. 
Her rules would apply to companies with $25 billion or 
more of global annual revenue. Ms. Warren would 
require smaller companies with revenue between $90 
million and $25 billion to operate in a “fair, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory” manner, but wouldn’t demand 
that they structurally separate different parts of their 
businesses. Secondly, the senator said she would appoint 
regulators who would unwind “illegal and 
anticompetitive tech mergers” that the government has 
previously blessed. Deals Ms. Warren targeted included 
Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods, Facebook’s 
purchase of WhatsApp and Instagram, and several 
Google acquisitions. . . .280 
Senator Warren’s presidential campaign has also placed billboards visible to 
the commuter trains traveling from San Francisco to the heart of Silicon Valley 
reading, “Break Up Big Tech.”281 She is just one voice in a growing chorus of 
political leaders reacting to privacy demands from constituents framed as an antitrust 
remedy.282 
D. State Law Scheme for Individual Privacy 
Professor Peter C. Ormerod observes that “[i]n recent years, the federal courts, 
led by the Supreme Court, have made it increasingly difficult to vindicate 
information security rights and harms under the doctrine of constitutional 
standing.”283 In Spokeo v. Robins, the Supreme Court held in 2016 that a statutorily-
                                                          
279 Brent Kendall & Jacob Schlesinger, Elizabeth Warren Calls for Breakup of Amazon, Google, 
Facebook, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warren-calls-for-
breakup-of-amazon-google-facebook-11552065735?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=19. 
280 Id. 
281 Nellie Bowles, Elizabeth Warren Sticks Her Message in Big Tech’s Face, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/technology/elizabeth-warren-big-tech-break-up.html. 
282 See Kristina Peterson, Lawmakers to Watch on Big Tech: Antitrust Stances of Key Figures Vary 
from Breakup Demands to More Measured Steps, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2019, at A8; see also Jacob M. 
Schlesinger, Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, Hunting for Giants: For Decades, the Washington 
Consensus Was to Let Markets Decide How Big Companies Could Get. No Longer. “Antitrust Law Now 
Stands at its Most Fluid and Negotiable Moment in a Generation,” WALL ST. J., June 8–9, 2019, at B1. 
283 Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. 
1893, 1896 (2019). 
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recognized right lacked sufficient “concreteness” to constitute a “case or 
controversy” that may be adjudicated by federal courts under Article III.284 Professor 
Ormerod writes, “Spokeo and its progeny in the lower courts are an enormous 
problem for information security regulatory reform because users whose information 
has been compromised are generally foreclosed from suing in federal court.”285 
Professor Ormerod proposes that states adopt legislation: 
Impos[ing] a fiduciary duty on entities that collect 
or retain personally-identifiable information . . . arguing 
that states should enact legislation that would codify a tort 
for the breach of an information fiduciary’s duty. This 
avenue is both good policy and sound strategy because it 
minimizes First Amendment arguments against 
vindicating informational harms. . . . 
[D]efendants should be strictly liable for 
information misuse. . . . 
[T]he statute should prescribe a schedule of 
damages that begins with nominal damages and 
attorneys’ fees for strict liability and ratchets up damages 
with a defendant’s culpability. . . . 
[T]his mechanism will, for the first time, impose 
some substantial costs for excessive information 
retention . . . structuring the remedy this way will benefit 
the cybersecurity insurance market, thereby helping 
disperse information misuse costs in a more distributed 
and equitable way. . . .286 
As an example of Facebook privacy challenges, Professor Ormerod points to 
the following examples of information misuse: “the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
where a Facebook app developer breached Facebook’s terms of service when he—
under the auspices of academic research—collected user’s data and provided that 
trove of information to a for-profit political consulting firm.”287 Then, in another 
scenario, a Facebook employee was reportedly terminated for using “his position to 
stalk women.”288 Next, Facebook appears to have used collected data to provide 
                                                          
284 Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. 
1893, 1896 (2019) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)). 
285 Ormerod, supra note 284, at 1894. 
286 Id. at 1896–97. 
287 Id. at 1898 (citing Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump 
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html). 
288 Id. (citing Joseph Cox, Facebook is Investigating a Claim That an Employee Used His Position 
to Stalk Women, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 30, 2018), https://mother-board.vice.com/en_us/article/kzxdny/ 
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“advertisers with users’ cell phone numbers, even when the company only acquired 
those numbers for multifactor authentication purposes.”289 
X. MARCH 2019 MARK ZUCKERBERG STRATEGY ANNOUNCEMENT 
To date, numerous governments have launched 
formal investigations into the company [Facebook] 
including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, 
Nigeria, Kenya, and India. There’s much we do not know 
about Cambridge Analytica, but there are significant 
facts already in the public record. We know that 
Cambridge Analytica was established by Robert and 
Rebecca Mercer in 2013 at the urging of former White 
House chief strategist Steve Bannon as an American 
subsidiary of a London-based firm, SCL Group. 
It has reported that the intent of creating an 
American shell was to give the appearance of compliance 
with the United States election law that prohibits 
foreigners from working on United States elections. 
According to CEO Alexander Nix, Cambridge Analytica 
worked for candidates in 44 United States elections in 
2014. 
Senator Dianne Feinstein 
Ranking Member, Senate 
Judiciary Committee 
May 16, 2018290 
On March 6, 2019, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg posted the following blog. 
Because of its historical significance, it is reproduced below in full: 
My focus for the last couple of years has been 
understanding and addressing the biggest challenges 
facing Facebook. This means taking positions on 
important issues concerning the future of the Internet. In 
this note, I’ll outline our vision and principles around 
building a privacy-focused messaging and social 
networking platform. There’s a lot to do here, and we’re 
committed to working openly and consulting with experts 
across society as we develop this. 
. . . 
                                                          
facebook-investigating-employee-stalking-women-online; Sam Levin, Facebook Fires Engineer Accused 
of Stalking, Possibly by Abusing Data Access, THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian 
.com/technology/2018/may/02/facebook-engineer-fired-alleged-stalker-tinder). 
289 Id. at 1898 (citing Kashmir Hill, Facebook is Giving Advertisers Access to Your Shadow Contact 
Information, GIZMODO (Sept. 26, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-is-giving-advertisers-access-to-
your-shadow-co-1828476051). 
290 Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy: Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 115th 
Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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Over the last 15 years, Facebook and Instagram 
have helped people connect with friends, communities, 
and interests in the digital equivalent of a town square. 
But people increasingly also want to connect privately in 
the digital equivalent of the living room. As I think about 
the future of the Internet, I believe a privacy-focused 
communications platform will become even more 
important than today’s open platforms. Privacy gives 
people the freedom to be themselves and connect more 
naturally, which is why we build social networks. 
Today we already see that private messaging, 
ephemeral stories, and small groups are by far the fastest 
growing areas of online communication. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Many people prefer the 
intimacy of communicating one-on-one or with just a few 
friends. People are more cautious of having a permanent 
record of what they’ve shared. And we all expect to be 
able to do things like payments privately and securely. 
Public social networks will continue to be very 
important in people’s lives—for connecting with 
everyone you know, discovering new people, ideas and 
content, and giving people a voice more broadly. People 
find these valuable every day, and there are still a lot of 
useful services to build on top of them. But now, with all 
the ways people also want to interact privately, there’s 
also an opportunity to build a simpler platform that’s 
focused on privacy first. 
I understand that many people don’t think Facebook 
can or would even want to build this kind of privacy-
focused platform—because frankly we don’t currently 
have a strong reputation for building privacy protective 
services, and we’ve historically focused on tools for more 
open sharing. But we’ve repeatedly shown that we can 
evolve to build the services that people really want, 
including in private messaging and stories. 
I believe the future of communication will 
increasingly shift to private, encrypted services where 
people can be confident what they say to each other stays 
secure and their messages and content won’t stick around 
forever. This is the future I hope we will help bring about. 
We plan to build this the way we’ve developed 
WhatsApp: focus on the most fundamental and private 
use case—messaging—make it as secure as possible, and 
then build more ways for people to interact on top of that, 
including calls, video chats, groups, stories, businesses, 
payments, commerce, and ultimately a platform for many 
other kinds of private services. 
This privacy-focused platform will be built around 
several principles: 
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Private interactions. People should have simple, 
intimate places where they have clear control over who 
can communicate with them and confidence that no one 
else can access what they share. 
Encryption. People’s private communications 
should be secure. End-to-end encryption prevents 
anyone—including us—from seeing what people share 
on our services. 
Reducing Permanence. People should be 
comfortable being themselves, and should not have to 
worry about what they share coming back to hurt them 
later. So we won’t keep messages or stories around for 
longer than necessary to deliver the service or longer than 
people want them. 
Safety. People should expect that we will do 
everything we can to keep them safe on our services 
within the limits of what’s possible in an encrypted 
service. 
Interoperability. People should be able to use any 
of our apps to reach their friends, and they should be able 
to communicate across networks easily and securely. 
Secure data storage. People should expect that we 
won’t store sensitive data in countries with weak records 
on human rights like privacy and freedom of expression 
in order to protect data from being improperly accessed. 
Over the next few years, we plan to rebuild more of 
our services around these ideas. The decisions we’ll face 
along the way will mean taking positions on important 
issues concerning the future of the Internet. We 
understand there are a lot of tradeoffs to get right, and 
we’re committed to consulting with experts and 
discussing the best way forward. This will take some 
time, but we’re not going to develop this major change in 
our direction behind closed doors. We’re going to do this 
as openly and collaboratively as we can because many of 
these issues affect different parts of society. 
Private Interactions as a Foundation 
For a service to feel private, there must never be any 
doubt about who you are communicating with. We’ve 
worked hard to build privacy into all our products, 
including those for public sharing. But one great property 
of messaging services is that even as your contacts list 
grows, your individual threads and groups remain private. 
As your friends evolve over time, messaging services 
evolve gracefully and remain intimate. 
This is different from broader social networks, 
where people can accumulate friends or followers until 
the services feel more public. This is well-suited to many 
 
 
 
T H E  F A C E B O O K  P R I V A C Y  C R I S I S  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.234 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
important uses—telling all your friends about something, 
using your voice on important topics, finding 
communities of people with similar interests, following 
creators and media, buying and selling things, organizing 
fundraisers, growing businesses, or many other things that 
benefit from having everyone you know in one place. 
Still, when you see all these experiences together, it feels 
more like a town square than a more intimate space like a 
living room. 
There is an opportunity to build a platform that 
focuses on all of the ways people want to interact 
privately. This sense of privacy and intimacy is not just 
about technical features—it is designed deeply into the 
feel of the service overall. In WhatsApp, for example, our 
team is obsessed with creating an intimate environment in 
every aspect of the product. Even where we’ve built 
features that allow for broader sharing, it’s still a less 
public experience. When the team built groups, they put 
in a size limit to make sure every interaction felt private. 
When we shipped stories on WhatsApp, we limited public 
content because we worried it might erode the feeling of 
privacy to see lots of public content—even if it didn’t 
actually change who you’re sharing with. 
In a few years, I expect future versions of 
Messenger and WhatsApp to become the main ways 
people communicate on the Facebook network. We’re 
focused on making both of these apps faster, simpler, 
more private and more secure, including with end-to-end 
encryption. We then plan to add more ways to interact 
privately with your friends, groups, and businesses. If this 
evolution is successful, interacting with your friends and 
family across the Facebook network will become a 
fundamentally more private experience. 
Encryption and Safety 
People expect their private communications to be 
secure and to only be seen by the people they’ve sent them 
to—not hackers, criminals, over-reaching governments, 
or even the people operating the services they’re using. 
There is a growing awareness that the more entities 
that have access to your data, the more vulnerabilities 
there are for someone to misuse it or for a cyber attack to 
expose it. There is also a growing concern among some 
that technology may be centralizing power in the hands of 
governments and companies like ours. And some people 
worry that our services could access their messages and 
use them for advertising or in other ways they don’t 
expect. 
End-to-end encryption is an important tool in 
developing a privacy-focused social network. Encryption 
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is decentralizing—it limits services like ours from seeing 
the content flowing through them and makes it much 
harder for anyone else to access your information. This is 
why encryption is an increasingly important part of our 
online lives, from banking to healthcare services. It’s also 
why we built end-to-end encryption into WhatsApp after 
we acquired it. 
In the last year, I’ve spoken with dissidents who’ve 
told me encryption is the reason they are free, or even 
alive. Governments often make unlawful demands for 
data, and while we push back and fight these requests in 
court, there’s always a risk we’ll lose a case—and if the 
information isn’t encrypted we’d either have to turn over 
the data or risk our employees being arrested if we failed 
to comply. This may seem extreme, but we’ve had a case 
where one of our employees was actually jailed for not 
providing access to someone’s private information even 
though we couldn’t access it since it was encrypted. 
At the same time, there are real safety concerns to 
address before we can implement end-to-end encryption 
across all of our messaging services. Encryption is a 
powerful tool for privacy, but that includes the privacy of 
people doing bad things. When billions of people use a 
service to connect, some of them are going to misuse it 
for truly terrible things like child exploitation, terrorism, 
and extortion. We have a responsibility to work with law 
enforcement and to help prevent these wherever we can. 
We are working to improve our ability to identify and stop 
bad actors across our apps by detecting patterns of activity 
or through other means, even when we can’t see the 
content of the messages, and we will continue to invest in 
this work. But we face an inherent tradeoff because we 
will never find all of the potential harm we do today when 
our security systems can see the messages themselves. 
Finding the right ways to protect both privacy and 
safety is something societies have historically grappled 
with. There are still many open questions here and we’ll 
consult with safety experts, law enforcement and 
governments on the best ways to implement safety 
measures. We’ll also need to work together with other 
platforms to make sure that as an industry we get this 
right. The more we can create a common approach, the 
better. 
On balance, I believe working towards 
implementing end-to-end encryption for all private 
communications is the right thing to do. Messages and 
calls are some of the most sensitive private conversations 
people have, and in a world of increasing cyber security 
threats and heavy-handed government intervention in 
many countries, people want us to take the extra step to 
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secure their most private data. That seems right to me, as 
long as we take the time to build the appropriate safety 
systems that stop bad actors as much as we possibly can 
within the limits of an encrypted service. We’ve started 
working on these safety systems building on the work 
we’ve done in WhatsApp, and we’ll discuss them with 
experts through 2019 and beyond before fully 
implementing end-to-end encryption. As we learn more 
from those experts, we’ll finalize how to roll out these 
systems. 
Reducing Permanence 
We increasingly believe it’s important to keep 
information around for shorter periods of time. People 
want to know that what they share won’t come back to 
hurt them later, and reducing the length of time their 
information is stored and accessible will help. 
One challenge in building social tools is the 
“permanence problem.” As we build up large collections 
of messages and photos over time, they can become a 
liability as well as an asset. For example, many people 
who have been on Facebook for a long time have photos 
from when they were younger that could be embarrassing. 
But people also really love keeping a record of their lives. 
And if all posts on Facebook and Instagram disappeared, 
people would lose access to a lot of valuable knowledge 
and experiences others have shared. 
I believe there’s an opportunity to set a new 
standard for private communication platforms—where 
content automatically expires or is archived over time. 
Stories already expire after 24 hours unless you archive 
them, and that gives people the comfort to share more 
naturally. This philosophy could be extended to all private 
content. 
For example, messages could be deleted after a 
month or a year by default. This would reduce the risk of 
your messages resurfacing and embarrassing you later. Of 
course you’d have the ability to change the timeframe or 
turn off auto-deletion for your threads if you wanted. And 
we could also provide an option for you to set individual 
messages to expire after a few seconds or minutes if you 
wanted. 
It also makes sense to limit the amount of time we 
store messaging metadata. We use this data to run our 
spam and safety systems, but we don’t always need to 
keep it around for a long time. An important part of the 
solution is to collect less personal data in the first place, 
which is the way WhatsApp was built from the outset. 
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Interoperability 
People want to be able to choose which service they 
use to communicate with people. However, today if you 
want to message people on Facebook you have to use 
Messenger, on Instagram you have to use Direct, and on 
WhatsApp you have to use WhatsApp. We want to give 
people a choice so they can reach their friends across 
these networks from whichever app they prefer. 
We plan to start by making it possible for you to 
send messages to your contacts using any of our services, 
and then to extend that interoperability to SMS too. Of 
course, this would be opt-in and you will be able to keep 
your accounts separate if you’d like. 
There are privacy and security advantages to 
interoperability. For example, many people use 
Messenger on Android to send and receive SMS texts. 
Those texts can’t be end-to-end encrypted because the 
SMS protocol is not encrypted. With the ability to 
message across our services, however, you’d be able to 
send an encrypted message to someone’s phone number 
in WhatsApp from Messenger. 
This could also improve convenience in many 
experiences where people use Facebook or Instagram as 
their social network and WhatsApp as their preferred 
messaging service. For example, lots of people selling 
items on Marketplace list their phone number so people 
can message them about buying it. That’s not ideal, 
because you’re giving strangers your phone number. With 
interoperability, you’d be able to use WhatsApp to 
receive messages sent to your Facebook account without 
sharing your phone number—and the buyer wouldn’t 
have to worry about whether you prefer to be messaged 
on one network or the other. 
You can imagine many simple experiences like 
this—a person discovers a business on Instagram and 
easily transitions to their preferred messaging app for 
secure payments and customer support; another person 
wants to catch up with a friend and can send them a 
message that goes to their preferred app without having to 
think about where that person prefers to be reached; or 
you simply post a story from your day across both 
Facebook and Instagram and can get all the replies from 
your friends in one place. 
You can already send and receive SMS texts 
through Messenger on Android today, and we’d like to 
extend this further in the future, perhaps including the 
new telecom RCS standard. However, there are several 
issues we’ll need to work through before this will be 
possible. First, Apple doesn’t allow apps to interoperate 
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with SMS on their devices, so we’d only be able to do this 
on Android. Second, we’d need to make sure 
interoperability doesn’t compromise the expectation of 
encryption that people already have using WhatsApp. 
Finally, it would create safety and spam vulnerabilities in 
an encrypted system to let people send messages from 
unknown apps where our safety and security systems 
couldn’t see the patterns of activity. 
These are significant challenges and there are many 
questions here that require further consultation and 
discussion. But if we can implement this, we can give 
people more choice to use their preferred service to 
securely reach the people they want. 
Secure Data Storage 
People want to know their data is stored securely in 
places they trust. Looking at the future of the Internet and 
privacy, I believe one of the most important decisions 
we’ll make is where we’ll build data centers and store 
people’s sensitive data. 
There’s an important difference between providing 
a service in a country and storing people’s data there. As 
we build our infrastructure around the world, we’ve 
chosen not to build data centers in countries that have a 
track record of violating human rights like privacy or 
freedom of expression. If we build data centers and store 
sensitive data in these countries, rather than just caching 
non-sensitive data, it could make it easier for those 
governments to take people’s information. 
Upholding this principle may mean that our 
services will get blocked in some countries, or that we 
won’t be able to enter others anytime soon. That’s a 
tradeoff we’re willing to make. We do not believe storing 
people’s data in some countries is a secure enough 
foundation to build such important Internet infrastructure 
on. 
Of course, the best way to protect the most sensitive 
data is not to store it at all, which is why WhatsApp 
doesn’t store any encryption keys and we plan to do the 
same with our other services going forward. 
But storing data in more countries also establishes 
a precedent that emboldens other governments to seek 
greater access to their citizen’s data and therefore 
weakens privacy and security protections for people 
around the world. I think it’s important for the future of 
the Internet and privacy that our industry continues to 
hold firm against storing people’s data in places where it 
won’t be secure. 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.234 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
Next Steps 
Over the next year and beyond, there are a lot more 
details and tradeoffs to work through related to each of 
these principles. A lot of this work is in the early stages, 
and we are committed to consulting with experts, 
advocates, industry partners, and governments—
including law enforcement and regulators—around the 
world to get these decisions right. 
At the same time, working through these principles 
is only the first step in building out a privacy-focused 
social platform. Beyond that, significant thought needs to 
go into all of the services we build on top of that 
foundation—from how people do payments and financial 
transactions, to the role of businesses and advertising, to 
how we can offer a platform for other private services. 
But these initial questions are critical to get right. If 
we do this well, we can create platforms for private 
sharing that could be even more important to people than 
the platforms we’ve already built to help people share and 
connect more openly. 
Doing this means taking positions on some of the 
most important issues facing the future of the Internet. As 
a society, we have an opportunity to set out where we 
stand, to decide how we value private communications, 
and who gets to decide how long and where data should 
be stored. 
I believe we should be working towards a world 
where people can speak privately and live freely knowing 
that their information will only be seen by who they want 
to see it and won’t all stick around forever. If we can help 
move the world in this direction, I will be proud of the 
difference we’ve made.291 
A. Reaction from Thought Leaders 
Mark Zuckerberg’s blog comments of March 6, 2019 were met with 
considerable reaction from the technology community. The New York Times 
coverage noted that Facebook “plans to start shifting people toward private 
conversations and away from public broadcasting. Mr. Zuckerberg, who runs 
Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger . . . expressed his intention to 
                                                          
291 Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking, FACEBOOK (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking/ 
10156700570096634/. 
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change the essential nature of social media.”292 Journalist Mike Isaac reports, 
“Instead of encouraging public posts . . . [Zuckerberg] would focus on private and 
encrypted communications, in which users message mostly smaller groups of people 
they know. Unlike publicly shared posts that are kept as users’ permanent records, 
the communications could also be deleted after a certain period of time.”293 The Wall 
Street Journal reported that Facebook “will develop products within those messaging 
services—such as payments and e-commerce—that eventually could allow it to 
diversify from the ad-supported business model that led to a number of privacy 
missteps.”294 Jeff Horowitz reports on an interview where Mark Zuckerberg 
described, “the shift as a response to user demand, saying people increasingly prefer 
to communicate in small groups or one-to-one in the style of its WhatsApp 
messaging platform, rather than blasting their thoughts to a public audience, as most 
users do on its Instagram and the company’s flagship Facebook platform.”295 Just 
days after the Zuckerberg blog, Chris Cox, one of the company’s first fifteen 
engineers and Facebook’s Chief Product Officer resigned—and Chris Daniels, 
WhatsApp Vice President has also departed.296 And now, a sampling of reaction 
within days of the Zuckerberg blog post from several technology industry thought 
leaders: 
Christopher Mims 
The Wall Street Journal’s technology writer Christopher Mims writes: “Mark 
Zuckerberg has outlined a new vision for Facebook Inc. that he says is focused on 
privacy. It is a major shift in direction, but it doesn’t mean what you think it 
means.”297 Mr. Mims continues: 
What the Facebook chief executive’s manifesto 
really promises is a more tightly integrated version of 
Facebook’s various apps and services, cloaked in the 
raiments of privacy but, in fact, continuing to operate in 
contradiction to it. Facebook would still gather data from 
its existing sources—the core social network, its 
Instagram app, a web-wide tracking system and countless 
apps that sometimes send the company deeply personal 
                                                          
292 Mike Isaac, Users’ Privacy Is New Focus, Facebook Says: Change by Zuckerberg Follows 
Scandals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2019, at A1. 
293 Id. 
294 Jeff Horowitz, Facebook Pivots to Private Sharing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2019, at A1. 
295 Id. 
296 Mike Isaac, 2 Facebook Leaders Quit, Adding to Churn at Top, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2019, at 
B1; Jeff Horwitz & Georgia Wells, Facebook Executives Exit After Shift in Strategy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 
2019, at A1. 
297 Christopher Mims, Privacy Doesn’t Mean Privacy from Facebook, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9–10, 
2019, at B4. 
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information—but also increasingly from messaging apps. 
These would double as interfaces with businesses and, 
eventually, usurp the functions of our credit cards and 
digital wallets. (He mentioned “payments” in his note 
four times.) 
Mr. Zuckerberg understood long before most of us 
did that the public sharing that made his business so 
successful was a fad. The price he paid for WhatsApp—
$22 billion—seemed like a multiple-zero typo, but now it 
is considered a prescient investment. 
Recent data from Edison Research suggest 
Facebook’s primary social network has lost an estimated 
15 million users since 2017 in the U.S. alone. Most of 
those are in the coveted 12-to-34-year-old demographic. 
Yet Facebook’s most recent quarterly report shows a 
company at the apex of its power, earning record profits 
and growing its overall user base as people shift to 
Instagram and WhatsApp. It’s clear Facebook must 
follow its users to the services they are turning to as 
alternatives to its flagship, and there can be no doubt that 
internal numbers, some of which Mr. Zuckerberg 
referenced, show people devoting more time to 
messaging, small groups and ephemeral posts like 
Instagram stories. 
WhatsApp was Facebook’s quick access into a 
world that has two dominant players occupying very 
different spheres: Tencent’s WeChat and Apple’s 
iMessage. WeChat has become a de facto operating 
system for life in China. While it doesn’t have the 
encryption features that Mr. Zuckerberg described, it has 
all of the revenue-generating services that he covets. . . . 
Belatedly, Mr. Zuckerberg seems to have realized 
that the reputational damage of the Cambridge Analytica 
data breach a half-dozen scandals since could affect his 
company’s bottom line. . . . It’s clear his company intends 
to continue to advertise to us, even on its encrypted 
platforms. . . . 
That Facebook wants to make it possible for 
dissidents to use its services to communicate securely is 
admirable, but must be weighed against the fact that this 
will put even more of the communications on Facebook 
beyond the reach of the company’s own content filters. 
Pivoting to privacy is a neat judo move for Facebook, as 
the company’s former chief security officer Alex Stamos 
observed on Twitter. It allows the company to absolve 
itself of responsibility for the content that passes through 
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its systems, while also allowing it to claim a victory for 
individual freedom.298 
Kara Swisher 
In an op-ed for The New York Times, Kara Swisher observes that Mark 
Zuckerberg’s decision process is data driven.299 Ms. Swisher writes: 
That data shows that the future is not looking good 
for the bloated, oversharing, fake-news spewing, Russian-
infected big blue app. Social media is in big trouble with 
the young and it is long past time for it to shift to a 
privacy-oriented stance that was never part of its DNA, 
except perhaps as a throwaway line in a news release. 
Now Mr. Zuckerberg has written a blog post—with 
not one single trace of irony and with nary a mention of 
the many privacy abuses he has presided over—
announcing that the company would be betting big on the 
private messaging and protected communications for its 
billions of users. 
You know, like snapchat. 
Over the years, Facebook has swiped many nifty 
ideas from Snapchat, the ephemeral messaging 
platform—which Mr. Zuckerberg tried to buy many years 
ago when it was still a start-up. That has been especially 
true at the Facebook-owned Instagram, which did a 
wholesale shoplifting of Snapchat’s Stories by 
creating . . . wait for it. . . Instagram Stories! 
In a podcast interview with me, the Instagram co-
founder and former chief executive Kevin Systrom did 
not even bother to hide the act. He said that he admired 
the creativity of Evan Spiegel, the Snapchat founder, and 
that there was nothing wrong with taking a good idea and 
making it better. . . . 
But this time Mr. Zuckerberg is pilfering so much 
more, sketching out a future business that looks a lot like 
China’s We-Chat mixed in. And, mostly, not at all like 
Facebook. . . . 
One person I spoke with likened Mr. Zuckerberg to 
a captain who has decided not to go down with his ship. 
                                                          
298 Id. 
299 Kara Swisher, Opinion, Facebook Steals a Good Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2019, at SR11. 
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He’s just going to jump to another ship rather than fix the 
first one. And keep on going.300 
Ben Thompson 
Ben Thompson is one of the most prolific and visionary observers of the 
technology scene, through his blog Stratechery,301 The Daily Update,302 and various 
subject-specific podcasts.303 Categorizing Facebook as one of the two Super 
Aggregators (Google is the other one), making “money through ads, and advertisers 
come to Facebook and Google because they want to reach consumers. From an 
advertiser perspective, users—or to be more precise, access to users’ attention—is a 
product they are absolutely paying for.”304 Mr. Thompson has observed: 
First and foremost, regulators need to understand 
that the power of Aggregators comes from controlling 
demand, not supply. Specifically, consumers voluntarily 
use Google and Facebook, and “suppliers” like content 
providers, advertisers, and users themselves, have no 
choice but to go where consumers are. To that end: 
Facebook’s ultimate threat can never come from 
publishers or advertisers, but rather demand—that is, 
users. The real danger, though, is not from users also 
using competing social networks (although Facebook has 
always been paranoid about exactly that); that is not 
enough to break the virtuous cycle. Rather, the only thing 
that could undo Facebook’s power is users actively 
rejecting the app. And, I suspect, the only way users 
would do that en masse would be if it became accepted 
fact that Facebook is actively bad for you—the online 
equivalent of smoking. 
For Facebook, the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
was akin to the Surgeon General’s report on smoking: the 
threat was not that regulators would act, but that users 
would, and nothing could be more fatal. That is because 
the regulatory corollary of Aggregation Theory is that the 
ultimate form of regulation is user generated. 
                                                          
300 Id. 
301 Ben Thompson, Facebook’s Privacy Cake, STRATECHERY (Mar. 7, 2019), https://stratechery 
.com/2019/facebooks-privacy-cake/. 
302 The Daily Update, STRATCHERY, https://stratechery.com/membership/. 
303 Id. 
304 Ben Thompson, Data Factories, STRATECHERY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://stratechery.com/2018/ 
data-factories/?utm_source=Memberful&utm_campaign=6be8b28dc0-weekly_article_12_19_ 
2018&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d4c7fece27-6be8b28dc0-110912269. 
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If regulators, EU or otherwise, truly want to 
constrain Facebook and Google—or, for that matter, all 
of the other ad networks and companies that in reality are 
far more of a threat to user privacy—then the ultimate 
force is user demand, and the lever is demanding 
transparency on exactly what these companies are 
doing.305 
Readers and regulators should benefit from a reading of Mr. Thompson’s full 
analysis of Mr. Zuckerberg’s vision statement, on the website Stratechery. Here is a 
brief summary: 
Look again at what Zuckerberg outlined: 
● Private interactions 
● Encryption 
● Reducing Permanence 
● Safety 
● Interoperability 
● Secure data storage 
The first three are all about owning the 1×1 private 
ephemeral space; critically, none of them have anything 
to do with Facebook’s core feed-based products. 
Facebook is going to continue to exist as it has to date, as 
will Instagram, including all of the data collection and ad 
targeting that currently exist. The “Privacy-Focused 
Vision for Social Networking” is in addition to 
Facebook’s current products, not in place of. This is the 
mistake made by those that took Zuckerberg too 
seriously . . . why wouldn’t Facebook want to move in 
this direction? There are multiple benefits: 
● First, this is a valuable space to own for all of 
the reasons that Snapchat succeeded in the first place. 
People want a place to communicate freely without fear 
of snooping or a historical record. 
● Second, to the extent the rise of 1×1 
networking is inexorable, it is better for Facebook that it 
happen on their properties. Not only does Facebook 
preserve the ability to advertise on privacy-focused 
platforms—the company can leverage data from 
Facebook to advertise in its messaging products (although 
I am skeptical that messaging products are well-suited to 
advertising)—it also prevents would-be competitors from 
capturing leverageable attention. 
                                                          
305 Id. 
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● Third, as we have seen over the last 24 hours, 
there are tremendous PR benefits from a privacy-focused 
service. Facebook has changed nothing about its core 
service or data collection policies, yet the assumption is 
that the company is pivoting and the only debate is 
whether to believe them or not. 
Perhaps most compelling, though, is the degree to 
which this move locks in Facebook’s competitive 
position. . . . Moreover, given Facebook’s focus on end-
to-end encryption, the company has made it that much 
harder to even get off the ground: not even Snapchat is 
fully end-to-end encrypted (pictures are, but not text 
messages). 
There is an even more important benefit to 
Facebook voluntarily forgoing the data within messages 
and limiting the time it keeps surrounding metadata 
(make no mistake, end-to-end encryption is a real thing—
Facebook will not be able to see encrypted messages). . . . 
Why can Facebook deliver most of the value? 
Because they are still Facebook! They still have the core 
Facebook app, Instagram, “Like”-buttons scattered across 
the web—none of that is going away with this 
announcement. They can very much afford a privacy-
centric messaging offering in a way that any would-be 
challenger could not. Privacy, it turns out, is a competitive 
advantage for Facebook, not the cudgel the company’s 
critics hoped it might be. 
Safety, Interoperability, and Strategy Credits 
The last three items in Zuckerberg’s list are 
interesting in their own right; to take them one-by-one: 
Safety: This is about the very real trade-offs that 
come with end-to-end encryption. One obvious issue is 
law-enforcement: . . . when it comes to phone security; 
end-to-end encryption is both more challenging and yet 
simpler, simply because it is, properly implemented, truly 
unbreakable. 
Another issue is misinformation: for all of the 
issues surrounding misinformation on Facebook, at least 
misinformation is traceable; that is not the case if 
messages are encrypted, which has already been an issue 
with WhatsApp in India. One could certainly make the 
cynical argument that, in the process of cloaking itself in 
privacy, Facebook is washing its hands of 
misinformation. 
To be sure, Facebook is confident it can leverage its 
ability to analyze metadata to stop bad actors; that the 
exact same sort of audience analysis is perfectly portable 
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to advertising is a rather happy benefit as far as Facebook 
is concerned. 
Interoperability: This is perhaps the feature that is 
easiest to be cynical about; while it can certainly be 
frustrating to have to balance multiple messaging apps, 
for much of the world consolidating Facebook-owned 
messaging will not fully address the problem, thanks to 
alternatives like Messages, LINE, Kakao, etc. Moreover, 
even in areas where Facebook owns both the Phone (via 
WhatsApp) and the phonebook (via Facebook and 
Instagram), exactly how much consumer demand is there 
for integration? 
There is, to be sure, a business argument: Facebook 
has already unified much of the ad infrastructure 
underlying its services, and unifying messaging is, to the 
extent Facebook wants to build a business platform on 
messaging, a natural next step. There is also a regulatory 
argument: while it is difficult to make the argument that 
Facebook has broken antitrust laws, the remedy, should 
that be accomplished, is obvious—split off Instagram and 
WhatsApp. That will be harder to do if they are fully 
integrated with Facebook, not simply on the advertising 
side but also the user side. 
Secure Data Storage: This is an interesting addition 
to this piece, as it has little to do with messaging in the 
communications sense, but a lot to do with messaging in 
the political sense. . . . 
Privacy Moats 
Ultimately there are three broad takeaways from 
Zuckerberg’s article: 
● Stop expecting companies to act against their 
interests. Facebook isn’t killing their core business 
any[ ]more than Apple, to take a pertinent example, is 
willing to go to the mat to protect user data in China. 
● Facebook doing something that benefits itself 
is not inherently bad for end users. It is perfectly 
reasonable that the company can be instituting genuinely 
user-friendly changes like end-to-end encryption even as 
it furthers its own self-interests. 
● Relatedly, and most importantly, there needs 
to be much more appreciation for the anti-competitive 
trade-offs inherent in an absolutist approach to privacy. 
Facebook is doing what its fiercest critics supposedly 
want, and enhancing its competitive position as a result. 
This was a point I made last year. . . . 
If an emphasis on privacy and the non-leakage of 
data is a priority, it follows that the platforms that already 
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exist will be increasingly entrenched. And, if those 
platforms will be increasingly entrenched, then the more 
valuable might regulation be that ensures an equal playing 
field on top of those platforms. The reality is that an 
emphasis on privacy will only increase the walls on those 
gardens; it may be fruitful to rule out the possibility of 
unfair expansion. 
This is a debate that is woefully lacking. The reality 
is that the only user-friendly way to enforce privacy—
which is another way of saying the only scalable way in a 
demand-driven world—is to severely limit inter-
operability and over-burden would-be challengers. 
Regulators need to be far more aware of this and either 
choose another approach to privacy—i.e. entrust it to 
individuals—or regulate data-platforms, at least in terms 
of competition on top of their platforms, even more 
severely.306 
In summary, Ben Thompson and James Allworth conclude, “this is smart 
strategy from Facebook and it’s dressed-up as addressing privacy concerns . . . but 
they are not really addressing privacy concerns . . . we’re just going to get more of 
what we’ve got and it’s just going to be harder for someone to come along and 
challenge them.”307 
Zeynep Tufekci 
Professor Zeynep Tufekci writes, “Why take seriously someone who has 
repeatedly promised—but seldom delivered—improvements to Facebook’s privacy 
practices?”308 Ms. Tufekci continues: 
This is a company, after all, that signed a consent 
decree with the Federal Trade Commission agreeing to 
improve how it handles the personal information of its 
users, after federal regulators filed charges against it for 
deceiving customers about their privacy. That was about 
seven years ago, and it has been one scandal after another 
since. . . . 
Here are four pressing questions about privacy that 
Mr. Zuckerberg conspicuously did not address: Will 
Facebook stop collecting data about people’s browsing 
behavior, which it does extensively? Will it stop 
purchasing information from data brokers who collect or 
                                                          
306 Thompson, supra note 301; see also Christopher S. Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1147 (2012) (discussing Facebook and antitrust). 
307 Ben Thompson & James Allworth, Mark Zuckerberg’s Projected Self, EXPONENT, 165 (Mar. 3, 
2019), https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/exponent/id826420969?mt=2&i=1000431353735. 
308 Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Zuckerberg’s So-Called Focus on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2019, 
at A27. 
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“scrape” vast amounts of data about billions of people, 
often including information related to our health and 
finances? Will it stop creating “shadow profiles”—
collections of data about people who aren’t even on 
Facebook? And most important: Will it change its 
fundamental business model, which is based on charging 
advertisers to take advantage of this widespread 
surveillance to “micro-target” consumers? . . . 
Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook’s chief operating 
officer, likes to say that the company’s problem is that it 
has been “way too idealistic.” I think the problem is the 
invasive way it makes its money and its lack of 
meaningful oversight. Until those things change, I don’t 
expect any shift by the company toward privacy to matter 
much.309 
Mark Zuckerberg 
And last, in an attempt to weigh the trustworthiness of his March 2019 change 
in strategy, it seems instructive to look at a prior statement by Mr. Zuckerberg, and 
weighing the importance of committing anything you think to email or text. The New 
Yorker reported during 2010 that: 
In another exchange leaked to Silicon Alley Insider, 
Zuckerberg explained to a friend that his control of 
Facebook gave him access to any information he wanted 
on any Harvard student: 
Zuck: yea so if you ever need info about anyone at 
Harvard 
Zuck: just ask 
Zuck: I have over 4000 emails, pictures, addresses, sns 
Friend: what? how’d you manage that one? 
Zuck: people just submitted it 
Zuck: I don’t know why 
Zuck: they ‘trust me’ 
Zuck: dumb fucks310 
                                                          
309 Id. 
310 See Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information 
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057 (2019) (citing Jose Antonio Vargas, The Face of Facebook: 
Mark Zuckerberg Opens Up, NEW YORKER (Sept. 20, 2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2010/09/20/the-face-of-facebook). 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.234 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
XI. GOVERNANCE OF THE FACEBOOK PRIVACY CRISIS 
I had spent a career trying to draw smart conclusions 
from incomplete information, and one day early in 2016 I 
started to see things happening on Facebook that did not 
look right. I started pulling on that thread and uncovered 
a catastrophe. In the beginning, I assumed that Facebook 
was a victim and I just wanted to warn my friends. What 
I learned in the months that followed shocked and 
disappointed me. I learned that my trust in Facebook had 
been misplaced. 
Roger McNamee 
Silicon Valley Investor311 
A. The Dual-Class Stock Issue 
A reasonable question to ask is “What is unique about the governance of 
Facebook that results in this user privacy crisis and complicit role in global election 
meddling? One possibility may be the result over-time from Facebook’s “dual-class 
capital structure, consisting of two classes of shares with differential voting 
rights.”312 Lucien A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel observe that many “U.S. public 
companies—including such well-known companies as CBS, Comcast, Facebook, 
Ford, Google [Alphabet], News Corp., and Nike have dual-class structures. 
Furthermore, since Google decided to use a dual-class structure for its 2004 IPO, a 
significant number of ‘hot’ tech companies have followed. . . .”313 The May 2019 
initial public offering of Uber also featured an entity having a dual-class structure.314 
Facebook provides the following description of its “controlled company” status: 
Because we qualify as a “controlled company” under the 
corporate governance rules for Nasdaq-listed companies, 
we are not required to have a majority of our board of 
directors be independent, nor are we required to have a 
compensation committee or an independent nominating 
                                                          
311 ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE 2 (2019). 
312 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 
VA. L. REV. 585, 587 (2017). 
313 Id. at 591. 
314 Stephen Grocer, A Cheat Sheet for the Hotly Anticipated Uber Public Offering, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 6, 2019, at B3; see also Examining Private Market Exemptions as a Barrier to IPOs and Retail 
Investment 116th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Renee M. Jones, Professor of Law, Boston College Law 
School) (observing, “examples of how badly things can go awry when investors fail to monitor unicorn 
operations can be seen in the histories of Uber, Theranos and other unicorn firms”); Dual-Class Shares: 
A Recipe for Disaster (remarks by Rick Fleming, Inv. Advoc. at the SEC, addressed the practice at the 
ICGN Conf. in Miami) (Oct. 15, 2019); Itai Fiegenbaum, The Controlling Shareholder Enforcement Gap, 
56(3) AM. BUS. L.J. 582 (Apr. 4, 2019). 
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function. In light of our status as a controlled company, 
our board of directors determined not to have a separate 
and independent nominating function and chose to have 
the full board of directors be directly responsible for 
nominating members of our board, and in the future we 
could elect not to have a majority of our board of directors 
be independent or not to have a compensation committee. 
Accordingly, should the interests of our controlling 
stockholder differ from those of other stockholders, the 
other stockholders may not have the same protections 
afforded to stockholders of companies that are subject to 
all of the corporate governance rules for Nasdaq-listed 
companies.315 
Now that we have more than a decade of experience with this form of corporate 
governance, why might this be an important element in the Facebook governance 
failures? Bebchuk and Kastiel write, “Entrenchment insulates controllers 
[Zuckerberg] from the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control that 
otherwise might limit the ability of a poorly performing controller to continue 
leading the company.”316 In addition, “[t]he cost of a dual-class structure are likely 
to increase over time for two main reasons: the likely erosion of any superior skills 
that the controller might have had at the time of the IPO and the likely decrease in 
the controller’s fraction of equity capital.”317 Consider: 
At any given time, the costs of providing a founder 
with a lock on control depends on the likelihood that the 
controller is no longer the most suitable person for this 
role. At the time of the IPO, the founder of a company 
may have the special skills and deep knowledge of a 
specific industry and business to make her uniquely fit to 
be at the helm. Therefore, supporters of dual-class often 
argue that it is preferable to let such a talented controller 
remain in control long after the IPO. 
However, this superior-controller argument does 
not provide a good basis for the use of a perpetual dual-
class structure. While such an argument might justify the 
use of dual-class stock at the IPO stage, it loses most of 
its power with the passage of time. . . . 
Rather, many years after the IPO, there is a real 
possibility that the founder’s superiority as the company 
leader will erode or even disappear. Over time, a once-
successful founder may face natural limitations in a fast-
                                                          
315 2018 Form 10-K, supra note 15, at 27. 
316 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 312, at 602. 
317 Id. at 604. 
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evolving technological or business environment. She 
could also simply lose her golden touch. If the founder 
stops being the most fitting (or even a fitting) leader, the 
expected costs from her lock on control could become 
significant. These expected costs are especially high in 
the case of a young founder: The longer her lock on 
control, the greater the risk that she would become an ill-
fitting leader.318 
Bebchuk and Kastiel write that Facebook “went public in 2012 with a dual-
class structure that placed some limits on the ability of its founder, Mark Zuckerberg, 
to reduce his fraction of equity capital without relinquishing control.”319 Then, a 
reclassification plan was approved because of Zuckerberg’s majority voting power 
in April 2016, “that would have enabled Zuckerberg to sell two-thirds of his 
Facebook shares—reducing his stake of equity capital to about 4% and possibly 
less—without losing his controlling voting power.”320 When faced with a 
shareholder lawsuit, Facebook announced during September 2017, “its decision not 
to proceed with the reclassification plan for the time being. Zuckerberg currently 
continues to face certain limits on his freedom to unload shares without losing his 
control.”321 In looking at dual-class capital structures (like Facebook) Bebchuk and 
Kastiel conclude: 
Over time, the potential benefits of dual-class 
structures can be expected to decline and the potential 
costs to increase. We have also shown that controllers 
have perverse incentives to retain dual-class structures 
even when those structures become substantially 
inefficient. Thus, as time passes from the IPO, there is a 
growing risk that a dual-class structure will become value 
decreasing and that public investors will find themselves 
subject to an inefficient structure with significant 
governance risks and costs. . . . 
Our key contribution . . . is to demonstrate that even 
those who believe that dual-class structures are often 
efficient at the time of the IPO, and the period following 
it, should have substantial concerns about dual-class 
structures that provide perpetual or lifetime control. . . . 
                                                          
318 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 312, at 604 (citing Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, 
Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction 
Review, 169 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 160, 168–69 (2013) (suggesting founders can serve 
as “high-powered” performance monitor). 
319 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO. L.J. 
1453–54 (2019). 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
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Permitting IPOs with a dual-class structure that 
sunsets after a fixed period of time (such as ten or fifteen 
years) unless its extension is approved by shareholders 
unaffiliated with the controller. The case for indefinite 
dual-class structures is untenable. . . .322 
Professor Soshana Zuboff provides the following example of Mr. Zuckerberg’s 
“super voting power to reject a shareholder proposal that would have required the 
company to report on its management of disinformation and the societal 
consequences of its practices. . . .”323 Facebook’s most recent proxy statement lists 
Mark Zuckerberg’s age at 33.324 It is sometimes hard to believe that Mr. Zuckerberg 
was only nineteen years-old when Facebook launched,325 and twenty-seven when the 
company had its successful initial public offering.326 Accordingly, seasoned 
corporate directors and others active in the field of corporate governance might 
question whether Facebook’s current privacy crisis is the result of a controlling 
shareholder who has not had the benefit of serving on and observing high functioning 
boards with independent directors exercising risk management and other best 
practices. Is an explanation for the Facebook privacy crisis as simple as a naive yet 
highly successful young entrepreneur? 
XII. CONCLUSION 
As it stands, the degree to which the allure of advertising revenues blinded 
Facebook to their complicit role in offering access to Facebook users to the highest 
bidder is not fully known. This Article cannot be a complete chapter in the corporate 
governance challenge of managing, monitoring, and oversight of individual privacy 
issues and content integrity on prominent social media platforms. The full extent of 
Facebook’s experience is just now becoming known, with new revelations yet to 
come. All interested parties: Facebook users; shareholders; the board of directors at 
Facebook; government regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and Congress, must now 
figure out what has transpired and what to do about it. 
                                                          
322 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 312, at 631; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The 
Lifecycle Theory of Dual-Class Structures (Dec. 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3300841. 
323 See ZUBOFF, supra note 48, at 511 (citing Hannah Albarazi, Zuckerberg Votes against 
Shareholder Push For Fake News Transparency, CBS SF Bay Area (June 2, 2017), http://sanfrancisco 
.cbslocal.com/2017/06/02/zuckerberg-shareholder-fake-news-transparency. 
324 Facebook 2018 Proxy Statement, supra note 40, at 10. 
325 Tom Huddleston, Jr., Here’s How 19-year-old Mark Zuckerberg described ‘The Facebook’ in 
his first TV interview (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/16/how-mark-zuckerberg-
described-the-facebook-in-his-first-tv-interview.html. 
326 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012) at 95, https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm#toc287954_12. 
